International Space Station Systems Engineering Case Study by Air Force Center for Systems Engineering et al.
Air Force Institute of Technology
AFIT Scholar
AFIT Documents
8-9-2010
International Space Station Systems Engineering
Case Study
Air Force Center for Systems Engineering
Bill Stockman
Joe Boyle
John Bacon
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/docs
Part of the Systems Engineering Commons
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in AFIT Documents by an authorized
administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Air Force Center for Systems Engineering; Stockman, Bill; Boyle, Joe; and Bacon, John, "International Space Station Systems
Engineering Case Study" (2010). AFIT Documents. 27.
https://scholar.afit.edu/docs/27
International Space Station
Systems Engineering Case Study
Dr. Bill Stockman
Joe Boyle
International Space Station
Systems Engineering Case Study
Air Force Center for Systems Engineering
Dr. John Bacon 
Report Documentation Page Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington
VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it
does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 
1. REPORT DATE 
2010 2. REPORT TYPE 
3. DATES COVERED 
  00-00-2010 to 00-00-2010  
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
International Space Station Systems Engineering Case Study 
5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 
5b. GRANT NUMBER 
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 
5e. TASK NUMBER 
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Air Force Institute of Technology,Air Force Center for Systems
Engineering,2950 Hobson Way,Wright Patterson AFB,OH,45433 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER 
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT 
NUMBER(S) 
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 
14. ABSTRACT 
 
15. SUBJECT TERMS 
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 
ABSTRACT 
Same as
Report (SAR) 
18. NUMBER
OF PAGES 
122 
19a. NAME OF
RESPONSIBLE PERSON 
a. REPORT 
unclassified 
b. ABSTRACT 
unclassified 
c. THIS PAGE 
unclassified 
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 
  
 
 
 
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited 
 
 
The views expressed in this Case Study are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of NASA, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, 
or the United States Government. 
 i 
 
FOREWORD 
One of the objectives of the Air Force Center for Systems Engineering (AFCSE) is to 
develop case studies focusing on the application of systems engineering principles within various 
aerospace programs. The intent of these case studies is to examine a broad spectrum of program 
types and a variety of learning principles using the Friedman-Sage Framework to guide overall 
analysis.  In addition to this case, the following studies are available at the AFCSE website. 
■ Global Positioning System (space system) 
■ Hubble Telescope (space system) 
■ Theater Battle Management Core System (complex software development)  
■ F-111 Fighter (joint program with significant involvement by the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense)  
■ C-5 Cargo Airlifter (very large, complex aircraft) 
■ A-10 Warthog (ground attack) 
■ Global Hawk 
■ KC-135 Simulator 
 
These cases support practitioners of systems engineering and are also used in the 
academic instruction in systems engineering within military service academies and at both 
civilian and military graduate schools.  Each of the case studies comprises elements of success as 
well as examples of systems engineering decisions that, in hindsight, were not optimal.  Both 
types of examples are useful for learning.  Plans exist for future case studies focusing on various 
space systems, additional aircraft programs, munitions programs, joint service programs, 
logistics-led programs, science and technology/laboratory efforts, and a variety of commercial 
systems. 
The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to develop and acquire joint complex 
systems that deliver needed capabilities to our war fighters.  Systems engineering is the technical 
and technical management process that focuses explicitly on delivering and sustaining robust, 
high-quality, affordable products.  The Air Force leadership has collectively stated the need to 
mature a sound systems engineering process throughout the Air Force. 
As we uncovered historical facts and conducted key interviews with program managers 
and chief engineers, both within the government and those working for the various prime and 
subcontractors, we concluded that today’s systems programs face similar challenges.  Applicable 
systems engineering principles and the effects of communication and the environment continue 
to challenge our ability to provide a balanced technical solution.  We look forward to your 
comments on this case study and the others that follow. 
 
John Paschall, Col, USAF 
Deputy Director, Air Force Center for Systems Engineering  
Air Force Institute of Technology 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) defines Systems 
Engineering (SE) as an “interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the realization of 
successful systems. It focuses on defining customer needs and required functionality early in the 
development cycle, documenting requirements, and then proceeding with design synthesis and 
system validation while considering the complete problem:  operations, performance, test, 
manufacturing, cost and schedule, training and support, and disposal.”1  This case study on the 
International Space Station considers what many believe to have been the ultimate international 
engineering project in history.2
 Probably more important was the 
significant leap in System Engineering 
(SE) execution that would be required to 
build and operate a multi-national space 
station.    In a short period of time, NASA 
and its partners had to work out how to 
integrate culturally different SE 
approaches, designs, languages and 
operational perspectives on risk and 
safety.      
   The initial plans involved the direct participation of 16 nations, 
88 launches and over 160 spacewalks—more space activities than NASA had accomplished prior 
to the 1993 International Space Station decision.     
The International Space Station 
(ISS) traces its heritage back to early plans 
for the United States Manned Orbiting 
Laboratory (MOL) program to the US 
Skylab, the Shuttle’s Space Lab and then through the multiple Soviet space stations culminating 
in the Mir.  With the successful development and launch of the Space Shuttle, the United States 
was ready to take on a much larger space station concept.   In the fall of 1985, NASA put 
together a plan for a dual-keel design with multiple US, European and Japanese research 
modules along with Canada’s planned Mobile Servicing System.   By 1986, this had changed 
due to the Challenger accident and other safety considerations.    A major new addition was a 
new “lifeboat” vehicle that would accommodate emergency returns to Earth.   All of these 
changes caused the estimated price to double.    By the end of the 1980s, the station design (now 
called Space Station Freedom) had shrunk along with total crew (down to four), electrical power 
generation (from 75 to 56 kw) and for budgetary reasons, there was no defined end-state for the 
station.  By 1990, the modified station cost was several times higher than the original plan.3
By 1993, the station design had continued to evolve and cost estimates continued to 
grow.  The new Clinton administration set up a blue ribbon panel to look at the space station and 
 
                                                 
1 INCOSE website:  http://www.incose.org/practice/whatissystemseng.aspx 
2 “Systems Engineering Challenges of the International Space Station,”  Mark. D. Jenks, 2000 NAE Symposium on 
Frontiers in Engineering. 
3 “Nasa’s Space Station Program:  Evolution of its Rationale and Expected Uses,”  Marcia S. Smith, Congressional 
Research Service, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Science and Space, United States Senate, April 20, 2005. 
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determine a new design that would fit within available budget.   The new design, eventually 
called the International Space Station (ISS), would still be an international effort but would now 
include the addition of Russia as a major contributor of ISS modules and support.    As the 
program progressed and assembly began, costs grew along with schedule delays.    By 2002, 
NASA was looking for a way to significantly reduce costs and to complete the station.   This 
involved the cancellation of a few modules along with the emergency crew return vehicle.    The 
original plan called for 6-7 astronauts full time doing research and this was considered for a 
reduction to 3.4
By 2004, in the aftermath of the Columbia accident, the schedule and budget had grown 
and ISS completion was now scheduled for 2010.   President Bush announced a new NASA 
Vision for Space Exploration which placed less emphasis on the ISS and started development of 
a new fleet of vehicles that someday would go to the Moon, Mars and beyond.   To make the 
budget available for this new effort, the Shuttle would be retired in 2010 with the completion of 
the ISS assembly.    The ISS retirement date was unclear, possibly as early as 2016.    These 
decisions do provide an end state for ISS construction, but raise risk issues about US access to 
the station after Shuttle retirement and before the next generation of US manned orbital vehicles 
will be ready. 
   Estimated cost for completion increased and the schedule slipped with a new 
completion date of 2004.    
Not to downplay the major cost and schedule issues, the systems engineering challenge 
on the ISS was equally monumental.   NASA had to quickly learn how to adapt its SE 
approaches to include an awareness of those of the international partnership.  NASA has its own 
challenges of multiple centers with their own SE differences and approaches.   NASA had to 
learn how to operate as a “managing partner” to accommodate its International Partners (IPs).    
A major effort was involved in developing the partnership agreements, allocating costs and usage 
rights, and determining operational control.   Under the new ISS partnership,5
NASA was concerned about maintaining schedule and cost on the ISS program, because 
failures would not be tolerated by Congress.   Initial program strategy was for no IP to be on the 
critical path, which would allow NASA more control to reduce risk.   As it turned out, however, 
the Russians ended up providing the first two major modules that were at the front of the critical 
path.    
 NASA was the 
first IP among equals, with each board chaired by the NASA representative.  In cases where 
consensus could not be reached, the NASA representative technically had the right to make a 
decision for the board; however, this right was rarely used in practice.   
 
 
NASA had to solve many major SE challenges.   It had to figure out how to coordinate 
and integrate all of the IPs and their highly integrated modules:     
                                                 
4 “Nasa’s Space Station Program:  Evolution of its Rationale and Expected Uses,”  Marcia S. Smith, Congressional 
Research Service, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Science and Space, United States Senate, April 20, 2005. 
5 “Lessons Learned and Recommendations on International Participation from the International Space Station 
Program,” Daniel V. Jacobs and Michael J. See, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Sept. 2004. 
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 The integration challenge was further hindered by a lack of computer and information 
technology capability both at NASA and its partners (especially the Russians).    The ISS 
helped accelerate NASA’s upgrade of its information technology systems and adoption of 
a full email and web focused data exchange system. Within the constraints of federal law, 
NASA had to supply computers and software to the Russians. 
 The Russians had a very different approach to SE, risk, and safety.    The Russians had 
significant on-orbit experience with the MIR and its predecessors, which drove their SE 
approaches.  For instance, they tended to be more conservative and evolutionary in 
design.  A prime example is their Soyuz/Progress vehicle designs, which are directly 
traceable to their 1960s designs. They also utilized an approach that could best be 
described as “dissimilar redundancy”.  In this mode different systems can be utilized to 
provide a basic capability. 
 The ISS design, development and construction began with Space Station Freedom design 
work in the 1980s and are not scheduled to conclude until 2010, with operations 
continuing until 2016 and possibly beyond, requiring NASA to solve major obsolescence, 
logistics, and technology issues.   The length of the program has created major personnel 
challenges as NASA attempts to capture, manage, and create program knowledge while 
dealing with significant career progression issues of its personnel. 
 The on-orbit assembly of the ISS created a major operational configuration challenge.    
Each on-orbit configuration had to operate as a stand-alone space station, requiring 
multiple design baselines for the structure, hardware, and operational systems.   NASA 
basically developed a new version of spiral construction theory. 
 NASA and its IPs had to develop innovative methods to test and verify interfaces. One of 
the most significant of these involved Multi-Element Integrated Testing solutions for the 
station components and then creating a complex test plan and hardware/software solution 
for each configuration. 
 NASA had to develop expertise in supporting its systems engineering approach while 
adjusting to the realities of a complex external environment including international 
politics across many partner nations.    At times, optimal technical solutions conflicted 
with political constraints, and prohibitions created by the Iran, North Korea and Syria 
Non-Proliferation Act, and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). 
Part of this problem was solved by adopting an integrated product team (IPT) approach.  This 
approach was utilized in a broad manner after the 1993 redesign activity.  Its use diminished as 
the design and development phase came to completion. 
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1.0 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES 
1.1 General Systems Engineering Process 
1.1.1 Introduction 
The United States government continues to develop and acquire new systems and to meet 
the scientific needs of our growing nation.  With a constant objective to improve and mature the 
acquisition process, the United States continues to pursue new and creative methodologies to 
purchase these technically complex systems.  A sound systems engineering process (hereafter 
referred to as the SE process), focused explicitly on delivering and sustaining robust, high-
quality, affordable products that meet the needs of customers and stake holders, must continue to 
evolve and mature.  Systems engineering encompasses the technical management process that 
results in delivered products and systems that exhibit the best balance of cost and performance 
with the highest resultant technical integrity.  The SE process must operate effectively with 
desired mission-level capabilities, establish system-level requirements, allocate these down to the 
lowest level of the design, and ensure validation and verification of performance, meeting cost 
and schedule constraints.  The systems engineering process evolves as the program progresses 
from one phase to the next, as do the tools and procedures.  The process also changes over the 
decades, maturing, expanding, growing, and evolving from the base established during the 
conduct of past programs.  Examples can be found demonstrating a systemic application of 
effective engineering and engineering management, as well as poorly applied, but well-defined 
processes.  Throughout the many decades during which systems engineering has emerged as a 
discipline, many practices, processes, heuristics, and tools have been developed, documented, 
and applied. 
Several core lifecycle stages have surfaced as consistently and continually challenging 
during any system program development.  First, system development must proceed from a well-
developed set of requirements.  Secondly, regardless of the evolutionary acquisition approach, 
the system requirements must flow down to all subsystems and lower level components.  And 
third, the system requirements need to be stable, balanced and must properly reflect all activities 
in all intended environments.  However, system requirements are not unchangeable.  As the 
system design proceeds, if a requirement or set of requirements is proving excessively expensive 
to satisfy or becomes otherwise unsupportable, the process must rebalance schedule, cost, and 
performance by changing or modifying the requirements or set of requirements with customer 
concurrence. 
Systems engineering includes making key system and design trades early in the process to 
establish the system architecture.  These architectural artifacts can depict any new system, legacy 
system, modifications thereto, introduction of new technologies, and overall system-level 
behavior and performance.  Modeling and simulation are generally employed to organize and 
assess architectural alternatives at this introductory stage.  System and subsystem design follows 
the functional architecture.  System architectures are modified if the elements are too risky, 
expensive, or time-consuming.  Both newer object-oriented analysis and design and classic 
structured analysis using functional decomposition and information flows/data modeling occur.  
Design proceeds logically using key design reviews, tradeoff analysis, and prototyping to reduce 
any high-risk technology areas. 
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Important to the efficient decomposition and creation of the functional and physical 
architectural designs are the management of interfaces and integration of subsystems.  This is 
applied to subsystems within a system, or across large, complex systems of systems, and requires 
acknowledgement of the human as an integral element of the system.  Once a solution is planned, 
analyzed, designed, and constructed, validation and verification take place to ensure satisfaction 
of requirements.  Definitions of test criteria, measures of effectiveness (MOEs), and measures of 
performance (MOPs), established as part of the requirements process, take place well before any 
component/subsystem assembly design and construction occurs. 
Several excellent representations of the systems engineering process are presented in the 
literature.  These depictions present the current state of the art in the maturity and evolution of 
the systems engineering process.  One can find systems engineering process definitions, guides, 
and handbooks from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, International Council 
on Systems Engineering (INCOSE), Electronics Industrial Association (EIA), Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), International Standards Organization (ISO), and 
various Department of Defense (DoD) agencies and organizations.  They show the process as it 
should be applied by today’s experienced practitioner.  One of these processes, long used by the 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU), is depicted in Figure 1.  It should be noted that this 
model is not accomplished in a single pass.  This iterative and nested process gets repeated to the 
lowest level of definition of the design and its interfaces.  
 
 
Figure 1.  The Systems Engineering Process as presented by the 
Defense Acquisition University 
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The DAU model, like all others, has been documented in the last two decades and has 
expanded and developed to reflect a changing environment.  Systems are becoming increasingly 
complex internally and more interconnected externally.  The process used to develop aircraft and 
other weapons of the past was a process effective at that time.  It served the needs of the 
practitioners and resulted in many successful systems in our inventory.  However, the cost and 
schedule performance records of the past programs are fraught with examples of some well-
managed programs and programs with less than perfect execution.  As the nation entered the 
1980s and 1990s, large DoD and commercial acquisitions were overrunning costs and running 
behind schedule.  The aerospace industry and its organizations were becoming larger and more 
geographically and culturally distributed.  As applied within the confines of a single system or a 
single company the early systems engineering process, was no longer the norm. 
Today, many factors overshadow new acquisitions, including System-of-Systems (SoS) 
context, network centric warfare and operations, and the rapid growth in information technology.  
These factors have driven a new form of emergent systems engineering, which focuses on certain 
aspects of the traditional process.  One of these increased areas of focus resides in the 
architectural definitions used during system analysis.  This process is differentiated by greater 
reliance on reusable architectural views describing the system context and concept of operations, 
interoperability, information and data flows and network service-oriented characteristics. 
1.1.2 Case Studies 
The systems engineering process to be used in today’s complex SoS projects is a process 
matured and founded on the principles of systems developed in the past.  The examples of 
systems engineering used in other programs, both past and present, provide many lessons to be 
used in applying and understanding today’s process. 
The purpose of developing detailed case studies is to support the teaching of systems 
engineering principles. The systems engineering case studies assist in discussion of both 
successful and unsuccessful methodologies, processes, principles, tools, and decision material to 
assess the outcome of alternatives at the program/system level.  In addition, the importance of 
using skills from multiple professions and engineering disciplines and collecting, assessing, and 
integrating varied functional data is emphasized.  Analysis of these aspects will provide the 
student with real-world, detailed examples of how the process plays a significant role in 
balancing cost, schedule, and performance.   
The utilization and mis-utilization of systems engineering principles are highlighted, with 
special emphasis on the conditions that foster or impede good systems engineering practices.  
Case studies should be used to illustrate both good and bad examples of acquisition management 
and learning principles, to include determining whether: 
■ Every system provides a balanced and optimized product to a customer. 
■ Effective requirements analysis was applied. 
■ Consistent and rigorous application of systems engineering management standards 
was applied. 
■ Effective test planning was accomplished. 
■ Effective major technical program reviews were conducted. 
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■ Continuous risk assessments and management adjustments were implemented. 
■ Reliable cost estimates and policies were developed. 
■ Disciplined application of configuration management was demonstrated. 
■ A well-defined system boundary was defined. 
■ Disciplined methodologies were developed for complex systems. 
■ Problem solving methods incorporated understanding of the system within the larger 
environment (customer’s customer). 
The systems engineering process transforms an operational need into a set of system 
elements.  These system elements are allocated and translated by the systems engineering 
process into detailed requirements.  The systems engineering process, from the identification of 
the need to the development and utilization of the product, must continuously integrate and 
optimize system and subsystem performance within cost and schedule to provide an 
operationally effective system throughout its life cycle.  Case studies highlight the various 
interfaces and communications to achieve this optimization, which include: 
■ The program manager/systems engineering interface, which is essential between the 
operational user and developer (acquirer) to translate the needs into the performance 
requirements for the system and subsystems. 
■ The government/contractor interface, essential for the practice of systems engineering 
to translate and allocate the performance requirements into detailed requirements. 
■ The developer (acquirer)/user interface within the project, essential for the systems 
engineering practice of integration and balance. 
The systems engineering process must manage risk, known and unknown, as well as 
internal and external.  This objective specifically focuses on external factors and the impact of 
uncontrollable influences, such as actions of Congress, changes in funding, new 
instructions/policies, changing stakeholders or user requirements or contractor and government 
staffing levels. 
Lastly, the systems engineering process must respond to “Mega-Trends” in the systems 
engineering discipline itself, as the nature of systems engineering and related practices vary with 
time. 
1.1.3 Framework for Analysis 
This case study is presented in a format that follows the learning principles specifically 
derived for the International Space Station, utilizing the Friedman-Sage6
                                                 
6 Case Studies of Systems Engineering and Management in Systems Acquisition, George Friedman and Andrew Sage, Systems 
Engineering, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2004, © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 
 framework to organize 
the assessment of the application of the systems engineering process.  The framework and the 
derived matrix can play an important role in developing case studies in systems engineering and 
systems management, especially case studies that involve systems acquisition.  The framework 
presents a nine row by three column matrix shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1.  Framework of Key Systems Engineering Concepts and Responsibilities 
Concept Domain Responsibility Domain 
 1.  Contractor 
Responsibility 
2.  Shared 
Responsibility 
3.  Government 
Responsibility 
A.  Requirements Definition and Management    
B.  Systems Architecting and Conceptual Design    
C. System and Subsystem Detailed Design and 
Implementation 
   
D.  Systems and Interface Integration    
E.  Validation and Verification    
F.  Deployment and Post Deployment    
G.  Life Cycle Support    
H.  Risk Assessment and Management     
I.  System and Program Management    
 
Six of the nine concept domain areas in Table 1 represent phases in the systems 
engineering life cycle: 
A. Requirements Definition and Management 
B. Systems Architecting and Conceptual Design 
C. System and Subsystem Design and Implementation 
D. Systems and Interface Integration 
E. Validation and Verification 
F. Deployment and Post Deployment 
Three of the concept areas represent necessary process and systems management support: 
G. Life Cycle Support 
H. Risk Assessment and Management 
I. System and Program Management 
While other concepts could have been identified, the Friedman-Sage framework suggests 
these nine are the most relevant to systems engineering in that they cover the essential life cycle 
processes in systems acquisition and the systems management support in the conduct of the 
process.  Most other concept areas identified during the development of the matrix appear to be 
subsets of one of these areas.  The three columns of this two-dimensional framework represent 
the responsibilities and perspectives of government, the contractor, and the shared 
responsibilities between the government and the contractor. 
The Friedman-Sage matrix is not a unique systems engineering applications tool, but 
rather a disciplined approach to evaluate the systems engineering process, tools, and procedures 
as applied to a program.  The Friedman-Sage matrix is based on two major premises as the 
founding objectives: 
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1. In teaching systems engineering, case studies can be instructive in that they relate 
aspects of the real world to the student to provide valuable program experience 
and professional practice to academic theory. 
2. In teaching systems engineering, there has previously been little distinction 
between duties and responsibilities of the government and industry activities.  
More often than not, the government role in systems engineering is the role of the 
requirements developer. 
1.2 ISS Major Learning Principles and Friedman-Sage Matrix 
The authors’ selection of learning principles from the Friedman-Sage matrix is reflected in 
the Executive Summary of this case study (separate attachment). 
The systems engineering of the ISS was necessarily biased towards government-led 
integration, owing to the numerous intergovernmental agreements executed between the US and 
its International Space Station partners. 
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2.0 INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION PROGRAM 
JOURNEY 
2.1 Historical Background 
Humans have always looked up at the sky and imagined 
what it might be like to view the earth from outer space or the 
heavens.  The first recorded reference to a space station as we know 
it today was in a short story7 by Edward Everett Hale entitled “The 
Brick Moon” in 1869. The space station or brick moon was to serve 
as a navigation aid to sailors much as the stars or moon did for 
centuries.  Hale’s space station was not practical, because it was 
constructed of bricks, had no propulsion and its inhabitants could 
actually wave at the ships and jump up and down to make the 
station vibrate as a warning signal.  While not a physicist, he 
identified an early concept to use orbiting satellites to aid in 
navigation—a very crude Global Positioning Satellite (GPS).  
Later, in 19238, Hermann Oberth wrote of space travel to the moon 
and beyond starting from an orbiting “space station”—which was 
the first coining of the term.  He even published the first concept of 
a wheel-like space station.9  In 1952, Dr. Werner von Braun (a 
former student of Oberth) published an important 
article in Colliers magazine about his idea for a 
rotating space station in a 1000-mile high orbit.  In 
1959, the U.S. Army began a study called Project 
Horizon10 to consider building a permanent outpost on the Moon along with a possible space 
station.  The Department of Defense (DoD) began a program called Manned Orbiting 
Laboratory11
                                                 
7 “The Brick Moon,”, Edward Everett Hale, The Atlantic Monthly, 1869 
 (MOL) in December 1963 (Figure 2).  Its purpose was to provide a reconnaissance 
capability to the Air Force and establish the first manned military space program.  The program 
was eventually cancelled in June 1969. 
8 By Rocket to Space, Hermann Oberth, 1923 
9 Frontiers of Space Exploration, Roger D. Lanius, Greenwood Press, 1998 
10 “Project Horizon Report:   A US Army Study for the Establishment of a Permanent Lunar Outpost,” 9 June 1959. 
11 “Best Laid Plans:  A History of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory,” Steven Strom, Aerospace Corporation. 
Figure 2.  US Manned Orbiting Laboratory 
(USAF Image) 
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2.1.1 Soviet Space Stations 
The Soviet Union launched the 
first space station in its early Almaz and 
Soyuz programs.  An early Almaz design 
is shown in Figure 3.  These early space 
stations were developed and built in the 
1964-1977 timeframe. They were 
relatively small and could not be refueled 
or resupplied (other than what the 
arriving crews brought in their small 
Soyuz capsules).  These stations were 
placed in orbit by Proton rockets with the 
crew to follow in Soyuz capsules.  They 
were marginally successful with at least 
five built; one failed to achieve orbit, but 
at least four were occupied by one or 
more crews.  The first successful mission 
occurred in 1971. However, the 
successful docking was overshadowed by 
the deaths of the Soyuz-11 crew due to a 
failed pressure equalization system that 
asphyxiated Georgi Dobrovolski, 
Vladislav Volkov, and Viktor Patsayev 
The second generation of Soviet 
space stations flew from 1977-1985.  
These were slightly larger but had the 
capability to be refueled and resupplied 
by automated Progress capsules—a major 
technological achievement.  As shown in 
Figure 4, the Salyut 6 space station was considerably larger than previous stations and allowed 
for multiple crews and longer missions.  These provided the Soviets with valuable experience in 
extended stays in space providing logistics support and crew transportation to the space stations.  
The third generation Soviet space station was the Mir which was first occupied in 1986 and 
remained in orbit 15 years.  It was 107 feet long by 90 feet wide and weighed an estimated 135 
tons when completed.  The Mir provided valuable research and information on long-term 
habitation in space.  It also became the stepping stone for the ISS and its future crews at the end 
of its operational life. 
Figure 3.  Soviet ALMAZ Space Station 
Figure 4.  Soviet Salyut 6 Space Station 
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2.1.2 Skylab 
The United States launched its first space 
station, Skylab, in 1973 with plans to keep it in 
operation well into the 1980s with support flights 
from the new space shuttle (Figure 5).  It was 
launched on 14 May 1973 and was occupied by 
three separate crews that year.  The original plan 
was to park it in a higher orbit, shut it down and 
then wait for the new Shuttle to resume support 
flights to the station.  Due to unexpected 
dynamics during the first reboost a second 
planned firing was not completed. Due to delays 
in the Shuttle development, the lower orbit and 
a degrading altitude resulting from higher 
than anticipated solar activity; it reentered 
the atmosphere on 11 July 1979. 
As the Shuttle program began launch 
operations in 1981,12
2.1.3 Space Station Freedom 
 it began to take experimental laboratories in its cargo bay into orbit for 
research and experiments—as part of what was called Spacelab.  While not a true space station, 
it allowed the US to conduct research in orbit and develop test equipment for the future space 
stations. 
In 1984, with the Shuttle on track, NASA announced plans for the next stage of space 
exploration to be a space station that would support up to eight full time astronaut scientists.  The 
design and funding changed multiple times during the 1980s and eventually ended up as the 
Space Station Freedom in 1988 with Canada, Europe and Japan onboard as partners. 
2.1.4 Shuttle-Mir Program 
At the end of the first Bush Administration in 1992, the United States and Russia agreed 
to jointly engage in space exploration.13
                                                 
12 “NASA’s Space Station Program:  Evolution of Its Rational and Expected Uses,” Marcia Smith, Congressional 
Research Services, 20 April 2005. 
  At this time the Space Station Freedom was 
transitioning into the International Space Station (ISS), and United States and Russia were 
looking for ways to renew cooperation and benefit from existing space programs.  Often referred 
to as Phase One of the eventual ISS program, the Shuttle-MIR program provided the United 
States access to the MIR and opportunities to engage in long duration space missions and 
experimentation (Figure 6).  Of equal importance to the Russians, it provided an influx of badly 
needed revenue (in excess of $400M) to continue and expand the MIR program. 
13 Russian Federation Agreement Between The United States Of America And The Russian Federation Concerning Cooperation In The 
Exploration And Use Of Outer Space For Peaceful Purposes (Signed at Washington D.C. on June 17, 1992, Proclaimed on June 17 , 1992) 
Figure 5.  US Skylab Space Station 
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Figure 6.  US Shuttle Docked with the Russian MIR Space Station 
The initial cooperative program negotiated in 1992 had a single American astronaut 
visiting the MIR and two cosmonauts joining a Shuttle mission.  By 1993, the United States had 
announced revised plans for ISS, and the program was expanded.  The new program allowed the 
United States to invest in the MIR construction which allowed for the launch and integration of 
new modules, the Spektr and the Priroda.14
The program began in February 1994 with the inclusion of Cosmonaut Sergei Krikalev 
on board STS-60 for a nine-day Shuttle mission.  The first Shuttle mission to MIR came in 1995, 
and Shuttle support ended in 1998.  During this time, seven astronauts performed long duration 
flights on the MIR (up to six months) which provided valuable information for systems 
engineering (SE) requirements generation of the ISS.  They also spent significant time in Russia 
training and working with the Russian system engineering staff. 
  Both were modules previously begun prior to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and both had initially been designed to accommodate some military 
missions (surveillance).  While NASA had little to do with the design of the MIR, it did allow 
NASA to research the long term effects of micro-gravity on astronauts, gain experience on 
spacewalks, allow testing and research of new equipment, gain valuable experience in docking 
(Shuttle and Soyuz capsules with MIR) and learn critical lessons about day to day operation of 
long term space assets in orbit. 
While the program is hailed as a major success and valuable source of data for the ISS, 
much of the valuable information was learned the hard way.  Although it would be incorrect to 
                                                 
14 In the mid-1990s with the return of US-Russian cooperation in space, NASA agreed to provide funds to complete 
the Spektr and Priroda modules in exchange for having 600 to 700 kg of US experiments installed. 
  
11 
 
say that the missions were totally successful and the US experience was flawless, it painted a 
clear picture of the risks involved in international space stations and their development.15
 The marriage of NASA with the Russian space program felt to many to be a 
forced marriage at best in the beginning.  It was a major cultural shock for the 
NASA astronauts, engineers and managers to integrate with the former Soviet 
bureaucracy and its systems engineering establishment.  Information was power 
in the Russian system, so documentation and sharing of information was 
constrained.  The Russians had similar difficulties learning and understand the 
engineering techniques and emphasis of their American counterparts. 
 
 Although NASA had significant experience in multi-national projects the level of 
support and integration required to form the partnership with Russia was 
overwhelming.  This was exacerbated by the condition of emergence from the 
Soviet era and the mammoth political and economic change occurring in Russia.  
 In most NASA international projects English was the primary language of the 
project.  With the initiation of the Russian partnership that was the accepted 
principle however it was not practical to have English as the primary language. 
Most of the NASA professionals couldn’t speak Russian and few Russians spoke 
English, which caused communication problems across the board—even with 
interpreters. In addition to basic language, the teams needed to agree on a 
fundamental engineering and project management lexicon.  
 In the difficult economic environment of the mid-1990’s in Russia, the Russian 
space industry was encouraged to seek “off-budget” resources. This also evolved 
into unique payment scenarios where cosmonauts were compensated for specific 
mission tasks. This raised significant differences in approach to crew operations 
and at times caused confusion in plans and motivations for activities. 
 In 1997, an oxygen-producing canister (the same as being proposed for the ISS) 
caught fire aboard the Mir Space Station due to a quality problem during 
production (apparently a piece of latex glove was accidently left in the canister16
                                                 
15 DragonFly:   NASA and the Crisis Aboard MIR, Bryan Burrough, Harper Collins Publishers. 
).  
The resulting fire and smoke seriously compromised the station’s environment 
and scalded one of the cosmonauts, who attempted to put it out with a water-
based fire extinguisher.  
16 “Latex Glove Sparked Fire Aboard MIR Space Station”, Michael Brooks, The Guardian, 1997. 
  
12 
 
 Also in 1997, the Russians 
experimented with a manual docking 
system for the Progress in hopes that 
it would allow them to avoid using 
an expensive automated system that 
had proven successful on past 
missions.  On one attempt, they lost 
control of the Progress and it barely 
missed the station.  A few months 
later, they attempted a similar 
experiment and this time the 
Progress hit the station and 
punctured the Spektr module.  This 
caused significant damage, a total 
loss of power and control and initial 
decompression (Figure 7). Note that 
partial power, control, and cabin 
pressure were later recovered and 
did not affect crew survivability. 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Space Station Freedom Redesign 
On June 17, 1993, President Clinton announced17
2.2.1 Budget 
 that he was accepting the advice of a 
special blue ribbon panel and directing NASA to downsize the planned Space Station Freedom 
(SSF) to save budget. He directed NASA to work with the US’s International Partners (IP) to 
develop this reduced cost, scaled down version of the original Space Station Freedom.  By the 
end of 1993, the space station had a new preliminary design and the partners had invited Russia 
as a major contributor and partner.  The name Space Station Freedom had been dropped and it 
became the International Space Station.  
The primary reason driving the redesign of the Space Station Freedom was escalating 
cost and a desire by the Administration and Congress to reduce NASA’s budget.  At the time in 
1993, the cost to design build and launch SSF was $31B with estimated operational costs of 
$100B over its 30-year lifespan.18
                                                 
17 “Space Station Redesign Decision Reduces Costs, Preserves Research, Ensures International Cooperation,” 
Executive Office of the President news release, 17 June 1993 
  The new station, chosen by President Clinton, had an 
18 “NASA Unsure If Redesigned Space Station Is Viable,” by Warren E. Leary, The New York Times, April 23, 
1993. 
Figure 7.  Damage to the Soviet MIR 
from Docking Accident   
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estimated cost of $12.8B over the first five years (develop/launch) and $16.5B for operational 
costs during deployment and a reduced lifespan of just ten years after its assembly in space.19  At 
this point in time, SSF had already cost $9B and it was hoped much of its technology and 
systems could be reused on the new design. An additional but enormously significant constraint 
was the direction from the Administration that the ISS program spending profile would be 
essentially flat, capped at $2.1 B per year, during its development.20
Despite the redesign and its presidential support, the station’s future was still in jeopardy.  
Just weeks after the report of the redesign team the ISS barely survived a cancellation vote in the 
Congress by a single vote.  Over the next several years, the program would continually face 
cancellation votes.  Although the margin of victory continued to climb, the level of 
Congressional interaction was a large drain on program resources. 
 [Note that for large 
government funded efforts, not only are technical issues the causal factor of cost growth, but 
when the funding profile or “phasing” does not meet the planned profile, the cost tends to grow 
and the schedule likely slips.  Thus it is not just the amount of funding, but when the project 
receives it.] As a program management challenge, incorporating a traditional development 
funding curve in a flat profile would drive the ISS program in many ways. 
2.2.2 Studies/Review Panels 
Underestimates by NASA of the station program's cost and unwillingness by Congress to 
appropriate funding for the space station resulted in delays of Space Station Freedom’s design 
and construction; it was repeatedly redesigned and rescoped. Between 1984 and 1993 it went 
through seven major re-designs, losing capacity and capabilities each time.  In January 1993, 
Vice President Dan Quayle provided the outgoing President Bush with the annual report on the 
US Space Program.21
On March 9, 1993, President Clinton directed the formation of the Advisory Committee 
on the Redesign of the Space Station.  Their task was to spend 90 days to redesign the space 
station with the goal of reducing costs while still retaining research capability.  At the same time, 
NASA formed a team of 45 top NASA engineers and administrators along with 10 
representatives from the International Partners to do the actual designs.   The NASA team was 
directed to develop three options that met budget goals, provided technical and scientific 
capability, and reduced NASA management and operation costs.  The three options, A, B, and C 
were targeted to different development budget targets. Option A kept much of the Freedom 
design but added an existing large spacecraft bus as an initial building block.  Option B was an 
optimized version of the Space Station Freedom design, Option C was a major deviation that 
  It generally supported the Space Station Freedom and gave it the go-ahead 
to continue development.  However, with a new administration a few weeks later, things changed 
dramatically.  Space exploration had been a major emphasis area of President Bush and his 
predecessor, President Reagan.  The new democratic administration had a different set of 
priorities and saw a need to reallocate the federal budget. 
                                                 
19 “Space Station Will Not Be Cancelled,” Audrey Leath, American Institute of Physics, June 18, 1993. 
20 A flat funding profile while simple from a budget viewpoint, has little correlation with the actual development and 
production requirements.    It causes the program managers to make sub-optimal decisions which normally result in 
schedule delays and cost increases. 
21 “Final Report to the President on the US Space Program,” The National Space Council, January 1993. 
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utilized a very large core module similar to the Skylab.  This option would require a new Shuttle-
C launch vehicle to lift the Station core.  The team recommended Option A as the best solution 
and that became the basis of negotiations with Russia.  Over time and with the addition of Russia 
many of the aspects of the Option A were dropped.  The ISS today is much more the Freedom 
configuration. 
2.2.3 Changes from SSF to ISS 
2.2.3.1 International Partners and Management 
The Reagan plan for the Space Station Freedom intended that it would be a permanently 
crewed space station built by the US, operated by the US, but with added capabilities from its 
IPs.22
With the new program and its IPs, the US did retain its role as the integrator (with Boeing 
as the prime US Contractor), but the IPs were responsible for the development and long term 
support of their modules and were now major investors and equal partners in the ISS.  In fact the 
management of the ISS has been devised in the Memorandums of Understanding (MOU’s) to 
utilize bilateral relationships to facilitate the development of the elements and a multilateral 
framework to integrate the overall operations of the ISS. In the multilateral framework the stated 
goal was consensus decision making although the US was empowered to make decisions if no 
consensus could be reached. As the configuration evolved, the IP contributions (particularly 
those from the Russians) became increasingly more important to the critical path of ISS 
assembly.  This situation required a much more integrated plan of testing, assembly and 
operations.  It also led to schedule impacts as partners had budget and development challenges. 
  The US goal would be that the IPs would not be on the critical path and their contributions 
would be enhancements.  As the definition of the ISS assembly task grew it became obvious that 
the Canadian Canadarm2 would play a critical role in the station operations and assembly.  The 
initial invitation to participate from President Reagan was to the US Allies.  This invitation was 
answered by Europe  (the European Space Agency, ESA), Japan (NASDA, later renamed JAXA) 
and Canada The Canadian Space Agency (CSA).  
Under the new ISS,23
                                                 
22 “Structuring Future International Cooperation:  Learning from the ISS,”  L. Cline, P. Finarelli, G. Gibbs, I. Pryke,  
 NASA was essentially the managing partner, with each board 
chaired by the NASA representative.  In cases where consensus could not be reached, the NASA 
representative had the right to make a decision for the board; however, this right was rarely used 
in practice.  Nothing in the ISS arrangements conferred upon NASA the right or ability to 
compel another IP to take specific actions against its interests; therefore, occasions were rare in 
which it was efficacious for NASA to make unilateral decisions.  This was a significant 
challenge to the systems engineering process, as NASA had to negotiate processes with 
individual partners and across the entire partnership.  In a systems engineering aspect several 
architectural decisions were successfully implemented across most of the elements.  Since the 
partnership agreement with Russia allowed the use of existing or heritage equipment some of 
those architectural agreements were not extended to the Russian elements.  
23 “Lessons Learned and Recommendations on International Participation from the International Space Station 
Program,” Daniel V. Jacobs and Michael J. See, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Sept. 2004. 
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The inclusion of the Russians brought major changes.  Several changes were cultural, 
since the Russian approach to space systems, engineering and operations was different than that 
of the US and its contractors. The source of the differences came with respect to approaches to 
systems design.  Basically, the Russians tended to employ a very evolutionary approach that 
drew heavily on heritage designs, whereas NASA and ESA engineers were much more inclined 
toward clean sheet designs which incorporate latest technologies.  So, there were differences in 
the details of the respective systems engineering approaches driven by these distinctive 
approaches to systems design. Furthermore, the other IPs, foreign countries with different 
languages, operated more like the US.  Many of their engineers and managers were US-trained 
and educated, and their aerospace firms had worked on US projects or with US contractors.  That 
was not the case with the majority of the Russian government and private contractors.  Most of 
the Russian contractors were cold war remnants of the Soviet Union and were struggling to 
remain in business.  Furthermore, most of their engineers had little contact with western firms or 
practices—despite some contact through professional organizations and journals.  Finally, the 
Russians as a new team member did not integrate as easily as European, Canadian, or Japanese 
partners, who had worked with NASA for years. 
2.2.3.2 Orbit 
A major change for the ISS was the decision to place the station in a 51.6 degree orbit, 
the inclination the Russians achieve by launching due east from Baikonour.  Prior launches from 
the Kennedy Space Center were frequently at an inclination of 28.5 degrees to the equator 
(which allows for the maximum delta-v imparted to the launch vehicle by the rotation of the 
Earth due to a due east launch), though the Shuttle had flown several different inclinations prior 
to the ISS flights.  This orbit provided safe launches over water into an orbit that the Soviets 
could not reach without incurring a substantial payload penalty.  Changing the orbital inclination 
to 51.6 degrees allowed the Russian launch facilities to provide support to the ISS.  
At the time, NASA was sensitive that future groundings of the Shuttle fleet due to 
accidents (Challenger had just occurred in 1986) would severely impact the ISS, and the possible 
use of a Russian capsule for rescue or backup crew transport was a valuable asset to bring to the 
team.  The downside to this option was the reduction of Shuttle lift capability (almost 11,500 
pounds out of its maximum capability of 55,000 pounds).  Later the Shuttle program regained 
much of this lift through the development of a “super lightweight” version of the Shuttle 
External Tank and other weight savings options. This dissimilar redundancy of launch vehicle 
was validated with the future repeated use of the Progress and Soyuz vehicles after the Columbia 
accident and the grounding of the Shuttle fleet in 2003.  Fourteen successive Russian crew and 
supply missions reached the ISS before the shuttle returned to flight. 
Changing the orbital inclination was a huge SE challenge.  It impacted key ISS design 
elements such as power and thermal subsystems, orbital debris protection, and STS operations. 
Moreover, none of the subsystems were redesigned to maximize operation in the new orbit. The 
decision was taken that in order to save design costs, much of the hardware designed for a 28 
degree orbit would be flown ‘as is’ in the higher-inclination orbit. The change increased the 
number of assembly flights, restricted launch windows throughout the year and per launch 
opportunity. Changing the orbital inclination was a major decision that ended up being 
negotiated at the Vice Presidential Level (Al Gore and Viktor Chernomyrdin). This decision 
salvaged much of the design up to that point, but created major operational complexities that are 
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still being experienced today, and that indeed drive the size and cost of the workforce needed to 
operate and maintain the ISS. 
2.3 NASA Systems Engineering Environment 
2.3.1 NASA Management Approach 
NASA had the task of leading a sixteen-country international team through the ISS 
system development, module production, visiting vehicle fleet scheduling and integration, on-
orbit construction, and the long-term station operation.  Each agency negotiated and signed 
detailed agency-specific Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) that defined partner 
contributions, payments for support, and operational responsibilities.  Operational control of the 
ISS in entirety was to be enabled from Houston and Moscow, while control of payloads and 
some partner module systems were planned for partner auxiliary sites such as St. Hubert and 
Huntsville. As shown in Figure 8,24 multiple control centers and launch sites are in use. 
 
Figure 8.  NASA and International Partner Operations Scope 
In order to appreciate the effectiveness of the post 1993 Space Station redesign 
management approach, a brief background of the Space Station Freedom period is useful. The 
original structure of the Space Station Freedom systems engineering effort involved several 
“levels”.  The Freedom engineering hierarchy was organized as much for political/congressional 
funding reasons as for any other reason, and this structure led to significant integration issues, 
due to its wide geographic spread and the decoupled nature of the financial oversight of the 
                                                 
24 “Final Report of the International Space Station Independent Safety Task Force,”   February 2007 
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program.   Level 1 was housed at NASA headquarters in Washington, DC. It was not directly 
involved in the day-to-day engineering effort, and instead handled most of the political interfaces 
and the highest-level program funding decisions.  Level 2 was a specially created NASA center, 
housed in leased office space in Reston Virginia, separate from both HQ and the NASA field 
centers. Level 2 was explicitly designed to be a systems engineering center for the Freedom 
program.  However, Level 2 was not empowered to control budgets of individual project offices 
(the work packages) at the field centers, thus it had virtually no leverage over the engineering 
projects it was supposed to integrate.   
Level 3 handled the detailed engineering of the subsystems and the modules.  Each 
subsystem and each module had a system development manager (SDM) and a system integration 
manager (SIM).  The power generation system was assigned to the Lewis (later renamed Glenn) 
Research Center, the environmental control and life support system was assigned to Marshall 
Space Flight Center (MSFC), most other systems and subsystems were assigned to the Johnson 
Space Center, the integration of the modules and payload accommodations were assigned to the 
Marshall Space Flight Center, and the special dexterous human-like robotic system called the 
Flight Telerobotic Servicer (FTS) was assigned to the Goddard Space Flight Center.  There was 
tremendous political pressure to have major responsibilities assigned in the different 
congressional districts: thus it was ambiguous in many cases to know who was actually in 
charge. 
As an example of the confusion that could ensue from such organizational structure, 
consider the distribution of electrical power. The secondary power system was managed at JSC 
as a subsystem.  Its interface with payloads occurred at the interface to racks within the US lab 
and inside modules developed by ESA and by NASDA (later named JAXA).  The control of the 
power distribution was accomplished through the data management system (DMS) architected at 
JSC, but programmed in the individual field centers in individual Tier 1 controllers (more on 
Tier 1 later). At varying meetings, it was claimed that the command and control of the power 
management at the payload rack interface was the responsibility of the power subsystem team, 
the payloads team, the lab module team, and the data management team.  Contractors working 
for the payloads community developed the obligatory Payloads to Electrical Power Subsystem 
(EPS) Interface Requirements Document (IRD).  At the same time, contractors working on the 
power subsystem developed the Electrical Power Subsystem to Payloads Interface Requirements 
Document. Neither was developed with the cooperation of the other contractor or center. The 
Lab team developed IRDs to both groups that encapsulated the electrical interface control with 
the Lab control processor in charge.  The Data Management System (DMS) team developed 
independent IRDs to the Lab, to payloads, and to EPS, and they in turn developed independent 
IRDs to the DMS, with such routine matters as closing electrical circuits as one of the major 
functions of the interface.  
Worse, in the early days of Freedom, the contract structure required that the contractors 
deliver such documents by certain drop dates.  The technical maturity of such contractually 
mandated books was not specified in the delivery dates: only the structure of the document and 
key contractually-mandated legal text was specified.   Thus, scores of such IRDs flowed around 
the program with boilerplate preamble text and acronym lists, sandwiched around technical 
sections that were largely filled with “TBD”.  It was easy to get decoupled, and to stay that way 
for long periods.  Level 2 had no power to order the elimination or merging of any duplicate 
documents.  From the scant technical content that did emerge from the myriad boilerplate 
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documents, the emerging command and control team found at least seventeen command names 
for the act of activating a switch, including command names such as “On”, “Toggle”, “Enable” 
“Switch”, “Power”, “Power ON”, and “Set On”. 
The concept of Level 2 and work-packages exemplified how not to conduct systems 
engineering on a complex system. As exemplified above, the Level 2 management had no 
control, specifically budgetary control, over the Level 3 Work Packages. “Influence” proved not 
to be a sufficient integrating lever. It was clear at that point that a single lead center with 
designated program management authority and control as well as resident engineering 
horsepower was an absolute necessity on a program this large, complicated and multi-national.  
The Johnson Space Center became the lead program management and SE center following the 
1993 redesign (the post-Space Station Freedom era). In that role, they are supported by Boeing, 
who served as the integrating contractor and prime support contractor.   Boeing has procured and 
developed several of the key modules and systems.  Boeing also provides overall hardware-
software integration and sustaining engineering.  Along with Boeing are hundreds of large and 
small contractors providing key subsystems, technical supports and logistics services.  Within 
NASA, these contractors are engaged through normal contracting channels and participation on 
Integrated Product Teams (IPTs).  
Boeing played a critical role on this team as the lead system engineer for the program.  
Boeing provided the experience to co-lead the IPTs with NASA and execute the SE management 
that was a major challenge on this program due to the multi-partner integration.  It was a 
challenging role, since Boeing could not officially negotiate with other countries and often had to 
provide the technical lead while NASA provided official signature on detailed international 
agreements known as “Protocols”. 
The overall Program team is managed through an ISS Control Board Structure, as shown 
in Figure 9.  The ISS team uses top-level control boards and panels to manage the ISS hardware 
and software configuration along with any operational products.  At the very top of the process is 
the Space Station Control Board (SSCB) that manages the multilateral control of the 
configuration.  A NASA Space Station Program Control Board exercises control over the several 
layers of more detailed ISS subsystem control boards associated with the US elements.  This 
process is also integrated with the Space Shuttle control boards. Each partner utilizes a similar 
control mechanism for their elements. 
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Figure 9.  Systems Engineering Integration Boards 
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2.3.2 NASA Center Approaches 
NASA has 10 major centers within its organization and in theory they are of one mind on 
systems engineering as it relates to major projects.  As an agency, NASA maintains Systems 
Engineering process guidance and good practices as documented in its NASA System 
Engineering Handbook.25
In a 1969 speech prior to the ISS and prior to becoming NASA Administrator,
  Despite this set of agency-level process requirements, the 
interviewees commented that each NASA center had a legacy systems engineering (SE) process 
that was at times, slow to conform to the agency approach.  Additionally, several reported that 
the SE processes were driven by the lead SEs, who tended to dominate the resident programs.  
The approaches are also different based on the systems being developed and operated, which 
allows for a tailoring of the approach.  In the case of the ISS, this was exacerbated by the 
inclusion of the international partners whose SE approaches differed significantly. 
26
“I believe that the fundamental difficulty is that we have all become so entranced 
with technique that we think entirely in terms of procedures, systems, milestone 
charts, PERT
 Robert 
Frosch commented on strict adherence to mandated SE techniques and bureaucracy: 
27
2.3.3 System Engineers and the Experience Chain 
 diagrams, reliability systems, configuration management, 
maintainability groups and other minor paper tools of the ‘system engineer’ and 
manager.  We have forgotten that someone must be in control and must exercise 
personal management, knowledge and understanding to create a system. . . . 
Systems, even very large systems, are not developed by the tools of systems 
engineering, but only by engineers using tools.” 
A major issue of any program, especially one like the ISS going on two decades, is how 
to recruit, develop, and retain quality system engineers.  In fact, NASA’s human spaceflight 
programs are usually generational programs.  NASA has to manage the workforce over decades 
while ramping up for new programs, maintaining ongoing programs and shutting down long-
term programs.  In the ISS case, the challenge is especially difficult.    
 The initial workforce was a mix of experience, some dating all the way to Apollo, 
Skylab and Apollo-Soyuz.  Most of the staff, however, came from the Space 
Shuttle, Space Station Freedom, and Shuttle-Mir programs.  While the ISS 
program has been relatively successful to date, it has been under constant attack 
due to its schedule and budget issues, along with competition from other 
programs (inside and outside of NASA).  This does not create a stable long-term 
work environment for some engineers. 
 Many of the engineers desire career progression either in management or to other 
technical areas or programs.  This tends to encourage engineers to leave the 
                                                 
25 NASA System Engineering Handbook,   NASA/SP-2007-6105 
26 “A Classic Look at Systems Engineering,”  Bob Frosch, Asst. Secretary of the Navy for RDT&E, speech to the 
IEEE Group on Aerospace and Electronic Systems their international conference in New York, 26 March 1969. 
27 PERT is Program Evaluation Review Technique 
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program and seek other opportunities.  This is particularly exacerbated in very 
long term programs like the ISS.  
 While not unique to ISS, over the program’s history, many of the traditional 
NASA government positions and areas of responsibility have been absorbed by 
contractors in attempts to reduce cost.  While this study does not allege any 
difference between a practicing government SE as opposed to a contractor SE—
there is a difference driven by job descriptions and responsibilities.  As the 
government SEs/engineering positions decline, the remaining personnel have less 
opportunity to “start at the bottom” and do detailed engineering over a full career.  
Rather, they often see their administrative and management responsibilities leave 
them little opportunity to learn and to hone their engineering skills.  At the same 
time, more and more of the engineering and system engineering responsibilities 
are assigned to the contractor.  This makes it very difficult for the government SE 
to gain in-depth SE experience. 
 During the space station redesign a decision was made to dramatically modify the 
systems engineering and integration aspect of the program.  Rather than the 
Freedom model of the government team (with a support contractor) providing 
SE&I, the team recommended selecting a single prime contractor to manage those 
functions across the multiple US elements and to provide support to the 
integration with the partners. This change was based on the potential cost savings 
but also to simplify what the panel felt was a confusing organizational structure 
and diffuse accountability.  Depending on the level of the division of labor 
between NASA and the Prime this can lead to dissatisfaction with engineers who 
desire a more “hands on” level of participation in the SE process. Although it may 
depend on who you ask, with many NASA ISS engineers believing that the IPT 
structure made the system a bit more “badge-less” between the Prime and the 
government. 
Multiple studies have researched the traits that make a good systems engineer and the 
environment that is required to nurture them.  A recent study28 from the Aerospace Corporation29
1. Componential element:  this element describes those aspects that are considered in 
systems thinking, such as systems objectives, elements, and domain.  This considers 
components such as political, organizational, economic and technical.
  
investigated why certain organizations were able to develop a steady stream of qualified systems 
engineers.  In this study, Dr. Davidz identified five foundational elements that support a system 
engineering development environment: 
30
                                                 
28 “Developing the Next Generation of Systems Engineers” by Dr. Heidi Davidz, Aerospace Corporation 2006 
 
29 Aerospace Corporation is a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) for the United States Air 
Force and the National Reconnaissance Office to support all national-security space and missile programs.   
They have provided independent technical and scientific research, development, and advisory services to national-
security space and missile programs since 1960. 
30 “Enabling Systems Thinking to Accelerate the Development of Senior Systems Engineers” PhD Dissertation, Dr. 
Heidi Davidz, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2006. 
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2. Relational element:  this element addresses the connections, interactions and 
interdependencies within the system or system of systems. 
3. Contextual element:  this element addresses the nested and embedded natures of systems 
4. Dynamic element:  this element links systems in time to the future and past, to include 
aspects such as feedback, uncertainty, risk and programmatic “ilities.”   
5. Modal element:  this element aids with understanding and comprehension of the system 
and is the “how of systems thinking.” 
 A NASA sponsored study31
2.3.4 Systems Engineering Challenges of the ISS 
 focused on 38 successful, highly regarded mid-level 
system engineers across the NASA Centers.  Despite the wide dispersal at different centers with 
different SE environments, the engineers demonstrated the same basic highly effective 
behaviors.  These behaviors fell into five broad categories:  leadership, attitudes and attributes, 
communication, problem solving and systems thinking, and technical acumen.    
The massive scope of budget, schedule, and technical goals of the ISS was daunting 
compared to previous space projects.  It is one of the largest international programs in modern 
times directly involving sixteen nations, well over 100 launches and almost 200 space walks 
before the station will be completed.  From the beginning, the team members were aware that 
they faced three major system engineering challenges32
1. 
: 
Extended Development Cycle
Over a long period of time, public and Congressional support can diminish, which 
puts incredible pressure on the team to make sure everything works—since 
failures are often rewarded with termination. As mentioned earlier the ISS 
program faced many cancellation votes in the Congress.  Key analysts and 
engineers are also looking for challenges and the opportunity to work on a broad 
number of programs, so knowledge management and experience retention are 
serious issues. 
:  The NASA team started on the initial space 
station program back in the 1984 time frame, then went through several changes 
before becoming the ISS in 1994.  Initial modules weren’t launched until late 
1998 with final assembly not scheduled until about 2010.    Final shutdown of the 
station is no earlier than 2016.  This creates an incredible burden of handling 
engineering staffs, knowledge retention and training, management, government 
transitions, budget fluctuations, technology maturation and obsolescence. 
2. Test and Verification
                                                 
31 “NASA Systems Engineering Behavior Study,” Christine Williams (NASA HQ) and Mary-Ellen Derro (JPL), 
October 2008. 
:  Due to the long development and build phases (not to 
mention the structural and size issues of the ISS), it is infeasible to test the entire 
ISS on the ground prior to launch.  The first modules were on orbit prior to the 
completion of later modules.  The modules and subcomponents must have high 
32 “Systems Engineering Challenges of the International Space Station,” Mark. D. Jenks, 2000 NAE Symposium on 
Frontiers in Engineering. 
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reliability and be able to work immediately, since on-orbit repair options are often 
limited.  As discussed later, new system test procedures were developed to allow 
for multi-element integrated testing.  Other parts are designed for space (such as 
the solar panels) and thus can’t be deployed on the ground for system checks 
without damaging them or required expensive special test fixtures.  As will be 
explored later, there is the not-so-trivial issue that several modules were made by 
the International Partners using different system engineering approaches with the 
goal of meeting integration standards.  Most of these modules never physically 
mated until they were in low Earth orbit. Finally, a major issue is that the ISS 
must be flight ready with the first module and then with the addition of each new 
module or sub-system, operate on its own as a new independent space vehicle. 
3. Infrastructure Scale and Complexity:
2.3.5 Systems Engineering Process 
  The infrastructure needed to house the 
program offices, engineering staffs, production facilities, and integration and test 
facilities is huge and represents a worldwide investment.  NASA made a large 
investment at the Kennedy Space Center to perform these functions and to stage 
major ISS subsystems and parts.  The infrastructure just for the launch vehicles 
and their support structure is a multi-billion dollar effort.  The ISS relied initially 
on the Shuttle and the Russian launch capabilities—all major programs 
themselves. Eventually European and Japanese launch capabilities are also 
utilized.  
The ISS used a system engineering process33
(1) The ISS is a time-phased development -- the build schedules for the ISS components 
are driven by the launch schedule, which was initially spread over a five year period 
(ultimately took 12 years including the Shuttle downtime from the Columbia 
accident.). 
 based on the classical textbook model with 
four key elements: 
(2) The ISS is physically integrated “in the field” -- the ISS is assembled on orbit from its 
87 major component items. 
(3) The ISS is literally built “around the world” -- major component items were built in 
the United States, Europe, Japan, Canada, and Russia, each of whose engineering 
methods and cultures differ significantly.  Because of this, a “meets or exceeds” 
process was established to allow each partner to use its own process standards rather 
than trying to force adoption of NASA’s process standards. In this case, a “meets or 
exceeds” evaluation was performed on foreign deliveries (from ESA, ASI, NASDA, 
and CSA) with respect to manufacturing standards, particularly on materials 
processes and EEE parts. With respect to Russia, the evaluation was extended to 
include almost all of the aerospace standards, including fracture control, human 
factors, and coatings. 
                                                 
33 “System Engineering the International Space Station,” L. D. Thomas, Proceedings of the 33rd Space Congress, pp. 
5-35 through 5-44, April 23-26, 1996. 
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(4) The ISS must function as a spacecraft during its assembly – its crew inhabited the ISS 
beginning with the third assembly flight, both to aid in assembly and conduct 
scientific research.  The ISS flew in 44 free-flying configurations during the assembly 
phase, an equal number of shuttle-mated unique configurations, and is comprised of 
scores of smaller flight elements.   
This was a fusion of the NASA systems engineering approach (as codified in the NASA 
SE Handbook SP-6105) and the Boeing system engineering process (which was also well 
documented and executed).  At program start, NASA had over 100 system engineers in the 
program office and Boeing provided 300-400 systems engineers.  Boeing brought a great deal of 
SE experience plus their airplane design and production experience that NASA lacked.  This 
allowed Boeing to share its aircraft experience in integrating parts and systems using digital 
preassembly techniques to form computer aided design (CAD) models.  
A key ingredient of the ISS success was the successful integration of the customer’s 
needs into requirements and specifications.  Dr. Dale Thomas (former ISS Systems Engineering 
and Integration Manager) described the approach as:34
“All too often, system engineering preoccupies itself with requirements definition 
for a product.  Requirements definition is a means, not an end.  For this reason, 
this section explicitly includes integration in the title.  Indeed, within the scope of 
this paper, system engineering includes the development of a valid and cogent set 
of requirements and the verification of the as built design against those 
requirements.  Hence, system engineering must provide assurance that the 
product as designed and built meets the customer's stated need; this is the 
integration half of the process.”  
 
2.3.6 International Partners 
2.3.6.1 Creating International Partnerships 
A major challenge of the ISS program was how to solve the political, financial, and 
technical aspects of putting together a long-term international partnership.  Long before the 
systems engineers from each country could sit down and start work, agreements on management, 
funding, and issue resolution had to be created.  While it was not easy, NASA eventually worked 
out a process that accommodated multiple countries with differing cultural and engineering 
approaches to major program development and execution.  NASA produced a lessons learned 
report on the process and issued the following recommendations:35
(1) Early in the program, NASA should establish the legal and policy framework for the 
partnership that covers intellectual property rights, liability, dispute resolution, public 
affairs, amendments, international and criminal jurisdiction, customs and integration, 
and terminations.  No technical program information should be included. 
 
                                                 
34 “System Engineering the International Space Station,”  L. Dale Thomas, Manager VAIT, NASA Space Station 
Program Office. 
35 “Lessons Learned and Recommendations on International Participation from the International Space Station 
Program,”  Daniel V. Jacobs and Michael J. See, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Sept. 2004. 
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(2) As an evolutionary type program, initial projects should be bilateral and relatively 
short in nature.  Larger projects requiring multilateral arrangements should come 
later.  
(3) A governance model and agreement must be established.  The ISS Program was set 
up to operate using a board and panel structure, each of which functioned on 
consensus.  NASA took the role of the managing partner, with each board chaired by 
the NASA representative.  In cases where consensus could not be reached, the NASA 
representative had the right to make a decision for the board; however, this right was 
rarely used in practice. The advantages of this arrangement were that each IP had a 
voice and that this system allowed IPs to abstain when it was not in their interest for 
cost, schedule or other programmatic reasons.  The drawback was that the system 
could become paralyzed when no consensus was reached on an issue and NASA 
could not progress on it absent the support of the dissenting IP(s).  The NASA report 
noted that the Russians had been reluctant to fully integrate itself into the board 
structure, preferring to handle most issues on a bilateral basis with NASA. All the 
partners have resisted providing staffing to support the NASA board structure to the 
level that NASA does. 
(4) Critical path management had to be maintained by NASA as the managing partner.  
The critical path had to be studied and evaluated from an integrated program 
perspective to determine the range of risks.  This would impact how the specific 
program plans were made or altered to minimize risk.  When partner elements or 
capabilities were on the critical path, NASA may have risk contingency plans in place 
(with the full knowledge of the IP). This was a key issue early on with the Russians 
delivering the first two major modules that were critical to attaining initial operational 
capability.  After the first module (purchased by NASA) had been delivered on orbit, 
there was a nearly two year gap to the next critical Russian element.  In this case 
NASA considered using a backup power and support module that had been partially 
developed for another program (later cancelled when not required).  
2.3.6.2 ITAR and shared technology issues 
The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) posed a threat of foreclosing 
whole categories of cooperative efforts on the ISS.36
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Authorization Act of 2005 
(Public Law 109-155), required the creation of an International Space Station Independent Safety 
  ITAR rules were designed to protect 
militarily sensitive U.S. technologies from falling into the hands of U.S. adversaries. But U.S. 
allies are also subject to them, even in cases in which the law's application seems to have 
escaped the bounds of its intent.  ITAR regulations apply to the ISS and all of its partners:  
Russia, Europe, Japan and Canada. These nations signed a treaty-level document called the 
Intergovernmental Agreement, which sets out each partner's rights and responsibilities, and 
governs relations in the station's operation.  The agreement was signed before ITAR went into 
effect in 1999, and the partners have debated whether the treaty takes precedence over ITAR, or 
whether ITAR should govern the station partners' relations. 
                                                 
36 “ESA Looks East,”  by Peter de Selding, Space New Business Report, Jul 2005 
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Task Force (IISTF) to assess the vulnerabilities of the International Space Station (ISS) that 
could lead to its destruction, compromise the health of its crew, or necessitate its premature 
abandonment and to report back to NASA and the Congress.  The February 2007 study37
The International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) restrictions and IP 
objections to signing what the IPs believe are redundant Technical Assistance 
Agreements are a threat to the safe and successful integration and operation of 
the Station. For example, a contractor workforce comprises a majority of the 
operations workforce and must be able to have a direct interface with the IP 
operations team to assure safe and successful operations. Their interactions, 
ability to exchange and discuss technical data relevant to vehicle operation, etc. 
are severely hampered by the current ITAR restrictions.  
 
reported the following: 
The systems engineering impact of ITAR was quite simple—it placed a constraint on the 
SE processes and engineers.  Like any constraint in a process, it usually results in a sub-optimal 
outcome.    At its simplest, it prevents the use of technologies on key modules or the interaction 
of systems engineering personnel to develop and operate systems.  On orbit, it could result in 
certain equipment, procedures, or full modules being off limits to specific astronauts, or specified 
equipment could not be integrated into other systems.  Obviously, the ISS could not operate with 
an integrated crew with those restrictions and NASA worked within the limitations of ITAR. 
2.3.6.3 Differing SE Approaches among International Partners 
There is a myth that science and engineering is black and white—that regardless of which 
country does a project they all approach it the same.  The NASA experience was that this was 
not true and that a significant amount of planning, organization, and statesmanship was needed to 
run a large international program like ISS.  The NASA lessons-learned report38
 There are no standard practices—SE approaches may differ widely (along with 
management, funding and scheduling approaches).  The key to success was technical and 
integration processes that were defined for all to follow or else to integrate with key 
milestones.  Communication protocols were essential, particularly in understanding the 
varying lexicons. 
 pointed out the 
following key observations: 
 The ISS had a single payload safety panel with full partner participation. 
 A difficult, but key, accomplishment was forcing all Partners to integrate their schedules, 
budgets, and development life cycles.  While each may have had different detailed levels, 
they all had to integrate at the top program levels for discussion and execution, 
particularly as the Space Shuttle was the launch vehicle for US, European, Japanese and 
Canadian elements. 
                                                 
37 “Final Report of the International Space Station Independent Safety Task Force,” February 2007. 
38 “Lessons Learned and Recommendations on International Participation from the International Space Station 
Program,”  Daniel V. Jacobs and Michael J. See, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Sept. 2004. 
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 Configuration Management and Control must be established early.  While this is always 
an issue, the ISS had a different twist with its IPs.  Here, the IPs as independent agencies 
could use the change process to gain political or financial leverage by either not accepting 
changes or not following procedures. 
 There were some benefits of having IP differences.  While commonality is often 
preferred, dissimilar hardware approaches can add robustness for certain critical and 
complex functions.  A good example is the two systems for adjusting station 
orientation—gyros and thrusters. 
2.3.6.4 The Political Environment 
Managing the disparate political environments of all partners has also been a challenge.  
All partners have differing constituencies, budget cycles and motivations.  The economic issues 
in Russia in the mid-1990’s created significant financial hardships and gave rise to commercial 
activities that were not fully embraced by the other partners.  Many of the partners faced political 
financial issues at various times. One of the most notable issues was the Russian plan to fly space 
tourists to the ISS.  While this caused significant strife in the partnership in the beginning, the 
teams have learned how to effectively manage with this component as well. Ultimately the other 
partners found a joint resolution which would accommodate the space tourist flights. 
Despite several very high level differences the partners have worked consistently 
effectively at the program level.  This is a tribute to all partner teams. 
2.3.7 Safety/Risk approaches 
2.3.7.1 NASA Safety Process 
NASA has developed a rigorous safety review process that is documented in their safety 
review process regulation39 for the overall integrated safety of the ISS.  The purpose of this is to 
provide in-line and phased reviews for the flight and ground elements and the support 
equipment.  NASA has signed MOUs with all international partner agencies40 including RSA41
NASA and its International Partners have put together a rigorous process to manage risk 
and to oversee the development and operation of all ISS activities:
 
delegating NASA as responsible for the overall integrated safety of the ISS.  In that role, NASA 
provides the overall certification that the system (and its elements) is safe. 
42
 ISS Mission Management Team:  This senior level group meets almost daily to discuss 
ongoing ISS operations, upcoming missions, and to discuss solutions to ongoing or 
developing problems.  This not only includes onsite leadership, but also coordination and 
participation of partners. 
 
                                                 
39  Safety Review Process, International Space Station, SSP 30599 Revision B, February 2000. 
40  International Partner specifications are derived from SSP 50021 (flight) and KHB 1700.7, Space Shuttle Payload 
Ground Safety Handbook. 
41 The Russian segment specification is implemented through SSP 50146, NASA/RSA Bilateral S&MA Process 
Requirements Agreement. 
42 “Final Report of the International Space Station Independent Safety Task Force,”   February 2007 
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 Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Office:  This group reports directly to the ISS 
program manager and is responsible for managing the ISS safety program.  The group 
integrates all inputs from the IPs and manages their safety reviews.  It also manages all 
S&MA activities, reviews and requirements with the major contractors.  Finally, it 
supports the headquarters organization as needed. 
 Safety Review Panel:  This group reviews and approves the hazard reports and safety 
data packages required for flight approval.  It assesses the safety and design of all flight 
ISS segments, related ISS flight support equipment, ISS visiting vehicles, and ISS 
assembly operations. 
To achieve safety and reduce risk, NASA and the team have addressed all elements of the 
SE process to minimize problems with the design, test, production and operation of the ISS.  
These key elements were reviewed by the ISS Independent Safety Task Force43
 Basic system design requirements must address three levels of risk: 
: 
1. Two-failure tolerant to catastrophic hazard—The on-orbit space station 
must be designed so that no two failures, or two operator errors, or one of 
each can result in a disabling or fatal injury or the loss of the Shuttle or 
ISS;. 
2. One-failure-tolerant to critical hazards--The on-orbit space station is to be 
designed such that no single failure or single operator error can result in a 
non-disabling personal injury, severe occupational illness, loss of a major 
ISS element, loss of an on-orbit life sustaining function or emergency 
system, or damage to the Shuttle; 
3. Design for minimum risk—Hazards are controlled by safety related 
properties and characteristics of the design rather than failure tolerance 
criteria. 
 Robust On-Orbit Systems: The design philosophy is that the elements must meet a 
two failure-tolerance requirement to avoid catastrophic outcomes.  Most of the 
major systems have a US system and separate Russian system.  Both agencies 
have very different approaches to providing these capabilities which reduce the 
likelihood of a common failure.  Most redundant systems also are built capable of 
repair or on-orbit replacement.  As an example, there are four sources of oxygen 
at all times: the Russian oxygen generator (Elektron), bulk oxygen in tanks, the 
US Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA), and oxygen generation canisters.  
While there have been issues with each, there never has been a simultaneous 
failure of all four. 
 Verification Process:  This is a five-step process that verifies that all hardware and 
software meet requirements: 
1. Clearly identify all requirements 
                                                 
43 “Final Report of the International Space Station Independent Safety Task Force,”   February 2007 
  
29 
 
2. Define the requirement’s closure strategy—verify the requirements are 
met via inspection, analysis, demonstration or test. 
3. Execute the necessary verification activities 
4. Develop verification reports/analysis 
5. Document closure 
 Physical Verification: This step checks to ensure that the parts fit together and the 
major sub-assemblies integrate correctly.  This step cannot be accomplished at the 
assembly level, since most of the modules and trusses are not assembled together 
until the parts are on orbit. 
o When possible, actual integration checks should be conducted on the 
ground 
o The process should develop and maintain accurate and detailed 
measurements of all parts for virtual integration checks and modeling 
o The process should include 3-D and virtual analysis or mating 
o Full simulation and continuity checks of all cables, electrical, and fluid 
connections should be conducted to ensure functionality   
2.3.7.2 Safety and Off-the-Shelf Systems 
A major focus of the ISS program was to use only proven systems (see page 50 for a 
discussion of technology readiness levels) but still meet evolving safety requirements.  There 
were initial concerns about the Russian modules being proposed (Zarya and the Service Module) 
since they were already partially built prior to the final station design requirements.  NASA 
safety officials44
1. Inadequate shielding from orbital debris—this was a basic design tradeoff by the 
Russians to keep the weight down and was designed prior to the ISS 
requirements.
 studied the systems prior to their launch and questioned four areas: 
45
2. Inability of Zarya and the Service Module to operate after losing cabin pressure.  
Much of the critical equipment in the modules required air for cooling electronics 
which would eventually fail in a vacuum.  This risk has been lessened with the 
addition of other modules with redundant capabilities. 
  With the exception of the Zarya module, built under direct 
contract to the US government, the Russian modules were too heavy to add any 
more protective panels before launch.  The fix would be to later install panels on 
orbit if needed. 
3. Service Module Windows not certified—at issue is whether the Russian windows 
meet the requirements of surviving a leak of the outside pane without causing a 
catastrophic failure or permanent leak.  The window design planned for the 
                                                 
44 “Russian Compliance with Safety Requirements,” GAO/T-NSIAD-00-128, 16 March 2000 
45 The ISS requirement was to have no more than a 2.4% probability of penetration over a 15 year life on orbit.   The 
assessment was that the modules had a 25% probability.    With the addition of shielding on orbit, the probability 
drops to 4% for the remaining life of the station. 
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Service Module windows did not meet the requirements for windows used on the 
other ISS elements. Several areas of concern included insufficient ultraviolet and 
infrared protection, no debris pane or scratch pane to protect windows from 
impacts or crew induced damage and no way to safe or replace a window should a 
window become damaged on-orbit. The windows on new modules are supposed 
to last 15 years, but the Russian design requirement was only five years. 
4. Noise levels on the Modules—the ISS requires noise levels no more than 55 
decibels over a 24-hour period, but the noise level in the Russian modules are in 
the 65-75 decibel range.  This was an issue on the MIR, and several astronauts 
suffered temporary or permanent hearing loss.  Several fixes have been 
implemented—more insulation, better crew hearing protection, and replacement 
of some of the noisiest equipment. 
2.3.7.3 Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel  
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) is a senior advisory committee that reports 
to NASA and Congress. The Panel was established by Congress after the Apollo Command and 
Service Module spacecraft fire in January 1967.46
The Panel's statutory duties, as prescribed in Section 6 of the NASA Authorization Act of 1968, 
Public Law 90-67, 42 U.S.C. 2477 are as follows:  
  This panel has a 40+ year history of providing 
support to NASA and all of its programs.  It is normally staffed with either senior or retired 
experts from the aerospace field to include previous NASA managers and astronauts. 
"The Panel shall review safety studies and operations plans that are referred to it 
and shall make reports thereon, shall advise the Administrator with respect to the 
hazards of proposed operations and with respect to the adequacy of proposed or 
existing safety standards, and shall perform such other duties as the 
Administrator may request."  
As part of the systems engineering process, safety plays a major role in the requirements, 
design, development, production and operation of the systems.  In the case of NASA, this panel 
provides oversight to all of these areas, but does so in a limited capacity.  The Panel does not 
work full time nor is it staffed47
This lack of authority and integration into the operational aspects has led to some heated 
discussions in the past.
 at a sufficient level to allow for detailed oversight or scrutiny.  
The panel also has limited authority other than recommendations to change NASA designs or 
operations.  The panel provides recommendations to the NASA Administrator, develops an 
annual report, and reports to Congress.  
48
                                                 
46 NASA Website:   http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/oer/asap/history.html 
  Following the Columbia accident in 2003, the board issued a report 
(and gave Congressional testimony) that challenged NASA to make the ASAP more independent 
47 The current ASAP has eleven members to include the director and an administrative officer. 
48 Testimony to the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee on 29 October 2003 by Dr. Arthur 
Zygielbaum. 
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and to give it an operational safety role in launch decisions and other operation activities.  The 
panel stated that in the past, NASA program managers allowed safety margins to erode in the 
face of schedule and budget pressures.  The ASAP recommended that NASA’s safety 
organization be placed in a separate chain of command that reported directly to the Administrator 
and thus provided a veto on the program managers’ decisions during key operations (such as 
launch decisions).  In a report issued prior to the Columbia accident, the board wrote: 
 “It is traditional in NASA for project and program managers to have the authority 
to authorize waivers to safety requirements. Safety critical waiver authority 
should reside with an independent safety organization using independent technical 
evaluation. Moving this authority would increase the management oversight of 
safety-related decisions and would strongly support the creation of a well-
respected and highly-skilled safety organization.” 
An independent technical, quality or safety oversight board is not a new concept.  In most 
DoD organizations and contracts, groups like these report outside of the program managers to 
guarantee independence.  This process is used by the US Navy Sea Systems Command.49
The ASAP issues a yearly report that often contains warnings or recommendations 
challenging NASA program managers.  The 2002 report was a prime example; the report listed a 
string of incidents or potential accidents due to miscommunication between Russian and 
American engineers that indicated a dangerous pattern to the committee: 
  In it, 
the technical authority is an independent expert who is isolated from the program managers’ 
schedule and budget pressures. 
 Shortly after STS-113 docked with the ISS, there was a loss of ISS attitude control due to 
a lack of system configuration. 
 Lithium thionyl chloride batteries were brought on board over the objection of other ISS 
partners. 
 Russian ground controllers sent commands to fire thrusters before US ground controllers 
had disengaged the Control Moment Gyroscope system. 
A comment was made by a former ASAP member50
                                                 
49 NAVSEA Instruction 5400.97A, Engineering and Technical Authority Policy, dated February 3, 2003 
 that there might be communication and 
cultural issues between the Russians and Americans that also might contribute to increased risk 
of accidents. 
50 Testimony to the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee on 29 October 2003 by Dr. Arthur 
Zygielbaum.    It should be noted that this testimony was triggered by the resignation of the entire ASAP the month 
prior (Sept 2003) due to criticism of the board by the Columbia Accident  Investigation board. 
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3.0 FULL SCALE DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Major ISS Modules 
3.1.1 Zarya Control Module 
The Zarya Module (known by the technical term Functional Cargo Block and the Russian 
acronym FGB) was the first component launched for the International Space Station. This 
module was designed to provide the station's initial propulsion and power. The 19,323-kilogram 
(42,600-pound) pressurized module was launched on a Russian Proton rocket in November 1998 
(Figure 10).   
As part of the business arrangement between NASA and Russia, the United States funded 
this component of the station, although it was built and launched by Russia. The module was 
built by the Khrunichev State Research and 
Production Space Center, which is also known 
as KhSC, in Moscow under a subcontract to 
The Boeing Company for NASA.  
Construction of the Zarya Module 
began at KhSC in December 1994. It was 
shipped to the Baikonur Cosmodrome, 
Kazakhstan, launch site to begin launch 
preparations in January 1998. The three-stage 
Proton rocket launched the module into a 220.4 
by 339.6 kilometer (137 by 211 statute miles) 
orbit. 
Only two weeks after Zarya reached 
orbit, Space Shuttle Endeavour made a 
rendezvous and attached a U.S.-built 
connecting module called Node 1, or Unity. 
The Zarya Module provided orientation 
control, communications, and electrical power 
to the passive Node 1 while the station awaited 
launch of the third component, a Russian-
provided crew living quarters and early station 
core known as the Zvezda Service Module. The 
Service Module enhanced or replaced many 
functions of Zarya. The Zarya module is now used primarily for its storage capacity and external 
fuel tanks. 
The Zarya Module is 12.6 meters (41.2 feet) long and 4.1 meters (13.5 feet wide) at its 
widest point. It has an operational lifetime of at least 15 years. Its solar arrays and six nickel-
cadmium batteries can provide an average of 3 kilowatts of electrical power. Its nadir docking 
port accommodates either a Russian Soyuz piloted spacecraft or an unpiloted Progress resupply 
spacecraft.  As the station grew, it became necessary to send an extension module (the Mini 
Research Module 1, or MRM1) to create a tunnel from this nadir port further towards the nadir, 
to provide docking clearance and additional ports for visiting vehicles. Each of the two solar 
Figure 10.  Russian Zarya Module 
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arrays is 10.7 meters (35 feet) long and 3.4 meters (11 feet) wide. The module's 16 fuel tanks 
combined can hold more than 5.4 metric tons (6 tons) of propellant. The attitude control system 
for the module included 24 large steering jets and 12 small steering jets.  Its two 300 kgf engines 
were used for reboosting the spacecraft and making major orbital changes before Zvezda arrived. 
All of these engines were de-activated 
several months after the Service Module 
arrived, leaving the FGB to serve as a 
propellant storage and feed system to the 
Service Module and the visiting vehicles. 
3.1.2 Unity Node 
The Unity module (Node 1) was the 
first major U.S.-built component of the 
station and was delivered during STS-88 
on Space Shuttle Endeavour in December 
1998.  It includes the Pressurized Mating 
Adapter 1 pre-fitted to its aft port.  
Assembly required crews to conduct three 
space walks to attach the Pressurized 
Mating Adapter 1 to the Zarya Control 
Module, and to outfit exterior gear such as 
handrails, cables, radio equipment, etc. 
 In addition to its connection to Zarya, Unity serves as a passageway to the U.S. 
Laboratory Module (attached later) an airlock, and other future growth modules. It has six 
hatches that serve as docking ports for the other modules.  It is 5.5 meters (18 feet) long, 4.6 
meters (15 feet) in diameter and fabricated of aluminum.  The Unity Node contains more than 
50,000 mechanical items, 216 lines to carry fluids and gases, and 121 internal and external 
electrical cables using 9.7 kilometers (6 miles) of wire. 
Two additional nodes (Node 2 Harmony and Node 3 Tranquility) were built for NASA 
by ESA and launched in October, 2007 and February, 2010 respectively. Harmony serves as the 
connection to the ESA Columbus and JAXA Kibo modules, discussed later, as well as the 
docking port for the Space Shuttle and later U.S. cargo and crew vehicles. Tranquility serves as 
the base for the cupola, also discussed later. 
3.1.3 Zvezda Service Module 
The history of the Zvezda module goes back to the late stages of the Cold War when it 
was originally intended as a cornerstone of the Russian Mir-2 space station.  The service module 
closely resembled the core module of the Mir space station and its design lineage traces back to 
the Salyut and Almaz space station programs (see Figure 12).  This was the first full Russian 
contribution to the ISS and was fully funded by the Russians. The Zvezda module was initially 
planned to launch in 1999. Given Russian delays, NASA embarked on development of a back-up 
module with the intent of securing the critical path in the assembly sequence. 
Zvezda was launched on July 12, 2000 from the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan..It 
served as the early station living quarters and as the main docking port for the Russian Progress 
Figure 11.  US Unity Module 
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cargo resupply vehicles. It also provided early propulsive attitude control and re-boost 
capabilities for the station. Zvezda's living accommodation51 provided two personal sleeping 
quarters, a toilet and hygiene unit, a galley with a refrigerator-freezer and a table for securing 
meals while eating. Its 14 windows52 offered direct viewing of docking activities, the Earth and 
other Station elements. Exercise equipment included a treadmill and a fixed bicycle. Cosmonauts 
wearing Orlan-M (and later, the Orlan MK) spacesuits used the Transfer Compartment as an 
airlock.53 Zvezda also provided data, voice and TV links with mission control centers in Moscow 
and Houston. 
 
Figure 12.  Zvezda Module with  
3.1.4 Destiny Laboratory Module 
The Boeing-built, Destiny Laboratory Module arrived at Kennedy Space Center, Fla. in 
November 1998 to begin final preparations for its launch on Feb. 7, 2001, aboard Space Shuttle 
mission STS-98, Station assembly flight 5A.  As the first major laboratory, Destiny was the 
centerpiece of the US portion of International Space Station, where science experiments were 
performed in the near-zero gravity of space. The aluminum module consisted of three cylindrical 
sections and two end cones with hatches that were mated to the Unity module at one end, and 
                                                 
51 http://www.russianspaceweb.com/iss_sm.html 
52 The windows in this module represented a difference in Russian design philosophy that placed importance on 
windows (for reconnaissance, research and crew considerations) vice the western designs that minimized the number 
of windows for safety reasons (a later US module would only contain a single, large window). 
53 Note, while the ISS had redundant airlocks early in assembly, the Russian airlock would only accommodate the 
Russian spacesuits and not the American suits. 
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would have the PMA-2 docking adaptor attached at the other on a later mission (See Figures 13 
and 14). 
When it arrived at the ISS, Destiny had five racks housing electrical and life-support 
systems. Subsequent shuttle missions have delivered more racks and experiment facilities, 
including the Microgravity Science Glove box, the Human Research Facility and five racks to 
hold various science experiments. Eventually, Destiny would hold 13 payload racks with 
experiments in human life science, materials research, Earth observations and commercial 
applications, plus eleven systems and storage racks. 
 
 
Figure 13.  US Destiny Laboratory Module 
A 50.9 centimeter diameter window was located on 
the nadir side of the central module segment and is the largest 
window ever to be incorporated in a space station.  Destiny's 
window (Figure 14), which takes up the space of one rack, is 
of optical quality that enables scientific quality photos, 
measurements and video. The window is protected by both 
internal and external covers to avoid degradation of the glass. 
The Window Observational Research Facility rack was later 
deployed to house scientific and observational equipment for 
use on the window.  
The aluminum module is 28 feet long and 14 feet in 
diameter. The lab consisted of three cylindrical sections and 
two end cones with hatches that were mated to other station 
Figure 14.  US Destiny Module 
High Grade Optical Window 
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components.  An exterior waffle pattern strengthens the hull of the lab. The exterior is covered 
by a debris shield blanket made of Kevlar similar to that used in bulletproof vests. A thin 
aluminum “sandwich” debris shield was placed over the blanket for additional protection. This 
module served as the primary living quarters for the non-Russian crewmembers during most of 
the assembly of the ISS. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.5 Canadian Space Robotics System 
The Canadian space robotics system, 
formally called the Mobile Servicing System or 
MSS, is an essential component of the ISS.54
• Canadarm 2, the Space Station Remote 
 The 
MSS provides astronauts the ability to move 
equipment and supplies around the exterior of the 
ISS (Figure 15). It supported astronauts when 
they were working in space and could be used to 
release and capture satellites. The system has 
three parts:  
Manipulator System (SSRMS) - 
delivered to the ISS in April 2001  
• the Mobile Remote Servicer Base 
System (MRSBS) - a work platform 
which moves on rails along the length of the space station - delivered to the ISS in 
2002  
• the Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator  (DEXTRE) - the space robotics "Canada 
Hand," which has two arms of its own - delivered in 2007. 
The contribution of this technology, including Canadarm 2, helps CSA pay for its share of ISS 
operating costs. It means CSA has access rights to the space station lab facilities for experiments. 
It also means that CSA may send an astronaut to the ISS approximately every three years. 
3.1.6 Quest Joint Airlock 
The Joint Airlock (also known as "Quest") (Figure 16) was built by the U.S. and provided 
the capability for ISS-based Extravehicular Activity (EVA) using either a U.S. Extravehicular 
Mobility Unit (EMU) or Russian Orlan EVA suits. Before the launch of this airlock, EVAs were 
                                                 
54 “Canadarm 2,”By Susan Monroe, Canada Online (http://canadaonline.about.com) 
Figure 15.  Canadian Space Robotics 
System 
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performed from either the U.S. Space Shuttle (while docked) or from the Transfer Chamber on 
the Service Module. Due to a variety of system and design differences, only U.S. space suits 
could be used from the Shuttle and only Russian suits could be used from the Service Module. 
The Joint Airlock alleviates this problem by allowing either (or both) spacesuit systems to be 
used.  In the past, if the Shuttle was not docked, then the Russian space suits had to be used 
through the Russian docking port if an EVA was required. The variation in airlocks and 
spacesuits available on the ISS provides an important level of dissimilar redundancy for the EVA 
function. 
The Joint Airlock was launched on ISS-7A / STS-104 in July 2001 and was attached to 
the starboard docking port of Node 1.  The Joint Airlock is 20 feet long, 13 feet in diameter, and 
weighs 6.5 tons.  The Joint Airlock was built by Boeing at Marshall Space Flight Center. The 
Joint Airlock was launched with the High Pressure Gas Assembly.  The High Pressure Gas 
Assembly was mounted on the external surface of the Joint Airlock and supports EVA operations 
with breathing gases and augments the Service Module's gas resupply system.  
The Joint Airlock has two main components: a crew airlock from which astronauts and 
cosmonauts exit the ISS and an equipment airlock designed for storing EVA gear and for so-
called overnight "campouts" wherein nitrogen is purged from astronaut's bodies overnight as 
pressure is dropped in preparation for spacewalks the following day.  This procedure prevents 
the bends as the astronauts are re-pressurized after their EVA. Without the ‘campout’ procedure, 
the cabin pressure in the entire ISS would have to be lowered prior to each EVA. The crew 
airlock was derived from the Space Shuttle's external airlock. It is equipped with lighting, 
external handrails, and an Umbilical Interface Assembly (UIA). The UIA is located on one wall 
of the crew airlock and provides a water supply line, a wastewater return line, and an oxygen 
supply line.  The UIA also provides communication gear and spacesuit power interfaces and can 
support two crew in spacesuits simultaneously.  These can be either two American 
Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) spacesuits, two Russian Orlan spacesuits, or one of each 
design.  
Before the crew airlock's hatch is opened to space, the crew airlock is depressurized to 3 
pounds per square inch (psi) from the ISS pressure of 14.7 (psi) and then down to zero psi. To 
conduct this depressurization, a Russian-built compressor temporarily moves most of the air 
within the airlock to the main pressurized volume of the ISS.  At the end of the EVA, the airlock 
is re-pressurized from this cabin air.  By conserving the air, even at only 1.2 kilograms per cubic 
meter, several tons of logistics are saved over the life of the program.  The Quest airlock is the 
only airlock in space history to conserve its air. 
 
The atmosphere inside spacesuits is pure oxygen at 4.3 psi.  Current spacesuit design 
requires these lower pressures in order for the suits to be flexible enough to work within.  At 
higher pressures the suits stiffen and are hard to work in for prolonged periods of time.  
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The Equipment Airlock has stations that assist  
astronauts and cosmonauts as they move into and out of their spacesuits during periodic 
maintenance. The Equipment airlock has two racks, one for avionics, and the other for cabin air.  
Batteries, power tools and other supplies are also stored in the Equipment Airlock. 
3.1.7 Russian Pirs Docking Compartment 
The 3,580 kilogram Pirs Docking Compartment is attached to the nadir (bottom, Earth-
facing) port of the Zvezda service module (Figure 17). It was docked to the ISS on September 
16, 2001, and was configured during three spacewalks by the Expedition 3 crew.55
                                                 
55 NASA official site, PIRS mission data, 
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/structure/iss_assembly_4r.html 
 
Figure 17.  Russian Pirs Docking 
Compartment 
Figure 16.  US Quest Airlock 
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Pirs was launched Sept. 14, 2001, as ISS Assembly Mission 4R, on a Russian Soyuz 
rocket, using a modified Progress spacecraft as an upper stage. The Docking Compartment has 
two primary functions. It serves as a docking port for the docking of Soyuz transport and 
Progress cargo vehicles to the ISS, and as an airlock for spacewalks by two ISS crewmembers 
using Russian Orlan-M spacesuits. 
In addition, the Docking Compartment can transport propellants from the tanks of a 
docked Progress resupply vehicle to either the Zvezda Service Module Integrated Propulsion 
System or the Zarya Functional Cargo Block. It can also transfer propellant from Zvezda and/or 
from Zarya to the propulsion system of Progress. The docking compartment's planned lifetime as 
part of the station was five years, but significant delay of its permanent replacement: the 
Multipurpose Laboratory Module (MLM:  built from the flight spare of the original Russian FGB 
module: see section 3.1.11) meant that it had to stay for several additional years.  A nearly-
identical Docking Compartment, dubbed the Multipurpose Research Module 2 (MRM2), joined 
the ISS at the Service Module Zenith port in late 2009.  MRM2 replaced a cancelled prior 
concept for a Russian solar array tower called the Science Power Platform (SPP).  MRM2 
instead created a fourth docking port for Soyuz and Progress vehicles, greatly simplifying the 
traffic planning at the ISS. 
3.1.8 Columbus Laboratory 
The European Columbus Laboratory (Figure 18) was launched on the Space Shuttle on 7 
February 2008 and successfully attached to the ISS on 11 February.  Columbus represents the 
European Space Agency’s largest contribution to the ISS and is a critical piece to bring the ISS 
research capability to fruition.56
                                                 
56 “ISS:  Columbus,” A. Thirkettle, B. Patti, P. Mitschdoerer, R. Kledzik, E. Gargioli, and D. Brondolo.  European 
Space Agency. 
  
  
40 
 
 
 
Figure 18.  ESA Columbus Research Module 
 The research laboratory accommodates ten science racks, five of them for European 
Space Agency use, the other five for NASA use. It is used primarily for research and 
experimentation in microgravity conditions for:  
 Microgravity Sciences, to study processes that are obscured by gravity on Earth, and to test 
physical theories at levels of accuracy that are impossible on Earth -- again, due to the 
planet's gravity.  
 Fluid Physics, to learn the behavior and properties of fluids in microgravity and develop 
techniques to improve oil spill recovery techniques, tracking of ground water contaminants, 
optical lens fabrication, and many other processes.  
 Life Sciences, to learn how flora and fauna growth and disease occur in microgravity and to 
convert what is learned into strategies for dealing with disease and disability on Earth.  
The Columbus module also provides four external payload attach sites.  
3.1.9 Kibo Japanese Experimental Laboratory 
The Japanese Experiment Module (JEM), called Kibo, was Japan's first human space 
facility and the largest module system on the ISS when completed in mid 2009 (Figure 19).  
Experiments in Kibo focus on space medicine, biology, Earth observations, material production, 
biotechnology and communications research. Kibo experiments and systems are operated from 
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the Mission Control Room at the Space Station Integration and Promotion Center (SSIPC), at 
Tsukuba Space Center in Ibaraki Prefecture, Japan, just north of Tokyo.  
Kibo consists of six components: two research facilities -- the Pressurized Module and 
Exposed Facility; a Logistics Module attached to each of them; a Remote Manipulator System; 
and an Inter-Orbit Communication System unit. Kibo also has a scientific airlock through which 
experiments are transferred and exposed to the external environment of space. The various 
components of Kibo were assembled in space over the course of three Space Shuttle missions.  
1. Pressurized Module
 
:  The Pressurized Module (PM) provides a shirt-sleeve environment 
in which astronauts conduct microgravity experiments. There are a total of 23 racks, 
including 10 experiment racks, inside the PM providing a power supply, 
communications, air conditioning, hardware cooling, water control and experiment 
support functions. As in Columbus, of the ten experiment rack locations in Kibo, 5 are 
allocated to JAXA and 5 to NASA. The PM is 11.2 meters (36.7 feet) long and 4.4 
meters (14.4 feet) in diameter, about the size of a large tour bus.  This module was so 
large (at 15 tons) that it was launched empty and most racks and other equipment were 
added separately. 
2. Exposed Facility
 
:  The Exposed Facility (EF) is located outside of the Pressurized 
Module and is continuously exposed to the space environment. Astronauts exchange 
experiment payloads or hardware from the Pressurized Module through the unique 
scientific airlock using the Kibo Remote Manipulator System. Items positioned on the 
exterior platform focus on Earth observation as well as communication, scientific, 
engineering and materials science experiments.  The EF is a platform that can hold up to 
10 experiment payloads at a time and measures 5.6 meters (18.4 feet) wide, 5 meters 
(16.4 feet) high and 4 meters (13.1 feet) long.  
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Figure 19.  Japanese Kibo Experimental Module and Facilities 
3. Experiment Logistics Modules (ELM)
 
 (Pressurized and Exposed Sections):  The 
Experiment Logistics Modules, or ELMs, serve as on-orbit storage areas that house 
materials for experiments, maintenance tools and supplies. The Pressurized Module and 
the Exposed Facility each have an ELM.  
a. Pressurized Section:  The Experiment Logistics Module - Pressurized Section, or 
ELM-PS, is a short cylinder attached to the top of the Pressurized Module that can 
hold eight experiment racks. It measures 4.4 meters (14.4 feet) in diameter and 
3.9 meters (12.8 feet) long.  
b. Exposed Section:  The Experiment Logistics Module - Exposed Section, or ELM-
ES, is a pallet that can hold three experiment payloads. It measures 4.9 meters 
(16.1 feet) wide, 2.2 meters (7.2 feet) high and 4.2 meters (13.8 feet) long.  
 
4. Remote Manipulator System:  The Remote Manipulator System, or RMS, consists of two 
robotic arms that support operations on the outside of Kibo. The Main Arm can handle up 
to 6.4 metric tons (14,000 pounds) of hardware and the Small Fine Arm, when attached to 
the Main Arm, handles more delicate operations. Each arm has six joints that mimic the 
movements of a human arm.  Astronauts operate the robot arms from a remote computer 
console inside the Pressurized Module and watch external images from a camera attached 
to the Main Arm on a television monitor at the RMS console. The arms are specifically 
used to exchange experiment payloads or hardware located on the Exposed Facility and 
Experiment Logistics Module - Exposed Section and from inside the Pressurized Module 
through a scientific airlock, support maintenance tasks of Kibo and handle orbital 
replacement units.  The Main Arm measures 9.9 meters (32.5 feet) long, and the Small 
Fine Arm measures 1.9 meters (6.2 feet). 
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3.1.10 Cupola 
 The Cupola (Figure 20) is a European Space Agency (ESA)-built observatory module of 
the International Space Station (ISS).57
Earth
 Its purpose is to provide ISS crew members with a direct 
view of robotic operations and docked spacecraft, as well as an observation point for watching 
the .  The Cupola project was started by NASA and Boeing, but was cancelled as a result of 
cost cuts early in the ISS design period. After a barter agreement between NASA and ESA, 
development of the Cupola was later taken over by ESA in 1998.  Designed and built by the 
Italian contractor Alenia, it is approximately 2 meters in diameter and 1.5 meters tall. It has six 
side windows and a top window, all of which are equipped with shutters to protect them from 
damage by micrometeoroids and orbital debris. It features a thermal control system, audio, video 
and MIL-STD-1553 bus interfaces, as well as the connections needed for installing in it one of 
the two identical robotic workstations that control the Canadarm2. The Cupola was launched 
aboard STS-130, in Frbruary, 2010 along with node 3..  
 
Figure 20. Cupola Observation Modules 
Alenia Spazio Cupola Project Manager, Doriana Buffa, says the Cupola, with its seven 
windows, is very unlike any of the other modules on the Station.  Its most important contribution 
is for making long duration space flights easier on the crew:   
“The large viewing windows will provide the astronauts with a view of the Earth 
quite unlike any other. For long-stay crews this will provide them with an 
important psychological boost–an umbilical cord connecting the crew on the 
Station to Mother Earth.” 
While not discussed in most systems engineering texts, the ability of the crew to function 
long term under often stressful situations must be part of the system’s design and part of the 
system engineering process. This specialty is part of human factors engineering, a recognized 
area of expertise at NASA’s Johnson Space Center. 
3.1.11 Russian Multi-Purpose Laboratory Module 
                                                 
57 European Space Agency News, http://www.esa.int/esaCP/SEMHAL0XDYD_Life_0.html 
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 The Russian Multi-purpose Laboratory Module (MLM) (Figure 21) has a long history of 
starts and stops.  It was originally started as a backup to the Zarya module (as the FGB2) and was 
almost 70% complete when construction was halted.  Then it was to be modified and used as the 
universal docking module, which was later cancelled.  The Russians always had plans for a 
research module (or two) and in 2005 it was decided to convert the existing FGB2 into the 
MLM.  During final design discussions, an agreement was made with ESA to have the European 
Robotic Arm mated on its surface for a later deployment in space.  The production and assembly 
suffered several delays and its launch on a Proton boost vehicle slipped to 2009. 
 The MLM is capable of supporting commercial 
projects to a moderate degree, limited by power and 
thermal constraints at its shaded nadir position.  This 
commercial payload concept allowed the Russians to 
outsource off-budget funding including investments to 
be used to complete and commission the module.  For 
the Russians, more so than other IP partners, the 
ability to generate revenue has been critical to their 
continued participation in the ISS.58
Following are the requirements set for the FGB 2-
based MLM as derived from the input data:  
  
 Provide a port for Soyuz and Progress 
vehicles and their modifications as well as 
for research modules to be able to dock in 
either automatic or manual mode.  
 Support propellant transfer from Progress 
vehicles into the SM and FGB tanks.  
 Support the ISS roll control using its own jets.  
 Provide room to accommodate European Robotic Arm, provide footprints for external 
experiments and for a cargo pallet, install probes for stowage and maintenance of 
EVA payloads.  
                                                 
58  Gunter’s Space Page, 
http://space.skyrocket.de/index_frame.htm?http://www.skyrocket.de/space/doc_sdat/mlm.htm 
Figure 21.  Russian Multi-Purpose 
Laboratory Module 
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3.1.12 Multi-Purpose Logistics Module 
The three Multi-Purpose Logistics Modules (MPLMs) (Figure 22), which were built by 
Alenia-Spazio for the Italian Space Agency, are pressurized modules that serve as the 
International Space Station's "moving vans," carrying equipment, experiments and supplies to 
and from the ISS aboard the Space Shuttle. 59
The unpiloted, reusable MPLM functions as both a cargo carrier and a temporary Space 
Station module. Mounted in the Space Shuttle's cargo bay for launch and landing, it is berthed to 
the ISS using the Shuttle's robotic arm after the Shuttle has docked. While berthed to the ISS, 
racks and equipment are unloaded from the module and then old racks and equipment may be 
reloaded to be taken back to Earth. 
 
The Logistics Module is then detached from the Station and positioned back into the 
Shuttle's cargo bay for the trip home. When in the cargo bay, the module is independent of the 
Shuttle cabin, and there is no passageway for Shuttle crewmembers to travel from the Shuttle 
cabin to the module.  
In order to function as an attached Station module as well as a cargo transport, the 
MPLM also includes components that provide air circulation, fire detection and suppression, 
electrical distribution and computer functions.  Ultimately, one of the MPLMs is to be re-named 
the Permanent Logistics Module (PLM) and will remain on the ISS.  Significant upgrades to its 
debris protection are required for this long-duration stay, unprotected by the orbiter payload bay. 
 
Figure 22.  Interior of Italian Multi-Purpose Logistics Modules 
                                                 
59 Official NASA information site:  http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/structure/elements/mplm.html 
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Although built in Italy, the logistics modules are U.S elements. and were provided in 
exchange for Italian access to U.S. research time on the Station. 
Construction of the Leonardo module began in April 1996 at the Alenia Aerospazio 
factory in Turin, Italy.  Leonardo was delivered to the Kennedy Space Center from Italy in 
August 1998 by a special Beluga cargo aircraft. Raffaello arrived at Kennedy in August 1999.  
The third module, named Donatello, was delivered to Kennedy on February 1, 2001.  
Each cylindrical module is approximately 21 feet long and 15 feet in diameter, weighing 
almost 4.5 tons.  Each module can carry up to 10 tons of cargo packed into 16 standard Space 
Station equipment racks.  Of the 16 racks the module can carry, five can be furnished with 
power, data and fluid to support a refrigerator freezer. 
One of the MPLM’s is being modified to remain on station as a storage module when the 
Space Shuttle retires. 
3.2 Launch Services 
A major decision and assumption was 
that the required launch services would, at least 
initially, all come from existing vehicles.  This 
meant the ISS was designed with the Shuttle and 
Russian launch vehicles as critical components 
for the long-term success of the ISS.  This total 
dependency on these two sources of lift has 
become a critical issue (see 3.4.5) with the 
announcement by the United States to retire the 
Shuttle by 2010 without a direct replacement. 
 
3.2.1 Shuttle  
The construction of the ISS was designed to rely upon the Space Shuttle to provide heavy 
lift and crew transportation—indeed, this was one of the main design criteria for the Space 
Shuttle.   In addition, the Space Shuttle provided regular “house calls” of large teams of short-
term, specially-skilled assembly astronauts for each key phase of assembly. While the Russians 
used their heavy lift Proton rockets, NASA had no plans to use expendable launch vehicles for 
its (or its partners’) large ISS modules.  All NASA and IP hardware were designed to interface 
with the Space Shuttle payload bay as well as to adhere to the launch requirements (loads etc.) 
that are more stringent than other vehicles because of its human rating. 
The Space Shuttle allowed NASA and its IPs to send up short-term “construction” crews 
to the ISS to assemble modules and trusses with the full support and flexibility of the Space 
Shuttle.  The Space Shuttle serves as a stand-alone research and assembly support vehicle with 
significant up-load capability (Figure 23). With the advent of the Shuttle retirement, a key 
function will be retired without replacement: capability to return large (anything larger than can 
fit in the Soyuz) payloads to Earth – which also requires changes to the ISS logistics and 
maintenance strategy. Instead of rotating failed Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs) with spares 
Figure 23.  US Shuttle Docked with the ISS 
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stored on the ground, equipment will need to be repaired on-orbit or spares will need to be pre-
positioned on-orbit. 
3.2.2 New NASA capability 
In 2004, NASA was directed by the Administration60 to develop not only a replacement 
for the Space Shuttle, but a family of vehicles that would extend space exploration to the moon 
and beyond.  The replacement for the Space Shuttle became the Ares I rocket and Orion Crew 
Exploration Vehicle, part of the larger NASA Constellation Program.  These were to provide 
transportation for the crew, but no significant ability to upload or download ISS payloads.  With 
the Space Shuttle able to finish supporting the ISS as currently planned (through completion of 
assembly), this was not to be an issue.61
3.2.3 Russian Vehicles 
 In January 2010 the Obama administration ordered a 
restructuring of Constellation activities, and a re-definition of the Orion effort to create a US-
built lifeboat capability for the ISS, with an option to evolve the spacecraft for later missions.  
The ARES 1 booster was canceled, and the larger ARES-5 booster is to be redefined, These 
actions leave the final configuration and capabilities of the Orion-derived capsule to be defined 
at the time of this case study’s publication.  Any transport capability of the future will have 
limited ability to bring up spares. Some orbital replacement units are so large that only the Space 
Shuttle can deliver them, or replace key components (like solar arrays) if they fail earlier than 
planned. Furthermore, the lack of Space Shuttle payload capability may also impact the 
operational life and any recertification activities. 
The Russians have played a critical role in providing launch services for the astronauts 
and for recurring supply missions to the ISS.  The early plans were that the Shuttle would supply 
all of the heavy lifting of key ISS components, supplies and astronauts.  While the Shuttle did 
eventually lift the major ISS elements into orbit, the frequency of flights was never achieved and 
significant delays occurred after the Columbia accident.  In the early years of the ISS program, 
NASA envisioned a new United States crewed vehicle that would serve as an ISS life raft and 
crew transfer vehicle.  The planned US rescue vehicle was the victim of budget cuts, which 
placed the Russians in the position of sole provider of rescue services.  The Russians launched 
the Zarya and Zvezda using their proven three-stage Proton rocket. The MLM module is set to 
launch in December 2011. 
 
                                                 
60 “The Vision for US Space Exploration,”  NASA Report, February 2004 
61 It is possible that with time and budget, large replacement modules or equipment transfer modules could be 
designed and launched as the Russians did with their two large modules.    However, as of this writing, NASA has 
no plans to develop this capability or additional ISS components. 
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3.2.3.1 Russian Soyuz 
The initial NASA plan (1990s) was to use 
the Russian Soyuz vehicle (Figure 24) as an 
astronaut transfer vehicle and to initially serve as 
the life raft until the planned US crew rescue 
vehicle arrived.  When this didn’t happen the 
Russians took responsibility for this role full time.  
The Russian plan was always to transport their 
crews on the Soyuz and to transport any fulltime 
ISS crew as needed and as funded by the US.  The 
Soyuz normally remains docked to the Russian 
module for six months prior to the return of the 
crew that launched with it.  The Soyuz system 
weighs approximately 14,200 pounds at launch 
and consists of three major elements.  The top part is the roughly spherical pressurized orbital 
module that can be used for cargo storage and for crew accommodation during missions.    This 
module docks with the ISS.  The middle section is the “gumdrop-shaped” re-entry module that 
returns the crew to earth.  It can carry up to three astronauts.  After the de-orbit burn to slow the 
Soyuz, the capsule separates and follows a semi-ballistic path with normal parachute landings on 
land in Kazakhstan in central Asia.  The third, lowest part of the Soyuz is the service module, 
which contains instrumentation, power and propulsion systems. 
3.2.3.2 Russian Progress 
The Russians were always expected to 
provide Progress vehicle launches to supply food, 
water, oxygen and other needed supplies (Figure 
25).  This proven space vehicle has had a good 
record of on time deliveries with no problems.  
The vehicle is normally operated as an expendable 
vehicle that is allowed to burn up in the 
atmosphere after de-orbiting.  As a derivative of 
the Soyuz spacecraft, it has the same basic 
structure but lacks the equipment to allow 
astronauts to ride inside during launch.  During 
normal operation, it is launched with a full load of 
new cargo and docked with the ISS. The cargo 
capacity is much smaller than that of the Space 
Shuttle, with the size of cargo limited by 
relatively small hatches through which cargo is transferred to ISS. The Progress vehicle provides 
a maximum pressurized cargo capability in the 1800 kg range. Prior to the arrival of the next 
Progress vehicle, it is filled with waste and de-orbited. The Progress is launched with the same 
Soyuz A2-class booster (also designated in some arenas as the SL-4) that launches the Soyuz 
capsule.  This booster is derived from the same original Korolyov design that launched Sputnik, 
many Earth-orbiting unmanned research and military craft, and every cargo and crew flight in 
Figure 24.  Russian Soyuz Manned Vehicle 
Figure 25.  Russian Progress Unmanned 
Cargo Vehicle 
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support of their human space effort.  After over 1000 launches of its different variants, the 
Soyuz-class booster is unparalleled in the world’s space launch systems for reliability.  
3.2.4 Japanese Projects  
The Japanese have been steadfast investors in the ISS program and have provided 
significant engineering support.  In the launch service arena, they developed the unmanned H-II 
Transfer Vehicle62
3.2.5 European Projects  
 (Figure 26), which was initially launched by the Japanese expendable booster, 
the H-IIB in September 2009.  The vehicle provides both pressurized and unpressurized cargo 
capability in the 5.5 metric ton range.   
The European ATV (Figure 27) is 
an expendable, automated cargo transfer 
vehicle that is launched on the Ariane V 
expendable rocket.  The first ATV (named 
Jules Verne) successfully completed its first 
mission to the ISS on June 20, 2008.63  The 
ATV successfully transferred over 800 kg 
of fuel to the Russian Zvezda module along 
with other supplies. The ship also demonstrated 
its ability to boost the ISS to a higher orbit.  The 
European Space Agency has committed to five 
vehicles over the 2008-2013 period.64
 
 
3.2.6 Commercial Capabilities  
NASA would prefer to provide 
transportation for crew and cargo to the ISS by 
using US sources to keep the dollars in the US and 
to encourage US development of such systems.  
NASA has already invested $500M to stimulate 
commercial launch sources to support the ISS after 
2010.  The investments require the commercial 
sources to demonstrate various levels of 
capability that will eventually culminate in their 
ability to reach and dock with the ISS. 
 
                                                 
62 Statement of Administrator Michael Griffin to the Subcommittee on Space, Aeronautics and Related Sciences, 15 
November 2007 
63 “Jules Verne Refuels the International Space Station,”  Science Daily, 20 June 2008. 
64 Statement of Administrator Michael Griffin to the Subcommittee on Space, Aeronautics and Related Sciences, 15 
November 2007 
Figure 26.  Japanese Unmanned H-II 
Transfer Vehicle 
Figure 27.  European Unmanned Automated 
Transfer Vehicle 
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 Under the NASA Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program, Space 
Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) and Orbital Sciences Corporation were selected 
to develop commercial cargo delivery capabilities for the ISS. 
Both plan to eventually also offer crew launch and return 
capabilities. 
SpaceX is developing a family of launch vehicles 
intended to reduce the cost and increase the reliability of access 
to space. Their design and manufacturing facilities are in 
Southern California by the Los Angeles Airport. Their 
propulsion development and structural test facilities are 
located in central Texas. Their launches will take place from 
Cape Canaveral, Florida. 
The SpaceX Falcon 9 launch vehicle and Dragon spacecraft will be used for cargo, and 
later crew, delivery to the ISS. Falcon 9 is a 2 stage launch vehicle powered by LOX/RP engines. 
The first stage is intended to be reusable. The Dragon spacecraft has a flexible cargo and crew 
configuration and is also recoverable. Pressurized cargo will be transported inside the capsule 
while unpressurized cargo will be located in an aft “trunk”. The crew configuration will be able 
to accommodate up to 7 crew members per flight. 
The initial test of the full up version of the Falcon successfully placed a qualification unit 
of the Dragon capsule into earth orbit in the spring of 2010. The first demonstration flight to ISS 
is scheduled for the third quarter of 2010.  
Orbital’s COTS operational systems consists of the Taurus II launch vehicle, the Cygnus 
advanced maneuvering space vehicle, and all the necessary mission planning and operations 
facilities and services. Their launches will take place from NASA’s Wallops Flight Facility in 
Virginia.  
The Taurus II is a two stage launch vehicle utilizing LOX/kerosene engines for the first 
stage and a solid rocket motor for the second stage. The Cygnus visiting vehicle is made up of a 
service module and interchangeable pressurized and unpressurized cargo modules. The 
pressurized cargo module is similar to the MPLM developed for the ISS by Alenia, which is a 
partner with Orbital for the COTS program.  
The first demonstration flight to the ISS is scheduled for the second quarter of 2011. 
  
3.3 Development Challenges 
The ISS has been an incredible success story, but has nevertheless had many interesting 
challenges to overcome.  The following are meant to represent a sampling of the engineering 
challenges and the approaches to solve them. 
Figure 29.  Orbital Sciences 
Cygnus Unmanned Cargo 
Vehicle 
Figure 28.  US SpaceX 
 Unmanned Cargo Vehicle 
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3.3.1 Technology Readiness and Obsolescence 
A major issue with any lengthy aerospace development program is the readiness of the 
technology chosen.  If the designer and systems engineer choose technologies that are already in 
use, they may become obsolete by the time the system is deployed or during its early life.  
Choosing cutting edge or unproven technologies also risks delays and cost increases as the 
technology is matured.  During the developmental phase of the ISS, the design underwent a 
capabilities-based assessment, where along with the fundamental mission capabilities, tasks, 
attributes and performance metrics, the gaps, shortfalls, redundancies and risk areas were 
identified and proposed. Many of these solutions required extensive validation of the underlying 
technology to be used in space. Even though many of the technologies or prototypes were tested 
on the ground, the effects of microgravity, radiation, and human factors could not easily be 
reproduced with the desired duration and accuracy.65
 
  To minimize this risk, most of the systems 
that were chosen had already flown on the MIR, Shuttle, and Spacelab or had been developed 
and tested as part of Space Station Freedom.  This approach created a risk of long term 
obsolescence but reduced the upfront schedule and cost risk. A case in point is the early baseline 
of the Solar Dynamic (SD) power subsystem that was to supplant the later photovoltaic arrays.  
The SD power subsystem was highly efficient in comparison to the photovoltaic arrays, but 
because of high up front development and validation costs, and the known reliability of 
photovoltaic arrays, the SD system was later abandoned. 
NASA has conducted extensive research in this area and helped to create the Technology 
Readiness Levels, shown in Table 2 below: 
Table 2.  Technology Readiness Levels 
TRL 1 Basic principles observed and reported
TRL 2 Technology concept and/or application formulated
TRL 3 Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic
proof-of-concept
TRL 4 Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory environment
TRL 5 Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment
TRL 6 System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant
environment (ground or space)
TRL 7 System prototype demonstration in a space environment
TRL 8 Actual system completed and “flight qualified” through test and
demonstration (ground or space)
TRL 9 Actual system “flight proven” through successful mission operations
 
The idea is to select a technology for a new system that will reach maturity (TRL 9) at the 
same time as the deployment of the target system.  For most major aerospace programs, the 
technologies are normally chosen at a TRL 6 or 7 for a new program three or four years in 
                                                 
65 “Reduction of Space Exploration Risk—Use of ISS as a Testbed for Enabling Technologies,” by Ilia Rosenberg, 
Michael Clifford, and Joe Bryant, The Boeing Company, AAI paper. 
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advance of deployment.  In the case of the ISS, some of the systems are not easily upgradeable or 
replaceable, so care must be taken in choosing the best system or technology that will provide 
long service but won’t represent a schedule or cost risk due to delayed development. 
3.3.2 Use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
NASA uses a variety of standard risk approaches for the ISS, but in particular specifies 
the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) procedure that details a structured risk management 
process for system development.  The NASA requirement66
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive, structured, and logical 
analysis methodology aimed at identifying and assessing risks in complex 
technological systems. PRA is generally used for low-probability, high-
consequence events for which limited statistical data exist. Its application is 
targeted at risk environments common within NASA that may involve the 
compromise of safety, inclusive of the potential loss of life, personal injury, and 
loss or degradation of high-value property that may be found in NASA mission-
related programs. 
 states: 
PRA is a decision support tool to help managers and engineers find design and operation 
weaknesses in complex space systems.  It allows them to systematically uncover and prioritize 
safety improvements.  PRA characterizes risk in terms of three questions called the triplet 
definition of risk: 
1. What can go wrong? 
2. How likely is it? 
3. What are the consequences? 
These simple three questions (often called the Triplet Definition of Risk) are then 
expanded into a full scope scenario-based PRA process.  
1. Objectives Definition 
2. System Familiarization 
3. Identification of Initiating Events (IEs) 
4. Scenario Modeling 
5. Failure Modeling 
6. Data Collection, Analysis, and Development 
7. Quantification and Integration 
8. Uncertainty Analysis 
9. Sensitivity Analysis 
10. Importance Ranking 
                                                 
66 NPR 8705.5 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedure for NASA Programs and Projects, NASA Office of Safety 
and Mission Assurance, July 12, 2004 
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If these structured steps are followed, the key to success or failure is how well management is 
integrated into the process, along with the subject matter experts, and how that management 
believes and acts upon the outputs 
3.3.3 Russian Contribution and Risk 
The decision to invite the Russians to participate was a complicated decision that 
involved numerous political, operational, financial/schedule and technical considerations. 
 From a political viewpoint, the US and USSR had just ended the Cold War (at great expense 
to both) and the USSR had split into a number of independent nations with Russia as the 
dominant force.  The Soviets (and now Russians) had extensive space experience and 
technology that might be of value to the new ISS that was being proposed.  However, the US 
and the Russians had limited experience working together (Apollo-Soyuz) to begin a major 
cooperative effort so soon after the Cold War ended.  On top of these major political 
problems, there were significant cultural issues that would impact the systems engineering 
challenge. 
 Operationally, the Russians had extensive on-orbit experience. The MIR was the state of the 
art in space station technology at the time.  The US had been launching Shuttle missions with 
many different missions utilizing the Shuttle’s cargo bay, but had little recent experience in 
long-term space habitation or system operation.  NASA and its contractors did have designs 
for new equipment/facilities and some older technology, but significant development and 
production remained before the US and its original partners would have been operational on 
orbit.   
 Russia was in financial straits following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the space 
program was not high as a priority for funding. A key driver was the US initiative to retain 
Soviet aerospace engineers and scientists for work on aerospace projects (particularly ISS). A 
concern at the time was that unemployed scientists and engineers from this sector could be 
easily attracted to work for interests not in keeping with long term US security needs if not 
gainfully employed on ISS. A large infusion of cash was needed. This was the primary 
reason the US (via NASA) was driven to pay for Russian contributions to the ISS, rather than 
in kind trades as with all other ISS partners. The inclusion of key Russian station elements 
offered the chance for NASA to reduce cost and schedule overall.  NASA was under pressure 
to deliver a space station at a reasonable cost, and the Russian modules were already started 
and most of the systems were flight proven. 
 In the initial assessment, the Russian participation should allow the ISS to accelerate or at 
least meet a shorter schedule that would put elements into orbit by 2000.  The Russian 
modules/systems were flight proven and appeared to offer less cost, schedule, and technical 
risk in comparison to the challenges of NASA designing and building some critical elements. 
While the Russian systems were considered off the shelf, they still presented some risk 
compared to the NASA SE protocols and system requirements.67
                                                 
67 “Russian Compliance with Safety Requirements,” GAO/T-NSIAD-00-128, 16 March 2000 
  As off-the-shelf modules (and 
thus high TRLs), they had been initially designed for the MIR or its replacement.  More 
important, the Russians had different engineering and system design requirements that did not 
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always meet the newer ISS requirements.  NASA engineers had to issue waivers for the early 
modules that acknowledged the additional risks and provided future fixes where necessary—
such as for MMOD shielding or noise.  Russian MMOD vulnerability and acoustic level 
exceeding requirements were respectively the number 1 and 2 program risks in 2000. Currently, 
the acoustic levels are no longer on the top list of concerns for ISS. 
3.3.4 Spiral Construction Approach and Multi-configuration issues 
A major task for the ISS program dated back to the Space Station Freedom effort.  The 
build-up sequence of the Space Station Freedom was problematic and considered high risk by 
several of the systems engineers of the day.  While the total system design was acceptable, the 
SE process at the time was only beginning to recognize the implications of spiral construction 
on-orbit.  For ISS, spiral construction was the integrated design, configuration and assembly of 
up to forty elements that had to operate as a fully functioning ISS at each sub-assembly stage.  
This meant that full operating procedures, software builds, center-of-gravity and station moments 
of inertia all had to be developed for each configuration.  This spiral construction and its multiple 
interim configurations drove the requirements for detailed Multi-element Integrated Testing 
(MEIT)—though it was not actually implemented until a few years into the program. 
One of the senior systems engineers commented that:  
“Systems engineering involved communications, so as you go between divisions, 
NASA centers and international partners, this makes things more difficult to 
engineer.  Communication bandwidth in these cases is essential.  A key is to make 
interfaces as simple as possible, then simplify further.  This is more critical when 
crossing organizational boundaries.  If its crossing government (or country) 
boundaries and its anything other than structure, it too complicated!”  
3.3.5 Computer Hardware and Software 
The ISS onboard computing architecture is a mixture of radiation-hardened Intel 386 chip 
based ISS mission computers for station housekeeping, environmental, and station-keeping 
duties combined with scores of standardized commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) notebook 
computers that the crews can use as interface devices to the more controlled software 
environment of the systems and payloads, or use “off net” for email, internet protocol telephone, 
training, and a host of other non-system uses.  A conscious effort was made to use COTS 
products where possible with minimal modifications while complying with safety to reduce cost 
and risk to the program.  The major critical computers provided significant capacity to 
accommodate future requirements.  The entire ISS system was designed as a distributed 
processing system over major nodes (multiplexors) with each dependent on a major computer 
system.  The standard station-keeping functions were on the ISS computers.  The non-critical and 
experimental support software is configured on the laptops. 
The use of laptop computers was not originally a major part of the program.  In fact, a 
local area network for support computers had to be retrofitted to the ISS after launch.   
Originally, two entire racks of computer interface equipment known as Multi-Purpose 
Application Consoles were to have been built as the main computing and training interface 
aboard the ISS, built and programmed from scratch to Mil specs, using ADA and the X-
Windows software standard, similar to the systems used in mission control. Beginning in 2003, 
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special studies were initiated to build upon the lessons of the Space Shuttle program’s experience 
with the Portable General Support Computer (PGSC).  The PGSC was used independently of the 
Shuttle General Purpose Computers, but had rapidly enabled many new capabilities for the crew. 
These studies led to a host of concepts, including onboard electronic training and procedures, 
phone services, video uplink, and even command and control.  A special safety position paper 
was drawn up to define the functions in command and control that could be assigned to a 
criticality-3 off-the-shelf hardware/software system, and those that must be assigned to 
configuration-controlled software development processes and fault-tolerant hardware.   
Generally this boiled down to the idea that the COTS system could display any data, and could 
send individual crew commands under an arm/check/fire transmission concept.  This prevented 
the COTS notebook from taking any active role in the automated critical systems processes, but 
enabled tremendous enhancements to situational awareness and to system debugging and control.   
The custom-built shuttle Grid PGSC computer has been recently replaced by COTS IBM 
Thinkpad computers, with vastly greater power and enough robustness to meet the demands of 
spaceflight.      However, such COTS computers had to be qualified and modified to make them 
fully safe for operation on the shuttle or ultimately the ISS.  The major changes that had to be 
made included: 
1. The laptops had to be modified with fans to handle cooling.  In microgravity the warm air 
generated around the computer circuit board does not move; it tends to stay in place 
unless forced air ventilation is provided.  Once the heat is removed, NASA then has to 
determine if the ISS or its modules can handle the heat that is rejected.  For instance, the 
Shuttle had a restriction against devices that produced heat greater than 113 degrees 
Fahrenheit. 
2. All internal circuit boards and printed connection areas had to be conformally-coated 
with dielectric film, to avoid the possibility of small conducting debris floating against 
the circuits and shorting them out in the 3-phase flows that are typical of zero-G cabin 
atmospheres. 
3. Power adaptors were needed to allow the computers to be plugged in to either module 
with 28 VDC. 
4. The laptop had to function normally in low pressure (10 psia) compared to normal earth 
pressure of 14.7 psia.  (This is more of a constraint onboard the Shuttle than aboard the 
ISS, whose atmosphere is regulated to sea level pressure at all times:  However, for 
commonality and the many advantages it brings, all notebook computers are certified for 
either vehicle.) 
5. The laptop had to be attached to a stable surface to allow the astronaut to use it without 
both floating away; Velcro was the common solution. 
Obsolescence was mainly a problem with laptop computers with a resulting major 
configuration question of how to upgrade and how often.  Obviously, NASA and its partners 
could buy new laptops every month to capture the latest technology.  The major expense was 
maintaining back compatibility with data and software along with modifications to make them 
flight-safe.  NASA currently has a replacement cycle that is roughly every four years.  
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Despite the NASA policy of using COTS hardware and software if possible, there is a 
cost in making them space-ready.  At a minimum, the cost to qualify includes ground testing and 
safety checks to make sure there are no surprises in orbit. 
Even with a multi-billion dollar ISS, the computers are not immune to such mundane 
threats as computer viruses or hackers.68
The ISS, its subsystems, and many space-related experiments employ a wide variety of 
software.  When possible, COTS software was used, especially for management or 
administrative tasks.  The laptops are all Windows-based and use the standard Microsoft 
products along with other more technical off-the-shelf packages.  There are specific programs 
written to control experiments and non-critical equipment that the astronauts use on each flight. 
  In August of 2008, the message traffic between ground 
controllers and the astronauts revealed that some of the computers on board had been infected 
with a common gaming virus worm that is used to gather information from the infected computer 
and then transmit it to the remote attacker.  In the end, this problem was minor and apparently 
caused no damage, but ensured virus protection on the ISS computers.   
An example of a more sophisticated software application is within the Mobile Servicing 
System (MSS), which is the system composed of the Canadarm 2 robotic arm that has been 
critical in the construction and maintenance of the ISS.69
“The most important safety features that make ADA ideal for development of fail-
safe software include its information-hiding capability, its ability to provide re-
useable code and its “strong typing”, which helps detect and solve many types of 
coding errors at compile time, very early in the development cycle.” 
  The operation of this equipment is 
safety-critical, so a software approach for “life-critical” operations was chosen.  In this case 
ADA was the language of choice.  Some system engineers believe ADA is a “dead language” 
which was used in the Department of Defense in the late 1970s.  However, it is still the language 
of choice for many system developers for applications requiring safety, low cost maintenance, 
and near perfect reliability.  At the time of Space Station Freedom, ADA was the US space 
systems required standard, and so was used.  ISS system developers stated that: 
 
While very robust languages like ADA prevent most errors from ever making it to orbit, long 
term maintenance and changes present significant challenges, especially when considering the 
integration of the module, control systems and experimental packages.   Here the software must 
be routinely torn down and rebuilt. According to Lehman's laws70
 
 of software evolution: 
“The functionality of a system must increase continually in order to maintain user 
satisfaction over its lifecycle. At the same time the software complexity increases unless 
something is done to reduce it.” 
                                                 
68 “Has the First Extraterrestrial (Computer) Virus been discovered on the Space Station,” by Ian O’Neill,  Space 
Reference, Inc.   August 26, 2008. 
69 “Case Study:  Space Station Robot Embeds ADA,” Rovert Devar, Ada Core Technologies, COTS Journal, March 
2002, 
70 M.M. Lehman, D.E. Perry, J.F. Ramil, W.M. Turski, and P. Wernick, “Metrics and Laws of Software Evolution 
- The Nineties View”, In Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Software Metrics, Metrics 97, 
Albuquerque, New Mexico, IEEE Comp. Soc. or. n. PR08093, November 5-7, 1997, pp. 20-32. 
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Particularly in the preliminary design phases of the complex ISS data management 
system, a strong typing language like ADA was a huge hindrance to the much-needed rapid 
prototyping of an enormously complex system.  Rapid prototyping’s “sloppy”, instant-iteration 
capability might allow cooperating engineers to discover and to work out major architecture and 
interface problems in an environment that quickly grows progressively more “flight like.”  The 
ISS program adopted a formal requirements definition process that led from system architecture 
requirements to Interface Requirements to Interface Control specifications before a single line of 
software could be written and explored.  Such a plan, while useful up to a manageable 
complexity level, put a burden on the software and command and control systems engineers to 
imagine all the intricacies of this multiple-interfaced system, and to capture all necessary 
interfaces, without a fully-functional test-bed.   
Further, particularly in the earliest days of the development, the agency did not have a 
strong enough background in the advantages and techniques of object-level programming, so 
most software planning was more reflective of (and appropriate to) the monolithic code that was 
typical of the Space Shuttle General Purpose Computers or the Mission Control Complex, and 
not to a system of over two dozen cooperating parallel processors.   
 A manifestation of the lack of use of true object programming was the persistence of 
what can be termed “push rod” command and control.  Although the grand vision of the software 
architecture had multiple tiers of higher and higher automation overseeing the low-level sensors 
and effectors working within an automated process or series of cooperating processes, the natural 
desire of the ground operators and astronauts was to have ultimate override capability at the 
effector and sensor level.  Thus for every automated application “object”, the architects were 
challenged to provide individual command paths to bypass virtually every function in the object. 
Sensor and effector objects were originally replicated at every level of the architecture, adding 
more and more resource requirement to the higher level tiers, instead of less. Thus, all tiers of 
automation hierarchy reverted to massive “pass through” relays of low-level commands for the 
operators down to the individual effectors.  Automation would come later, and the complex 
system was thus architected from the bottom up, rather than the top down. 
 One study71
1. Lehman’s thesis was confirmed:  In both maintenance scenarios, the altered 
designs increased the complexity of the system compared to the original 
architecture. 
 considered the challenges to ISS software system engineers of how to 
respond to design problems discovered during testing and how to incorporate new features into 
the software design after launch and initial implementation.  The study focused on the ISS 
Operations Control Software (OCS), since it was a good example of a complex software system 
with extensive testing early on, and then a long maintenance period once the system was 
deployed.  The study considered both cases: constructive fixes early on and adaptive fixes during 
operations.  The study concluded: 
                                                 
71 “The Space Station Operations Control Software:  A Case Study in Architecture Maintenance,” Robert Leitch and 
Eleni Stroulia, Proceedings of the 34th Hawaii International Conference on Sciences, 2001. 
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2. During maintenance, re-factoring operations helped alleviate the increased 
complexity introduced by new architectural elements such as hardware and 
software. 
3. Additions as opposed to changes are often more desirable to developers, because 
they do not risk “breaking” already developed code. 
4. Engineers tend to consider implementation cost more than maintenance cost—not 
necessarily best for long term operation or ISS life cycle cost. This tendency is 
also a by-product of the U.S. government’s year-to-year funding process which 
forces decisions early in the system life cycle thus impacting the operational 
costs. 
3.3.6 Power Systems 
The power system for the ISS is the largest space based electrical power system (EPS) 
ever developed and successfully operated.72
The US segment of the EPS is a channelized, load following (i.e., points at the sun) 
network of extensive solar photovoltaic arrays, batteries, voltage converters, remote controlled 
switchgear, and power routing cables.  
  The EPS was designed as a hybrid 120-volt DC US 
segment and a 28/120 volt Russian segment.  The two systems are independent, but can be 
interconnected via dc converters.  The split system derives from the early decision to use the 
Russian modules that were essentially off-the-shelf and space proven (low risk).  The power flow 
diagram is shown in Figure 30.   
 
                                                 
72 “The Electric Power System of the International Space Station—A Platform for Power Technology 
Development,” Eric Gietl, Edward Gholdston, Bruce Manners, and Rex Delventhal, NASA/TM-2000-210209, June 
2000. 
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Figure 30.  Single Channel Power Flow Diagram 
The ISS has eight solar array wings that when fully extended are each 35 meters long by 
12 meters wide.  The wings are constantly adjusted to maintain an optimal tracking of the sun, 
simultaneously achieving orbital power balance, minimum depth of battery discharge, and 
minimized frontal area projected to the ram direction (thus minimizing ISS drag, and saving 
propellant), while constantly avoiding differential heating of the slender mast longerons, that 
could lead to very dangerous structural fatigue. Because the station is in and out of the sun 
approximately every ninety minutes, the ISS contains a large battery set to store the energy 
during eclipse.  The US system uses actively-cooled nickel-hydrogen batteries specifically 
designed for high (40,000) charge/discharge cycles.  
A critical requirement is to constantly track the sun with the arrays and the station to 
maximize photovoltaic solar cell output.  A key part of the system is the solar array rotating joint 
(SARJ), which rotates the large solar panels.  In fall 2007, the ground team noticed unusual 
vibrations when the starboard SARJ rotated, along with higher than normal current usage.  
During a scheduled EVA in October 2007, astronauts did a visual inspection and found the 
exterior to be free of damage—but once they removed covers over the motor and gears, they 
found metal shavings, indicating either debris left during assembly, or more likely, the gears 
were chewing themselves up.  The initial fix was to lock down the unit and not adjust those solar 
panels; but long term, this would seriously diminish electrical output—at a time when NASA 
was hoping to increase electrical production for the upcoming six-person crews.  Fortunately, 
during several 2008 EVAs, the astronauts were able to replace the bearings and other joint parts 
and thoroughly lubricated the system to make the joint operational.  
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3.3.7 Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Protection 
For an aircraft program, engineers typically worry about bird-strikes while in flight or 
foreign object damage (FOD) that is picked up on the ramps, taxiways and runways.  In the case 
of FOD, prevention is the major emphasis area with some degree of damage tolerance built in to 
the system.  Bird strikes are normally defended against with material strength and engines that 
can tolerate bird ingestion and allow the aircraft to land safely.  For space vehicles, there is a 
major difference: each piece of micrometeoroid or space debris contains large amounts of kinetic 
energy as they travel at extremely high velocities: 
Ek=1/2mV2 where V is speed and 343 2( )dm ρ π=  is the particle mass with density ρ  
Even small micrometeoroid particles can have densities that range from 7-8 g/cm3 while smaller 
ones (mainly ice) are 1-2 g/cm3.  Typical space debris velocities range from 6-16 km/sec while 
meteorites can be up to 70 km/sec—thus the high velocity-squared allows even tiny particles to 
have hazardous energy levels. 
 
Figure 31.  Average Micrometeoroid Environment for ISS 
The threat has been characterized in several studies73
                                                 
73 “Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Environments for the International Space Station,”  Glenn Peterson and 
David K. Lynch, Engineering and Technology Group, The Aerospace Corporation, TR-2008-8570-1, December 15, 
2007. 
 and metrics used to measure flux, 
or the number of micrometeoroid hits per square meter per year on an exposed surface.  
Obviously with a large station and thousands of meters of exposed surface, this is not a trivial 
risk.  A recent study looked at various models to predict the number of hits and size of the 
projectiles with some results shown in Figure 31.  The models clearly indicate that thousands of 
small hits probably occur every year and this distribution is a function of orbital path, altitude, 
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and speed of the satellite or ISS.  At the time of this study (December 2007) the authors 
speculated that: 
“The calculations do not include the as yet unknown change in OD particle 
number and distribution due to the recent Chinese ASAT experiment. Such events 
are certain to increase the number of orbiting particles. Some people have 
suggested that a relative small number of explosions in LEO can eventually 
render LEO space uninhabitable for satellites because one large particle can 
cause an explosion that leads to further particles that hit more spacecraft until a 
runaway situation is reached.” 
Since that study came out, there has been a major collision in orbit between a dead Russian 
satellite and US communications satellite.74
The ISS has several means of protecting itself and crew against impacts with 
micrometeoroids and orbital debris.  First, the ISS can be moved to a different orbit if the ground 
controllers (with radar) can discover and track a potential threat. The ISS has been moved on 
occasion to avoid any possibility of collision.  NASA and the DOD (plus other countries) already 
track over 13,000 objects larger than about two inches known to be in orbit.   
  Both were over 680 kg (1500 lbs) in mass and 
created a debris field many times larger than the Chinese ASAT experiment, with thousands of 
new smaller objects going in a multitude of directions.  While the collision occurred at an 
altitude of 790 KM (about 490 miles), which is well above the ISS (normally around 200-240 
miles), the debris will all eventually sink to lower orbits and threaten the ISS orbit as the debris 
speed decays.  Large debris from that event was seen re-entering the atmosphere over Texas as 
early as a week after the collision. 
The ISS has an outer skin and additional protective “curtains” to increase its protective 
shields.  These shields and outer skins are meant to absorb the initial energy of a small strike and 
have the energy spread out through the protective layer much like a bullet hitting a bullet-proof 
vest (see 2.3.7.2).  An interesting highlight of the high importance of MMOD protection to the 
ISS program is the fact that the US government allowed the technical export of the “BUMPER” 
hypersonic ballistic penetration software code to all foreign ISS partners as the de-facto analysis 
standard to allow technical development of better and better protective strategies.  This export 
was quickly granted, despite the fact that such a code has obvious military benefits. 
3.3.8 Test and Integration 
3.3.8.1 ISS Multi Element Integrated Testing (MEIT) Program 
Testing complex space systems represented a major challenge to NASA and its partners.  
Many of the modules were developed in different countries and delivered “just in time” for the 
launch.  Each module had to be tested for its own internal operation; then it had to interface with 
the launch vehicle, and finally it had to work in space while integrated with multiple modules 
and systems.  An early strategy at NASA to save cost was coined as “Ship and Shoot” which 
implied the modules or systems were delivered as late as possible to the launch site preventing 
extensive testing, checked for internal operation (but with little or no testing when coupled with 
other systems or simulators) and then “shot” into orbit where they would be installed.  The 
                                                 
74 “Satellite Collision Puts Hubble at Risk,”  ABC News, Gina Sunsiri, 13 Feb 2009. 
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factory-level and subsystem checkouts were all that might have been planned or possible. Given 
this approach, the modules were not originally scheduled to be delivered in time to perform 
additional testing at the Kennedy Space Center. 
By the late 1990s and with the benefit of MIR and Shuttle mission experience, NASA 
adopted a more integrated approach for testing.75
MEIT 1 – US Lab Module, Z1, P6, SSRMS, Node 1 (simulated since it was in orbit) 
  It became apparent that most of the modules 
and major subsystems would be available prior to launch for some version of integrated testing 
and limited ground assembly to imitate the final “on-orbit” assembly and operation.  This 
approach allowed for element-to-element interface capability to be tested and verified as well as 
systems end-to-end operability with hardware and software.  To the degree that hardware could 
be physically connected in its final orbit configuration, it was tested as such.  Otherwise, the 
segments were connected with simulation hardware.  Four major test configurations are detailed 
on the following page and were [Note the truss segment designations: Z for zenith, P for port, 
and S for starboard. The truss numbers indicate the order from the center.]: 
MEIT 2 – S0/MT/MBS, S1, P1, P3/4, US Lab (simulated since it was now in orbit) 
MEIT 3 – JEM, Node 2, US Lab (simulated since it was in orbit) 
Node 2 System Test – Node 2, US lab & Node 1 (simulated) 
The MEIT 2 set-up is shown in Figures 32 and 33. 
The results of this MEIT approach were significant and prevented major problems that 
would have been discovered only after attempting to assemble and then test the major elements 
while in orbit.76
 P6 Truss failed to power up due to Auxiliary Power Converter Unit under voltage 
trip condition. 
 The MEIT approach for functional verification was a major SE contribution 
from Boeing based on their lessons learned on their 777 aircraft development program.  In 
particular, Boeing brought the Digital Pre-Assembly (DPA) and Cable Assessment/Fluid 
Assessment (CA/FA) technologies to bear, which enabled the success of MEIT. DPA ensured 
verification of element-to-element structural interfaces without interference, while CA/FA 
ensured that on-orbit assembled fluid and electrical lines would mate properly once installed. 
Major discoveries on the ground were: 
 US Lab activation took over 36 hours during on ground first MEIT power up due 
to significant computer/procedure problems. 
 Multiple Command and Control (C&C) computer failures due to task overrun 
problems.  C&C computers failed to perform synchronization with GPS time. 
 Incorrect video cable harnesses which would have required difficult EVA in orbit 
to replace 
                                                 
75 “Integrated Testing at KSC between Constellation Systems,” Tim Honeycutt, KSC Constellation Ground 
Operations Project Office, February 2008. 
76 “Integrated Testing at KSC between Constellation Systems,” Tim Honeycutt, KSC Constellation Ground 
Operations Project Office, February 2008. 
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 Space to ground communication audio was unacceptable and would have required 
a major on-orbit upgrade and fix. 
The net result of these and other discoveries was a chance to fix them while on the 
ground at significant cost and schedule saving as well as a major risk reduction to the crew and 
to the future missions. 
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Figure 32.  Multi Element Integrated Test Configurations for the ISS 
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Figure 33.  Multi Element Integrated Test 2 Set Up for the ISS
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3.3.8.2 Software 
The modules, experiments and ISS housekeeping systems all had different base 
programming languages and were written independent of each other during development with 
only specified moderately-detailed interface specification.  The issues tended to be handled 
relatively well by the IPT process and the integrations protocols, despite the lack of a full rapid-
prototyping simulation area for the integrated software.  The bigger issue was the practical 
requirement for a different and distinct software configuration for each flight configuration.  This 
required a major systems engineering effort to coordinate the exchange of information, followed 
by the process for testing and assuring that changes were producing the expected results for the 
new configuration.  Such multiple-configuration integration was one of the more important 
aspects of the program and the system engineering process. 
Initially, there were over 4 million lines of code in the ISS command and control system.   
This code had to accommodate multi-configurations to include active modules for those elements 
already on orbit and “inactive” software modules for elements that had not yet been delivered.   
As the new ISS elements arrived, the new code was turned on.  The software test and evaluation 
took place on the ground using a duplicate of the entire ISS system architecture.  This large 
software build has been re-written numerous times in the ISS’s lifespan. 
3.4 Execution Issues 
3.4.1 Unrealistic Estimates for Cost and Schedule 
The ISS has one major area in 
common with all current NASA 
development programs—significant 
schedule and cost overruns.   
Multiple GAO reports have targeted 
NASA for these problems (See 
Figures 34 and 35)77.  A recent 
Aerospace Corporation study78
Starting with the Space 
Station Freedom in the 1990s, cost 
overruns on the space station were a 
 
looked at a variety of NASA 
programs and found results typical to 
those shown below for forty NASA 
mission projects.  The vast majority 
all overran their budgets.  The NASA 
experience has been to create 
optimistic schedules with the 
majority suffering schedule slippage. 
                                                 
77 “Perspectives on NASA Mission Cost and Schedule Performance Trends,” David Beardon, Presentation at GSFC 
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Figure 34.  NASA Cost and Schedule Overruns 
  
67 
 
common problem and led to its eventual redesign. Despite excellent progress in technical areas 
and in integrating its IPs, the program 
suffered schedule and cost overruns 
from the very start.  By 2001, the 
problem was getting worse, so a blue-
ribbon ISS Management and Cost 
Evaluation Task Force was created to 
look at the ISS program and make 
recommendations.79
 
  This panel of 
senior and very experienced former 
NASA, government and corporate 
experts delivered the following 
findings: 
1. The ISS program plans and 
budget were not credible.    
NASA had not and did not 
have the capability to develop 
and implement a rigorous ISS cost estimate.   It also did not have the capability to track 
and audit costs in a timely fashion.    NASA lacked the basic tools and financial staff to 
create and track a detailed life cycle cost estimate.  
2. The existing estimate at the time (2001) had doubled since program inception and much 
of the cost and schedule growth was due to poor original estimates, requirements 
definition, capability creep, and program changes—all traditional reasons for cost growth 
in large programs. [These issues were exacerbated during the Freedom station design. In 
particular, the meandering mission scope which included stakeholders for micro-gravity 
science, Earth observation, satellite servicing, and spacecraft assembly for deep space 
missions. Such diverse interests drive the system design as well as cost and schedule 
performance.] 
3. The program was being managed as an “institution” rather than a program with specific 
purpose, focused goals and objectives, and defined milestones.   The program budget was 
paying for a large number of NASA staff and support contractors—a “standing army.”   
This flat-funding concept by Congress did not match the system’s engineering life cycle 
and prevented NASA from optimizing the development and construction. 
4. The budget from Congress and NASA’s focus on fiscal year management provided no 
strategic management or focus.  The Congress provided level funding, but without multi-
year authority to make optimal economic decisions. 
5. Lack of a defined program created confusion and inefficiencies.  The budget and 
execution did not match reality and major changes to the program had been made 
(reductions) without the approval of the IPs. 
                                                 
79 “Report by the International Space Station Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force to the NASA Advisory 
Council,” November 1, 2001 
 
Figure 35.  NASA Schedule Outcomes 
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The result of the budget growth and schedule slips has been the construction of a station 
with less capability than planned and with a completion date that complicates needed support 
from all partners.  After this report was presented, the ISS suffered additional delays as a result 
of the Columbia accident.       
3.4.2 Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act 
The United States uses trade incentives (or bans) as a part of its foreign policy to 
encourage nations to achieve its national strategies and those of its partners.80   One of the issues 
that the United States has been concerned about is the proliferation of nuclear weapons and of 
technologies for their development.    In the late 1980s, the United States and its partners began 
an effort to stop the sales of ballistic missile technology under the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR).81    In 1993, Russia joined the ISS partnership and agreed to abide by the 
MTCR (1995).  During this same period, it was perceived that entities under the control of the 
Russian space Agency began to sell sensitive technology to Iran. In response, Congress passed 
the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA)82
The INA and its actual implementation in terms of ISS had many restrictions, but NASA 
was still able to move ahead with the ISS program.   It did not forbid the completion of any 
ongoing contracts or agreements.   It also allowed for the US (NASA) to purchase service if the 
crew of the ISS was in “imminent” danger services to maintain the existing Russian service 
module, and $14M for Russian docking hardware already under development and production.   
The Russian partnership agreement requires them to maintain a “lifeboat” at the station at all 
times with the capability to return three astronauts.   Because it carries three, and the Soyuz 
normally can stay aloft only six months, this implies two launches per year.  The US must 
provide the capability for three more crew once the station is complete (for a total of six).  There 
was also a 1996 “Balance Agreement” to provide 11 Soyuz missions for Russian and American 
(or other) crew.  At this point, the NASA strategy was to have either a US crew rescue vehicle in 
place or a new space plane.  Neither of these happened in the post Columbia environment.     
 which banned the US from doing business with entities 
that support Iran—in this case, it specifically targeted the Russia Space industry and the NASA 
human spaceflight program.    Prior to this, it was estimated that the US had spent $800M in 
direct buys of goods and services to support the ISS programs.  However, the Iran Non-
Proliferation Act (INA) would put a severe limitation to this unless Russia could demonstrate 
cooperation. 
With the new vision of space exploration announced by the administration in 2004, the 
Space Shuttle is scheduled for retirement in 2010.  NASA plans to contract for Soyuz flights 
                                                 
80 “The Iran Nonproliferation Act and the International Space Station:  Issues and Options,” Sharon Squassoni and 
Marcia S. Smith.  22 August 2005, Congressional Research Service. 
81 The Missile Technology Control Regime is an informal and voluntary association of countries which share the 
goals of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and 
which seek to coordinate national export licensing efforts aimed at preventing their proliferation. The MTCR was 
originally established in 1987 by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Since that time, the number of MTCR partners has increased to a total of thirty-four countries, all of which have 
equal standing within the Regime. 
82 Iran Nonproliferation Act, Public Law 106-178 
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through 2012 and for limited Progress flights—which should be replaced by European, Japanese 
or American automated supply vehicles.  There remains an issue about what happens after 2012 
and until the new US crew vehicle is ready in the 2015-2016 timeframe. Studies are underway 
for human-rating both commercial and IP launch vehicles that may provide services to ISS; 
although no decisions have been made to enable US crew access to ISS between 2012 and the 
availability of the Orion/Ares 1 vehicle. 
3.4.3 ISS Logistical Support 
Traditional crewed space vehicles have been designed for short term missions with 
maintenance and logistics a distant second to performance.  The ISS challenge is more like 
designing a naval ship that operates in a hostile environment, but must have periodic 
maintenance with no chance of visiting a dry dock.  The ISS has been in orbit as of this writing 
over 4000 days with over nine full years of crew habitation.  With an expected lifetime of over 
15 years (2015 and beyond), space logistics is a major portion of the ISS program and a learning 
laboratory for future space exploration and engineering. 
As discussed previously, the transportation issues alone are complex and made more so 
by budget constraints and limitations on what can be brought into space.   The system 
engineering challenge for each system and subsystem had to consider initial deployment, 
assembly and then possible repairs of all or part of a major component.   To complicate this, the 
designers also had to consider spare parts, tools, diagnostic equipment and sensors (both ground 
and on-orbit) and how to do maintenance without disrupting the ISS operation.     
An early discovery on the MIR by the Soviets was the large amount of time spent on 
station maintenance compared to research.    The ISS has been no different.   In the five-year 
time period since initial occupation (2000-2005), astronauts spent over 4000+ hours on ISS 
preventive and corrective maintenance—not counting how long it took to assemble the station.83
One of the challenges to system engineers when designing equipment and systems is 
determining the mean-time-between-failures (MTBF), which determines maintenance plans and 
spares inventory.  Using traditional “earth” values has resulted in some ISS items far exceeding 
their MTBFs—which means some of the ISS stored spares are not needed and waste critical 
space.   If the delivered MTBF is too short, then critical systems or services may suffer—such as 
crew lighting when the bulbs burn out too soon. In most cases, the Orbital Replacement Units 
(ORUs) were planned for removal and replacement on-orbit, swapped out with spares, and the 
failed equipment being shipped back to Earth for repair. Given the expected retirement of the 
Space Shuttle, this strategy for large ORU maintenance has shifted to storage of ORUs on-orbit. 
    
This works out to almost two hours of maintenance per day per astronaut.     
A major problem has been how to deal with subsystems that fail in orbit, but which were 
not optimized for on-orbit repair or replacement.  This can be as simple as lacking the right tool 
for disassembly or the problem of physically removing an item without cutting a hole in the side 
of the ISS.  The problem manifests itself when items on the exterior break or fail and the only 
access is through a space walk with limited tools or ability to address the system.  The tools 
                                                 
83 “Crew Maintenance Lessons Learned from ISS and Considerations for Future Manned Missions,”  Christie 
Bertels, Senior Operations Engineer, System Engineering Support Services (SESS), Munich Germany at the June 
2006 AIAA SpaceOps Conference, Rome Italy. 
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themselves are an issue if they have to be calibrated or the modules require different tools—such 
as metric or standard.  While there were attempts to standardize equipment, there are still 
hundreds of different fasteners, washers, etc. that all require their own tools. 
Another major issue is the engineering tradeoff between designing in automated health 
monitoring systems--and sensors that might pinpoint failures to key parts--and how to fix 
malfunctioning equipment or major components.    While useful, this option increases 
complexity, cost, and weight.    One major advantage that the ISS has over other space systems is 
the human in the loop.   On-site astronauts tied in with thousands of ground support engineers 
have the ability to modify the systems already in place plus innovate as needed with materials on 
hand.     
Mundane issues have often had major impacts in ISS operations.  The use of consumable 
parts limits ISS functionality.  A lack of disposable batteries and duct tape can limit repairs or 
research progress.  Items such as filters, carbon dioxide scrubbers, water, cleaners and many 
other items we take for granted have to be rationed.  The design challenge is how to design a 
system where these are not needed or else minimized.  
A last major issue mentioned by several of the past ISS systems engineers is 
obsolescence and shortened equipment life-spans.  Some of the major equipment is not lasting as 
long as NASA had hoped and the failure of these parts and subsystems is forcing revised 
decisions about upgrades, replacement and long term repair strategies.  The rotating joints that 
turn the large solar panels have exhibited failures. With the root cause of the joint failure 
unidentified, the problem has disappeared with the maintenance steps of cleaning up the filings, 
regreasing the joint, and installing the new array (note: EVAs performed in 2008).  Some of the 
ISS systems continue having problems—such as oxygen generators, the new urine recycling 
system, and the toilets.   
3.4.4 Handling a Major Computer Failure 
The importance of the systems engineering process came to light during a major 
computer disruption that occurred on 14 June, 2007, during the STS-117 mission.  In this case, it 
shed light on the requirements, design, integration and test and evaluation process that had been 
used during the ISS’s early period that resulted in the existing configuration of June 2007. 
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Figure 36.  STS-117 Extra-Vehicular Activity at ISS  
The major goal of the STS-117 mission to the ISS was to deliver and deploy the last major set of 
large solar arrays (See Figure 36).  Each ISS solar wing contains two 115 foot long panels that 
attach to a central truss for a total width of almost 240 feet and a weight of 17.5 tons.   Unfurling 
the panels is a slow, tedious procedure that has not always gone as planned.   On a previous 
assembly mission (STS-97), a similar panel failed to deploy properly and had to be repaired 
during a subsequent space walk.   This deployment went smoothly—considering the 120-foot 
panel had been in storage for several years, compressed into a block only 20-inches deep (see 
Figure 37).  In order to provide a clear field of view for the new panels, an older solar array had 
to be furled and stowed.  Both the new and old 
panels generate several KWs of power, create 
large static charges and can generate radio and 
static noise. 84
The first hint of trouble came during 
the deployment when the Russian navigation 
computer developed some anomalies forcing 
the ISS crew to switch to the Space Shuttle 
Atlantis’s thrusters along with the ISS US 
gyroscopes to maintain attitude control.    This 
delayed the initial power up of the solar wings 
(since the ISS was not initially in optimal 
position to charge the panels). 
 
                                                 
84 “Engineers Close in on Cause of ISS Computer Glitch,” Tariq Mailik, Space News.  23 July 2007. 
Figure 37.  Stowed Solar Panel Being Unfolded for Deployment 
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A short time later on 14 July, all six of the command and control computers in the 
Russian module failed.85
The computers were eventually brought back on line by running jumper cables to bypass 
the computers power monitoring devices.  After running tests of all critical systems, the Shuttle 
Atlantis departed with replacement computers to be delivered on board an unmanned Russian 
supply ship (Progress).  While the fix seemed to work, it was not immediately clear why it 
worked. 
  The computers controlled the Russian module attitude control thrusters 
as well as the Elektron oxygen generators and other atmosphere control system equipment.    The 
station did have sufficient oxygen on board for the short run (estimated at 56 days for the basic 
ISS crew), but this would have long-term impacts if unresolved.  To control the station, the ISS 
used the four US control moment gyroscopes to maintain orientation along with the Space 
Shuttle Atlantis thrusters.   The computers also controlled power to the Soyuz return vehicle 
(lifeboat) and the external service module cooling loops.  The atmospheric control system and 
carbon dioxide scrubbers were also off line.  As a result, the station internal temperature began to 
rise.  After two of the computers were rebooted, this triggered a false alarm for the crew in the 
middle of a sleep cycle. 
This was not the first command and control computer system failure—in 2001 the mass 
storage drives on the US side had suffered a failure and had to be replaced.86  Again in February 
2002, the main computer shut down for several hours before the crew and ground controllers 
were able to reboot it.87  It was however, the first major failure of all three, redundant computer 
systems.  The Russian computers were developed and manufactured by Daimler Benz (German 
company) almost a decade before.   The initial starting point for a solution was to determine what 
might have triggered the event (root cause analysis).  The astronauts had just connected the new 
truss elements a few minutes before the failure sequence began.  Both the Russians and NASA 
were aware that the ISS electrical properties can change with each new configuration.  It was 
known that the Russian computer system design was sensitive to static noise and voltage spikes – 
thus the need for a sophisticated power monitoring system.  With the addition of a major solar 
array and the movement of an existing one, it appeared that this was an obvious source of a static 
or electrical spike that might cause a computer failure.  The US modules used a structural ground 
system while the Russians used a floating ground approach.  Adding a major new module or 
element could cause a potential difference between the Russian ground and the ISS structure.88  
The basic theory at the time was that the electrically charged plasma field shifted when the ISS’s 
shape changed with the addition of the new truss and solar panels.89  Both NASA and the 
Russian space companies alluded to this as a probable cause—and both proved to be premature 
and wrong.90
                                                 
85 “International Systems Integration on the International Space Station,” William H. Gerstenmaier, Ronald L. 
Ticker, IAC-07-B3-1.01 
 
86 NASA International Space Station Status Report #01-13, 9 May 2001 
87 International Space Station Status Report, #02-07 
88 “Legacy of the ISS Computer Crisis,”  Spaceflight Magazine, 2008 January. 
89 “ISS Computer Woes Concern Europe,” Irene Klotz, BBC News, June 2007. 
90 “Space Station Repairs on Main Computer System Continues,” Todd Weiss, Computer World, 15 June 2007. 
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After the Atlantis left, the ISS crew (Russians Fyodor Yurchikhin and Oleg Kotov and 
American Clayton Anderson) disassembled the individual systems to troubleshoot possible 
causes.  They suspected the power monitoring system since the bypass around it allowed the 
computers to work (though it did present a risk to possible voltage spikes).  While disassembling 
the power monitoring systems they discovered connection pins that were corroded and wet.   
Performing continuity checks, they discovered that one of the main lines had shorted out.  More 
surprising, when they and ground personnel simulated the failure of the lines, they discovered 
that this created a power off command to all three of the “redundant” processing units—they had 
a single point failure designed into the system. 
A Russian Progress 26P re-supply ship was launched on 2 Aug 2007 to bring supplies 
and replacement computers (new models built by ESA).  On August 8, the Endeavor launched 
with STS-118 crew to install another major truss segment and to continue work on the computer 
system.  Further investigation by the crew found the source of the corrosion—water 
condensation.  They determined that the units were close to dehumidifiers that mal-functioned, 
ejecting water vapor on the unit.  When the boxes were removed for replacement, their bases 
were wet and mold was discovered.  
The good news for the ISS was that the computers did not have a fatal flaw.  The same 
computer system was built into the European Columbus Laboratory Module that was scheduled 
to fly later in 2008.  They also were on the Automated Transport Vehicle scheduled for 2008 
launch.  Replacing and or redesigning that system would have been a major problem for both 
systems. 
In retrospect, this incident focused questions on key areas of the systems engineering 
process: 
1. Did the requirements and integration process encompass all needed areas? 
a. Grounding issues and electrical impacts of configurations changes 
b. Impacts of humidity on electronics and the adequacy of the environmental 
control system 
c. Systems integration between international systems 
2. Was the test and evaluation process sufficient? 
a. How did the German/Russian system contain a single point failure node? 
b. How are configuration changes modeled, studied and tested? 
c. Were the computers/electronics properly tested for the ISS environment?  
3.4.5 Transportation  
Transportation to the ISS is a major part of the system that is equal in importance to the 
safety and reliability of the ISS itself.  The US Skylab experience is a painful reminder that a 
failure to integrate the schedule, budget and planning of a new system with all critical elements 
can lead to unwanted outcomes.  In the case of Skylab, the system was totally dependent on the 
old Apollo systems for initial launch and servicing, and then the promised availability of the 
shuttle for continued operation and support.  In hindsight, it appeared questionable why the US 
would launch a system that could be used for only one year (1973-74), cancel the existing 
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transportation system (Apollo), and then expect to park it in orbit for at least five years (until late 
1978) on the hope that the Space Shuttle would be on schedule and capable of immediately 
performing maintenance missions.   This obviously demonstrates the challenge inherent in US 
plans to retire the Shuttle in the 2010 timeframe with a known gap in US crew transport to 
service the ISS.91
3.4.5.1 Impacts of launch delays (Columbia failure) 
  This is a basic systems engineering requirements discussion coupled with 
budget and politics. However, the benefits of international partnership highlights the fact that 
even if the US is unable to sustain the ISS, the robust partnership is in place to sustain it. 
From the beginning of the ISS program, the 
space shuttle fleet was considered an essential part of 
the ISS program and critical to its completion.  The 
Space Shuttle (Figure 38) is the only vehicle capable of 
carrying large payloads of up to 36,000 lbs into low 
earth orbit.  The remaining ISS major modules were 
designed to be carried on the shuttle. The shuttle also 
transports the multi-purpose logistics module to the ISS 
which is loaded with cargo, supplies, experiments and 
other key life support items.  It is removed from the 
cargo bay and docked with the ISS for unloading.   At 
the end of the mission, it is loaded with trash, waste 
material and experiments and placed in the shuttle bay 
for return to earth. 
Throughout the program, the schedule has always been optimistic and included little 
slack to accommodate risk.  At a very top level, much of the program cost is for the “standing 
army” of scientists, engineers and technicians that work for NASA, its partners, and its 
contractors.  For the Shuttle this is the large team required to process the vehicle for flight.  For 
the ISS the significant problem is the extended development time that requires maintaining the 
team at a higher staffing level.  As the program slips for a variety of reasons, this “fixed yearly 
cost” continues and raises the total program cost.  Several major government and NASA panels92
When the shuttle Columbia was lost in February 2003, NASA grounded all remaining 
shuttles indefinitely pending the outcome of the accident investigation.  This meant a day for day 
slip in the ISS construction schedule, plus a serious problem on how to logistically support the 
station and transport astronauts.  The Russians already were providing Soyuz and Progress 
flights carrying six astronauts per year plus cargo. Initially, many options were contemplated, 
including bringing the Americans home from the ISS.  The inventories of food and supplies were 
carefully updated and tracked closely on orbit and on the ground to determine the feasibility of 
continuing ISS operations relying solely on Russian capability. A strategy eventually developed 
 
have studied these issues and recommended major program changes to reduce cost—most of 
which also reduced the final size or capability of the ISS and the number of shuttle flights. 
                                                 
91 “The Vision for US Space Exploration,”  NASA Report, February 2004 
92 “Report by the International Space Station Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force to the NASA Advisory 
Council,”  NASA Report, 1 Nov 2001. 
Figure 38.  Space Shuttle 
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that reduced the crew aboard ISS from three to two—one Russian and one American—and 
officially lengthened the Increment duration from approximately 4 months to a standard 6 
months to fit the Soyuz rotation schedule. Upon completion of Increment 6, the ISS complement 
was reduced to two people. This situation was managed as a temporary situation, although it 
eventually lasted two and a half years. 
The grounding of the Shuttle fleet lasted until July of 2005 (almost 30 months) with the 
launch of the shuttle Discovery.  It was then another year (July 2006), before the next shuttle 
visited the ISS.  This caused a number of impacts to the ISS program:93
 The number of Progress vehicles was increased to 3-4 per year to provide 
logistics support.  This required a modification to the exemption of the Iran, North 
Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act. 
 
 Shuttle payloads already packed and certified had to be unpacked and the contents 
safely stored.  Some of the contents and equipment had to be serviced, and in 
some cases replaced due to their time sensitive natures (such as batteries and 
fluids) 
 A solar array awaiting launch had to be unpacked and unfurled and then 
recertified.  Another solar array wing had to be returned to the factory and 
replaced since it was only allowed to be in storage (tightly packed in its container) 
for a fixed period of time. 
 The single most significant impact was the reduction of crew size for several 
expeditions from 3 to 2.  This was done largely to improve margins on critical 
logistics. 
 Obviously, only limited repairs could be made on the ISS without spare parts or 
new equipment.  Without new research and or maintenance equipment, the ISS 
crew used the existing resources more—which contributed to higher failure rates. 
Very limited equipment was flown on Progress and Soyuz. 
 A normal part of every shuttle mission was the return of science experiments, 
especially time sensitive experiments.  The Soyuz vehicle had very little space to 
return payloads; so much of this research was not completed. 
While the total cost of the delay may never be known, it was significant.  NASA 
estimated that the following were the major issues they faced that drove cost: 
 The 30-month delay before resuming normal flight schedules extended the cost of 
maintaining the ISS support staff and contractors to finish development 
 Numerous requirements to recertify equipment 
 Disassembly, reassembly and in some case repair of component parts 
 Cost of additional storage 
 Cost of maintaining and replacing consumables (especially batteries) 
 Storage effects on the solar arrays 
                                                 
93 “Impact of the Grounding of the Shuttle Fleet,: GAO Report GAO-03-1107, September 2003. 
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 Additional cost of Russia support flights and the cost of travel and working with 
Russians 
 Continued cost of maintaining critical engineering skills on the program for an 
additional 30-40 months. 
3.4.5.2 Russian Soyuz and Progress vehicles 
From the start of the ISS program, it was assumed that there would be service and 
transportation missions consisting of the US Space Shuttle, Soviet expendable vehicles (Soyuz 
and Progress) along with future systems to be developed.  The Russians had extensive 
experience with their early space stations through the more recent Mir program with launching 
cargo and cosmonauts.  They developed very reliable automated docking capability that allowed 
them to routinely use unmanned Progress resupply vehicles. 
For crewed transportation, the Russians have used their Soyuz systems successfully 16 
times carrying 47 astronauts up to the ISS and returning 48 astronauts to Russia.  However, 
recent return missions in the Soyuz have raised some fears about the safety of the Russian 
system.  On 21 October 2007, Soyuz TMA-10 undocked from the ISS for an expected, normal 
return carrying two cosmonauts and a space flight participant (paying passenger).  Normally, the 
utility module is detached and sent in a safe direction to de-orbit and burn up.  The propulsion or 
instrument assembly module is bolted to the bottom and provides the required de-orbit burn to 
slow the spacecraft and align it for reentry (See Figure 39).  Once on course, the propulsion 
module’s explosive attachment bolts fire and the two are separated.  The capsule then begins its 
reentry in a heat shield down mode where it “skims” along the atmosphere from the lift 
generated which limits the heat buildup and limits the G-force on the astronauts to a 4.5 G 
maximum. 
 
Figure 39.  Soyuz Manned Vehicle 
In this case, the capsule failed to properly separate from the propulsion module 
(apparently due to a control cable issue) and was not able to fly the normal trajectory.  Instead, 
after the propulsion module separated, the capsule went into a fail-safe mode and took a steep, 
ballistic trajectory.  This subjected the crew to almost 9 Gs plus generated significant burn 
damage to the capsule’s exterior.    
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Figure 40.  Fire at Scene of Soyuz Capsule Landing 
The capsule landed hard, several hundred kilometers off course, and was so hot it started 
a grass fire around the capsule (see Figure 40).  One of the cosmonauts reported later that the 
grass fire burned quite heavily causing smoke to enter the ventilation system of the capsule 
(normally opens upon landing) causing the three cosmonauts to switch back to their spacesuit 
breathing modes. 
Six months later (April 2008), a similar incident occurred.94
As a result of these two incidents, two Russian cosmonauts on the ISS made a spacewalk 
in July 2008 to remove one of the explosive bolts from the Soyuz TMA-12 that was docked and 
planned for an upcoming descent.  That Soyuz did successfully return with a near perfect landing 
in October 2008 with two cosmonauts and an American tourist. 
  This time Soyuz TMA-11 
was returning one American (ISS Commander Peggy Whitson), a Korean and a Russian 
astronaut when the capsule failed to properly separate.  This time the culprit was thought to be 
faulty explosive separation bolt.  Once again, when the normal systems failed, the capsule 
defaulted to the fail-safe mode and performed a ballistic trajectory subjecting the astronauts to a 
high G reentry.  The Korean astronaut suffered back injuries as a result of the hard landing. 
The Progress supply ship has an excellent record with over thirty-seven missions to the 
ISS.  Compared to the Soyuz, it does not have to safely reenter the atmosphere and land—instead 
it is normally filled with waste and sent on a trajectory to burn up in the atmosphere.  NASA has 
decided to stop using Progress after 2011 in favor of promised US-based commercial launch 
providers.  Several firms are competing for contracts to provide logistics support to the ISS in the 
post 2010 time frame.  (See section 3.2.6) 
This policy decision to not spend money on Russian vehicles and instead invest the 
money in American technology made good domestic public policy sense.  However, from a 
systems engineering risk viewpoint, it must take into account the TRL levels of the replacement 
systems, the cost, the schedule, the risk and the relevant MTBF of the new systems.  As an 
example, one of the US competitors is Space Exploration Technologies Falcon 1 rocket (See 
                                                 
94 “Space Crews Hard Landing Raises Hard Questions,”  James Oberg, MSNBC News. 
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Figure 41).  It completed its first successful 
launch on 28 September 2008 after three 
previous failures and plans on delivering 1000 
kg payloads to low earth orbit for about $10M. 
3.4.5.3 Retirement of the Shuttle 
Two key parts of any well-engineered 
system of systems are that all parts work well 
with each other (integration and performance) 
and that the various systems are available when 
needed.  In the case of the ISS and the Shuttle, 
the Shuttle was always destined to be a key 
element of the successful construction and station operation.   
In later testimony to Congress,95
“Retirement of the Space Shuttle is on schedule for 2010 and critical to future 
Exploration plans. As we approach this date, we are hopeful that we can complete 
the ten remaining Space Station assembly flights, the servicing mission to the 
Hubble Space Telescope, and the two contingency Shuttle missions to the ISS 
within this timeframe. If it becomes clear that we will not complete the flight 
manifest by 2010, NASA will evaluate options and make adjustments consistent 
with not flying any flights beyond 2010. Continuing to fly the Shuttle beyond 2010 
does not enhance U.S. human spaceflight capability, but rather delays the time 
until a new capability exists and increases the total life cycle cost to bring the new 
capability on line. . . . Flying the Space Shuttle past 2010 would carry significant 
risks, particularly to our efforts to build and purchase new transportation systems 
that are less complex, less expensive to operate, and better suited to serving both 
ISS utilization and exploration missions to the Moon, Mars, and beyond.”  
 the Administrator explained that the decision to retire 
the Space Shuttle is basically one of trading off the ISS (and its completion) against future 
manned spaceflight capability if it requires extending the Shuttle beyond 2010: 
The decision to retire the shuttle has been controversial. From a systems engineering 
viewpoint, the decision should consider risk, cost, safety and performance to decide what the 
best overall approach should be. Further, with a significant downward trend in the economy 
NASA programs are not at the top of Congressional priorities, and are thus vulnerable, especially 
when already winding down. Such a budgetary position tends to lead to “status quo” in 
congressional direction: the sense that NASA should plod on with the existing year’s mode of 
business until directed otherwise. In this backdrop of political and financial reality, George W. 
Bush’s vision for NASA in February 2004 required the shutting-down of two existing programs 
with expensive but functioning infrastructure, with ongoing missions that had been actively 
cultured as priorities with the American public and with many international partners. Once the 
“keep on operating” status quo was replaced with a “keep on shutting down, and waiting for the 
next big thing” status quo, NASA was deeply limited and constrained in its ISS systems 
                                                 
95 Statement of Administrator Michael Griffin to the Subcommittee on Space, Aeronautics and Related Sciences, 15 
November 2007 
Figure 41.  Space Exploration Falcon 1 
Rocket 
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engineering options. While the shuttle program’s realities were of course more dire than ISS’s 
with their more immediate shut-down, the ISS also faced a highly uncertain and less desirable 
future than the one for which it had been designed.  The entire ISS maintenance strategy had to 
be re-engineered for a slow obsolescence with no chance of major Shuttle repair flights or 
ground refurbishment of critical large system components.  The logistics and crew rotations 
would be severely cut back from original plans.   Meanwhile, the inevitable delays in the Orion 
spacecraft have led to a long forecast period of no US launch capability, significantly dulling the 
accustomed luster of the US Space program on the world stage. 
The Shuttle has been the primary transportation for long duration US crew members and 
for short term US research, construction and visits by US astronauts.  If the Shuttle is terminated 
after 2010, the US will be dependent on the Russians for crew transportation until a domestic 
capability is ready.  Initial analysis done by NASA indicates a gross requirement for sustainment 
supplies of 80 metric tonnes (MT) between 2010 and 2015.  Additionally, the plan is to occupy 
the ISS with a full time crew of six, with each crew doing six month rotations.  Of the six person 
crew, three would be Russian and three would be from the US, Canada, Europe or Japan.  The 
US has current arrangements with the Russians for crew launches (Soyuz) through 2011 only and 
for limited Progress flights.96
Sustaining the International Partnership 
  
A major question for the US and its partners is how well the international partnership has 
worked and what may be useful on future cooperative ventures.  There is little doubt that the 
participation by the IPs allowed the program to succeed much more quickly and more 
successfully than if the US had shouldered the entire program.  In fact, the dissimilar redundancy 
in launch capability ensured the continuation of the program through the Columbia accident 
down time. 
 Despite the different systems engineering environments, the IPs were able to work 
with the joint SE structure and integrate modules and systems that came from 
very different development processes.  
 It is quite possible that Congress and/or a US President would have cancelled the 
program had not an IP arrangement occurred to execute the new ISS design.97
From our partner’s viewpoints, there were some major challenges:
 
98
 The Japanese invested heavily in the program early on and met their original 
schedules only to face months and years of wait times prior to launch and/or on 
orbit participation. 
 
                                                 
96 As a reference point, in 2005, NASA paid Russia $43.8M for one seat up to the ISS and one seat down using the 
Soyuz vehicle.     
97 In January 1993, the first advice given to the new President Clinton by his Budget Director Leon Panetta was to 
cancel the Space Station.    Lawmakers Guide to Balancing the Federal Budget.  June 9, 1992. 
98 “Foreign Policy in Orbit:  The International Space Station,”  John M. Logsdon, Director, Space Policy Institute, 
George Washington University’s Elliot School of International Affairs. 
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 The Russians were essentially on schedule to deliver the first module (Functional 
Cargo Block—FGB) as it was funded by the US.  Their next major module, 
Zvezda, was almost two years late, primarily due to Russian funding issues. 
 ESA and CSA have all remained in the program, but like all IPs, their level of 
financial support has varied and is often a function of domestic politics. 
3.4.6 Anomaly Resolution and the Columbia Accident 
A major issue that has challenged NASA and other managers of major programs is how 
to handle technical and or performance anomalies that occur.  This has been at the heart of the 
two Shuttle accidents and at incidents related to the ISS and other NASA programs.  This 
involves the proper identification, reporting, investigation, resolution and documentation for all 
ISS crew, hardware and software issues.  At issue is how to have the full resources of NASA 
(and the international team) quickly focus on and solve a problem before the ISS and its crew are 
placed in peril—while at the same time not declaring an emergency with every possible incident 
and making the operation of the ISS impossible.  Following the Columbia accident, NASA 
reviewed its policies to include anomaly resolution for the ISS.99
 The ISS will provide capability to do external surveys of visiting spacecraft as 
well as itself.  ISS external surveys of itself (to discover damage or maintenance 
issues) are limited in certain areas without Shuttle support.  The ISS and crew 
since that time have completed surveys and developed procedures for regular 
inspections. 
  The main recommendations 
(October 2003) that affected the ISS were as follows: 
 The board directed the ISS team to review all of its analytical models that are 
used to support on-orbit operations, anomaly resolution and decision making 
processes. 
 Evaluate and improve ISS shielding and planning to avoid damage from 
micrometeoroid or orbital debris damage.  This has taken the form of additional 
shielding, movement of the station and new procedures and equipment to handle 
possible impact damage. 
 The report directed the ISS team to address major nonconformance report issues.  
The most serious was that the Space Shuttle reaction jet drive system did not have 
adequate failure tolerance to control against an inadvertent firing when attached to 
the ISS.  This was fixed. 
 While not a hardware issue, one of the most important recommendations was a 
major review and validation of the ISS anomaly resolution process and its work 
instructions, to assure that proper resources were assigned and processes were 
begun in a timely manner to deal with anomalies early. 
                                                 
99 “NASA’s Implementation Plan for International Space Station Continuing Flight,”October 28, 2003.    This was 
the ISS Program’s response to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s Report.    
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3.4.7 Major Risks to the ISS 
As part of the SE process, NASA and its international partners have had to carefully 
consider all design elements and requirements.   A key consideration is the remoteness of the ISS 
relative to traditional systems and the inability to rapidly provide additional support (i.e., quickly 
supply spare parts or personnel onsite).  The most likely operational safety risks are briefly 
discussed below along with their demonstrated or planned solutions. 
 Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Damage:100
Table 3.  Probability of Penetration Damage to the ISS 
 There are millions of 
particles in orbit that range from micro-millimeter sized particles to large pieces 
of decaying spacecraft.  While most large pieces are tracked, there is always a 
probability of impact.  For the larger tracked items, the ISS can be moved given 
enough warning.  The ISS is designed with a level of protection in its outer skin 
for most modules.  MMOD debris panels have been added to protect the Russian 
modules and the living quarters.  There is also the danger of impact during 
extravehicular activities, as the space suits have a lesser level of protection.  The 
probabilities of MMOD impacts have been studied to show how safety is 
improved with service module augmentations in place and additional Russian 
Progress and Soyuz enhancements: 
 
Existing ISS Design 
With Service Module 
Augmentations in 
Place 
With Service Module 
Augmentations plus 
Progress and Soyuz 
Enhancements 
No Penetration 45% 54% 71% 
Isolate the 
Penetrated 
Element 
19% 16% 11% 
Penetration 
Leading to ISS 
Abandonment 
18% 14% 8% 
Repairable 
Penetration 
9% 8% 5% 
Penetration 
Leading to Loss 
of ISS and/or 
crew 
9% 8% 5% 
 
As the table indicates,101
                                                 
100 A further discussion on micrometeorite and orbital debris protection is at 3.3.7. 
 there is a very good chance that the ISS will sustain some level 
of appreciable damage during its lifetime. 
101 SM stands for service module 
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 Collision with vehicles or remote manipulator systems: The MIR program 
demonstrated that collisions between the various vehicles and the ISS are a real 
possibility.102
1. The vehicles must have at least a two-failure tolerant approach against 
catastrophic outcomes.  The system must have onboard fault detection, 
isolation and reconfiguration capability plus the ability to self monitor all 
critical functions.  It must have an independent collision avoidance maneuver 
function.  There must be a manual ground and crew monitoring capability to 
follow progress and react to out of tolerance situations.  It must have 
robustness against failed capture capabilities. 
  A major engineering challenge of the ISS was how to unload cargo 
and personnel from arriving space vehicles and how to move the new or old 
module around for installation.  Arriving vehicles all have a combination of 
automated and manual docking interfaces and procedures. These vehicles use a 
three-tiered approach to ensure safety: 
2. The second level of protection requires that the ground station be able to 
monitor all aspects of the activity with the ability to abort while the ISS crew 
must be able to monitor and take evasive actions. 
3. The third level of protection requires the new systems to demonstrate key 
capabilities during their first flight while maintaining a safe distance from the 
ISS prior to an actual attempted docking. 
 There is also a risk of damage from any of the space station’s robotic arms.  In 
some case, there are definite limits to their movement that prevent damage.  
However, most have to have the ability to reach most areas of the ISS to be 
useful.  The key approaches to safety for these operations center on two-fault 
tolerant designs, extensive crew training, monitoring by the crew and the ground 
support and careful mission design and simulation. 
 Fire: This is a major hazard and the primary safety approach is prevention. In the 
early design phase, the engineers carefully selected fire-safe materials and 
mechanical/electrical designs with low probability of fire creation.  There is also 
extensive fire detection (smoke and heat alarms) throughout the ISS to provide 
quick warning of any dangerous situations.  The ISS system was designed to 
identify the fire site, isolate the area (remove power, ventilation and oxygen), and 
extinguish the source without damaging the station or endangering the crew.  The 
physics of a fire in space make this a very unlikely but still dangerous possibility.  
A chronic problem early in the program was that the very sensitive smoke 
detectors (particularly those in the FGB) would too often alarm ground operators 
and crew at nuisance levels.  Although there have been dozens of alarms, not a 
single actual fire has occurred onboard. The ISS is also equipped with hand-held 
fire extinguishers and the crew is trained in their use. 
                                                 
102 The MIR was hit on at least two separate occasions, once with a Progress transfer vehicle and another with a 
Soyuz.   The Progress accident caused a module to depressurize. 
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 Toxic Spills: The main means of preventing toxic spills is by not bringing toxic 
materials on board or containing them in spill-proof devices.  When toxic items 
are allowed, the crew follows strict procedures for using the items and conducting 
the experiments or procedures.  The crew has well-practiced procedures for 
cleaning spills in microgravity and has access to full protective gear if needed.103
 Catastrophic system failure: This type of failure and its prevention permeate the 
SE approach to the ISS.  At each stage of review, methods for reducing this risk 
are considered—redundancy, sound design specification, rigorous testing, and 
risk assessment.  After the Columbia accident, the ISS management team took the 
opportunity to focus on the ISS to see if any significant risk remained.  If found, 
these are documented in noncompliance reports (NCR).  The only significant 
NCR remaining at this time dealt with the shuttle reaction jet driver (RJD) and 
primary jet thrusters.  The danger was that they might inadvertently fire and 
damage the ISS.  NASA quickly studied the issue and dictated no fire zones 
during certain key operations, performing avionics checks prior to system 
activation, and performing each flight’s first-time Shuttle equipment power-up 
before Shuttle docking to the ISS. 
 
 Extravehicular Activity (EVA): This is primarily the safety of the astronauts, their 
equipment and the contamination of their equipment and danger of damaging the 
exterior of the ISS.  The most important preventative measure has been the 
extensive planning and practice of the EVAs.  Each EVA has been rehearsed 
underwater (when possible) for hundreds of hours prior to the missions to ensure 
the astronauts understand the repair, have the right tools, and have the EVAs 
orchestrated properly using the robotic arms if needed.  There is also an intra-
vehicular crew member always coordinating with the EVA crew.  The biggest 
danger to date has been a concern about damaging the suits.  This can happen due 
to a rip or tear, chemical exposure or contamination or puncture by a meteorite or 
orbital debris.    The suits are a compromise between flexibility and impact 
protection.  The current EVA requirement for MMOD is to meet a probability of 
no penetration of 91% against two member performing 2700 hours of EVAs.  
Current analysis puts the actual probability at 94%.  So far, there has been no 
evidence of a MMOD impact to any of the EVA suits. 
 There is a danger of contamination from ISS materials and lubricants.  On a 
recent mission (18 November 2008) an astronaut was preparing to repair and 
lubricate one of the solar array joints.104
                                                 
103 On 19 Sept 2006, the first ever “emergency” was declared on the ISS when a Russian oxygen generator  
(Elekton) malfunctioned and began to overheat.   It caused an o-ring to overheat and smoke, which allowed some 
potassium  hydroxide to leak.    The three astronauts quickly donned protective gas masks and implemented their 
emergency procedures to isolate the module and the spill.    They cleaned up the spill with towels and used special 
carbon filters to scrub the air.   Within a few hours, the station air was clean again and the situation was over.   
(Associated Press Report, Seth Borenstein, 19 Sept 2006) 
  In a pre-packed tool kit, the astronaut 
opened the bag and discovered one of the grease cartridges for the grease gun had 
“exploded,” contaminating everything in the bag—along with the astronaut’s 
104 “Engineers Study Options for Replacing Lost Grease guns,”  William Harwood, CBS News, 18 Nov 2008 
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gloves and sleeves.  The cleanup method was to basically wipe up the grease with 
towels and store the dirty towel and most of the grease in plastic pouches.  In this 
case, the problem is more than just a minor mess; the remaining grease on the 
space suit can contaminate the airlock, the space station interior and exterior—to 
include sensors and exterior experiment payloads. 
 Errant Commands or Security Compromises: The ISS by design shares a great 
deal of control with the ground stations.  There is always a danger of an outside 
source compromising the security and sending false commands.  The ISS design 
and operation meet all NASA and National Security Agency (NSA) requirements.  
The systems are tested and challenged regularly to maintain system security.  
There is also a risk of an inadvertent critical command from NASA.  Commands 
that could cause catastrophic damage are required to be two-stage commands—a 
separate “arm” and then “fire.”  Additionally, these types of commands are 
automatically safed and require approval by Mission Control Center personnel at 
Houston and must also be approved by the mission flight director.  There is also 
software protection on other critical commands that query the crew with “are you 
sure” messages that must be acknowledged.  NASA reports that each year, over 
100,000 commands are sent to the station with a command accuracy exceeding 
99.95%. 
3.5 Long Term Outlook 
The long-term challenges for the ISS are more financial and political in nature than 
systems engineering problems.  The United States, like its IPs, is facing economic pressures 
during a down economy while trying to develop a new crewed launch system (see Figure 42) and 
a new exploration program to the moon and beyond (dubbed the Constellation Program).  As 
discussed earlier, the US decision to retire the shuttle has had major impacts on the ISS 
completion and operation.  The US has also discussed possible retirement dates for the ISS and 
what that would mean to its partners.  Many of the partners invested and developed their 
modules with the plan of a long station life on orbit.  Many, including the Russians, are even 
considering possible new additions to the ISS for research.105
In May 2009 the station's crew was expanded from three to six astronauts, A record 39 
Russian space launches were planned for 2009, as opposed to 27 in 2008 (not all to ISS, but an 
indicator of the robustness of the Russian program, even in light of the world’s financial crisis).  
  The possibility of an early shut 
down of the ISS would have negative impacts on future cooperative efforts. 
While the Constellation Program competes for budget with the legacy ISS program, it 
also may become the biggest supporter and benefactor of the ISS.106
                                                 
105 “The Role of Space Stations in Russia’s Long Term Exploration Strategy,” Valery Borisov and Andrey 
Golovinken, IBC Workshop, Berlin, November 17, 2006. 
  During the development 
phase of the new program, it will have to do a capabilities-based assessment of planned 
technologies.  Many of these new or modified technologies will be needed for long duration 
space missions and will require extensive validation.  While some tests are quite feasible on the 
106 “Reduction of Space Exploration Risk—Use of ISS as a Test Bed for Enabling Technologies,”  Ilia Rosenberg, 
Michael Clifford, and Joy Bryant, The Boeing Company, AIAA conference paper.    
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ground, the best method is to test them in the environment in which they will operate—outer 
space.  The ISS as a test bed for space exploration is the best tool to evaluate the acceptable 
tradeoff between new technology, manufacturing maturity and applicability for long duration 
spaceflights. 
Despite political and financial challenges, there are some indications that the ISS may 
already be suffering premature aging issues that could shorten its lifespan.  In January 2009,107
                                                 
107 “Nasa Delays Shuttle Launch, Space Station’s Relocation,” Traci Watson, USA Today, February 4, 2009. 
 
ISS rockets were commanded to fire to move the station into a higher orbit as part of routine 
station-keeping.  An incorrect delay filter was loaded for the “off pulsing” delta-V burn, allowing 
the jet pulses to hit a resonance with fundamental ISS structural modes.  The jet firing filter is 
designed to prevent just such an occurrence, and the resonant excitation had the potential to 
severely limit the fatigue life of the ISS, which diminishes roughly as the fourth power of the 
magnitude of the applied load.  This load reached previously unexpected levels during the 
incident.  Onboard video confirmed that the station shook severely—much like a ship in a violent 
storm.  The vibration episode was severe enough that the three astronauts notified mission 
control and ground engineers did a full check of the station’s systems.   While nothing was found 
to be wrong, ground controllers delayed additional thruster burns for two months to give them 
time to recheck the systems.  NASA Space Station program manager Mike Suffredini noted that 
while this event appears not to have harmed the station, its total lifetime has been shortened due 
to extra stress on its components over the years.  
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Figure 42.  Orion Visiting the ISS 
4.0 SUMMARY 
4.1 Summary 
The International Space Station definitely has been the most complex NASA systems 
engineering program to date.  Despite the enormous challenge of dealing with International 
Partners, multiple configurations and a dynamic political environment, the ISS is close to 
completing its final configuration and becoming fully operational.  A major element of its 
success has been the program management and effective systems engineering process that NASA 
has developed and executed over the last three decades.   
The success of the ISS traces back to the original decisions to use much of the 
demonstrated technologies from the Skylab, Space Station Freedom, Shuttle missions and 
eventually, the Russian contributions that were proven onboard MIR and it predecessors.  While 
many of the systems were updated, it was done in an evolutionary manner that reduced system 
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risk, reduced cost and minimized schedule risk.  Another major part of the success was the team 
effort to develop advanced element-to-element physical and functional verification methods for 
interfaces assembled on-orbit.  While this was also applied at the sub-system level, this helped to 
discover and quickly fix many system problems that would have been very difficult, if not 
impossible to fix once on orbit.  Finally, NASA and its partners developed an excellent systems 
engineering approach to handle the 40+ on-orbit configurations that placed demanding 
requirements on unique software, hardware and operational requirements every time the ISS was 
upgraded with the next component or modules. Such evolutionary performance is atypical of 
almost every other complex electromechanical system, and its complexity is compounded by the 
additional strict requirements of human-rated space hardware.  
NASA and its partners also had problems that the system engineering approach had to 
either deal with or work around.  The biggest issue was program uncertainty from all the 
countries as budgets were adjusted or eliminated during the life of the program.  The current plan 
for the Shuttle retirement and the uncertain lifespan of the ISS (prior to decommissioning) 
remains a major issue for the ISS partners. 
4.2 Lessons Learned 
We interviewed experts and asked what they felt were the most important lessons learned 
for NASA systems engineers.  While there were a variety of responses, those responses tended to 
repeat the same core topics discussed below: 
 Sometimes difficult topics need to be finessed with the use of less-than-precise language.  
While open to interpretation or requiring future interpretation, such constructive ambiguity 
allows negotiators to move beyond an impasse.108
 Don’t be so ready to chase revolutionary designs over evolutionary designs.  A key lesson 
from Russian experience (such as the Soyuz) is that it is often less risky to stay with a known 
design and provide minor improvements. 
 
 Multi-Element Integrated Testing with actual hardware, high fidelity simulators and 
connectors is critical and must be in the program from day one. 
 Systems engineering involves communications, critical to international partnerships, so 
before worrying about technical interfaces, make sure the integrated product teams and 
communication bandwidth between partners are optimal. This fundamentally includes face-
to-face meetings, so regular international travel is a large and essential part of the systems 
engineering cost. 
 In an ISS like project where so many different countries and companies contribute hardware 
and software, the interfaces must be extremely simple. 
 Maintaining a high level of competent and experienced personnel over a two decade long 
program requires strategic level planning and execution of workforce planning.  Despite 
budget realities, cyclical hiring and layoffs due to budget minimized workforce competence. 
 Don’t be too quick to allow partners (or NASA) to start building modules or expensive 
experiments too far in advance of locking in schedule and program baseline.  109
                                                 
108 “Structuring Future International Cooperation:  Learning from the ISS,”  L. Cline, P. Finarelli, G. Gibbs, I. Pryke, 
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 Conversely, physically simple models are important, especially in the early systems 
engineering phase. These should be budgeted for and provided on a continuing basis.   A 
simple turned-wood model can be produced overnight to illustrate most of the complex 
geometries of a typical spacecraft, and such a model definitely beats using lay-around objects 
such as pencils and salt shakers to imitate construction or rendezvous details.  Generally, 
appropriate crude models were scarce, with the Program waiting for the next design iteration 
before commissioning an official one-of-a-kind public relations model.  Such lower-fidelity 
models were most needed by the engineers during the process to get to that next iteration.  
Some of the most rapid gains in the US integration with Russian partners occurred with crude 
models cut from cardboard and wood during breaks between meetings.  (One team even built 
a full-scale cardboard mockup of a key US-Russian interface along their meeting table during 
a week-long meeting, and filled in many interface control details using a tape measure 
against the model).   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
109 This is not unique to the ISS.   NASA previously built a back-up Skylab that was not used and today hangs in the 
Smithsonian as one of the most expensive exhibits.   The Russian Multi-Purpose Logistic Module is another 
example of major hardware that was started, then stopped, then started again and finally launched into space.  
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APPENDIX 2.  ACRONYMS 
 
 
1P Progress flight110
1S Soyuz flight 
 
AC Assembly Complete 
ACU Arm Control Unit 
ARC Ames Research Center 
ARIS Active Rack Isolation System 
ATCS Active Thermal Control System 
atm Atmospheres 
ATV Automated Transfer Vehicle, launched 
by Ariane [ESA] 
ATV-CC Automated Transfer 
VehicleControl Centre 
BCA Battery Charging Assembly 
BCDU Battery Charge Discharge Unit 
BSA Battery Stowage Assembly 
CBM Common Berthing Mechanism 
CC Control Center 
CCAA Common Cabin Air Assembly 
CCC Contaminant Control Cartridge 
CDRA Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly 
CETA Crew and Equipment 
TranslationAid/Assembly 
CEV Crew Exploration Vehicle 
CEVIS Cycle Ergometer with Vibration 
Isolation System 
CHeCS Crew Health Care System 
CMG Control Moment Gyroscope 
CMRS Crew Medical Restraint System 
 
                                                 
110 NASA Space Flight Guide 
 
CMS Countermeasures System 
CNES Centre National D’Études Spatiales 
[French space agency] 
COF Columbus Orbital Facility 
COL-CC Columbus Control Centre 
COTS Commercial Orbital 
Transportation Services 
CPDS Charged Particle Directional 
Spectrometer 
CRPCM Canadian Remote Power 
Controller Module 
CSA Canadian Space Agency 
CTB Cargo Transfer Bag 
CWC Contingency Water Container 
DC Docking Compartment; Direct Current 
DCSU Direct Current Switching Unit 
DDCU DC-to-DC Converter Unit 
DDT&E Design, Development, Test, and 
Evaluation 
DLR German Aerospace Center 
DMS Data Management System 
DOS Long-Duration Orbital Station 
[Russian] 
EADS European Aeronautic Defence and 
Space Company 
ECLSS Environmental Control and Life 
Support System 
ECS Exercise Countermeasures System 
ECU Electronics Control Unit 
EDR European Drawer Rack 
EDV Water Storage Container [Russian] 
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EF Exposed Facility 
EHS Environmental Health System 
ELC Expres Logistics Carrier 
ELM Experiment Logistics Module 
EMU Extravehicular Mobility Unit 
EPM European Physiology Module 
EPS Electrical Power System 
ERA European Robotic Arm 
ESA European Space Agency 
ESTEC European Space Research and 
Technology Centre 
ETC European Transport Carrier 
EVA Extravehicular Activity 
ExPCA EXPRESS Carrier Avionics 
EXPRESS Expedite the Processing of 
Experiments to the Space Station 
FGB Functional Cargo Block 
FRAM Flight Releasable Attachment 
Mechanism 
FRGF Flight Releasable Grapple Fixture 
FSA Roscosmos, Russian Federal Space 
Agency 
FSL Fluid Science Laboratory 
GASMAP Gas Analyzer System for 
Metabolic Analysis Physiology 
GB Gigabyte 
GCM Gas Calibration Module 
GCTC Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center 
GN&C Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite 
System [Russian] 
GPS Global Positioning System 
GRC Glenn Research Center 
GSC Guiana Space Center 
HMS Health Maintenance System 
HRF Human Research Facility 
HTV H-II Transfer Vehicle [JAXA] 
IBMP Institute for Biomedical Problems 
ICC Integrated Cargo Carrier 
ICS Internal Communications System 
IEA Integrated Equipment Assembly 
IRU In-flight Refill Unit 
ISPR International Standard Payload Rack 
ISS International Space Station 
ITA Integrated Truss Assembly 
ITS Integrated Truss Structure 
IV-CPDS Intravehicular Charged Particle 
Directional Spectrometer 
JAXA Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency 
JEM Japanese Experiment Module 
JEM-ELM Japanese Experiment Module- 
Experiment Logistics Module 
JEM-ELM-EF Japanese Experiment 
Module-Experiment Logistics Module-
Exposed Facility 
JEM-ELM-ES Japanese Experiment 
Module-Experiment Logistics Module-
Exposed Section 
JEM-ELM-PS Japanese Experiment 
Module-Experiment Logistics Module-
Pressurized Section 
JEM-PM Japanese Experiment Module-
Pressurized Module 
JEM-RMS Japanese Experiment Module- 
Remote Manipulator System 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
kgf Kilogram Force 
kN Kilonewton 
KSC Kennedy Space Center 
lbf Pound Force 
  
94 
 
LF Logistics Flight 
LiOH Lithium Hydroxide 
LSS Life Support Subsystem 
Mb Megabit 
MBS Mobile Base System 
MBSU Main Bus Switching Unit 
MCC Mission Control Center 
MDM Multiplexer-Demultiplexer 
MELFI Minus Eighty-Degree Laboratory 
Freezer for ISS 
MGBX Microgravity Science Glovebox 
MLE Middeck Locker Equivalent 
MLM Multipurpose Laboratory Module 
MMOD Micrometeoroid/Orbital Debris 
MMU Mass Memory Unit 
MOC MSS Operations Complex 
MPLM Multi-Purpose Logistics Module 
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center 
MSS Mobile Servicing System 
MT Mobile Transporter 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 
NAVSTAR Navigation Signal Timing and 
Ranging [U.S. satellite] 
NPO Production Enterprise [Russian] 
NTO Nitrogen Tetroxide 
NTSC National Television Standards 
Committee 
OMS Orbital Maneuvering System 
OGS Oxygen Generation System 
ORU Orbital Replacement Unit 
OVC Oxygen Ventilation Circuit 
P1, P6, etc. Port trusses 
PCAS Passive Common Attach System 
PDA Payload Disconnect Assembly 
PDGF Payload Data Grapple Fixture 
PLSS Primary Life Support System 
PM Pressurized Module 
PMA Pressurized Mating Adapter 
POC Payload Operations Center; Primary 
Oxygen Circuit 
PROX OPS Proximity Operations 
PSA Power Supply Assembly 
PSC Physiological Signal Conditioner 
PTCS Passive Thermal Control System 
PVGF Power Video Grapple Fixture 
PVR Photovoltaic Radiator 
RED Resistive Exercise Device 
RGA Rate Gyro Assembly 
RM Research Module 
RMS Remote Manipulation, Manipulator 
System 
RPC Remote Power Controller 
rpm Revolutions Per Minute 
ROEU-PDA Remotely Operated Electrical 
Umbilical-Power Distribution Assembly 
RPCM Remote Power Controller Module 
RSC Rocket and Space Corporation 
RV Reentry Vehicle 
S&M Structures and Mechanisms 
S0 or S Zero, Starboard trusses 
S1, etc. 
SARJ Solar (Array) Alpha Rotation Joint 
SAFER Simplified Aid for EVA Rescue 
SASA S-Band Antenna Structural Assembly 
SAW Solar Array Wing 
SFOG Solid Fuel Oxygen Generator 
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SFP Space Flight Participant 
SGANT Space-to-Ground Antenna 
SM Service Module 
SPDM Special Purpose Dexterous 
Manipulator 
SS Space Shuttle 
SSA Space Suit Assembly 
SSIPC Space Station Integration and 
Promotion Center 
SSRMS Space Station Remote Manipulator 
System 
SSU Sequential Shunt Unit 
STS Space Transportation System 
TCS Thermal Control System 
TDRS Tracking and Data Relay Satellite 
TEPC Tissue Equivalent Proportional 
Counter 
TKS Orbital Transfer System 
TKSC Tsukuba Space Center 
TMA Transportation Modified 
Anthropometric 
TMG Thermal Micrometeoroid Garment 
TNSC Tanegashima Space Center 
TORU Progress Remote Control Unit 
[Russian] 
TSC Telescience Support Center 
TSS Temporary Sleep Station 
TSUP Moscow Mission Control 
TVIS Treadmill Vibration Isolation System 
UDMH Unsymmetrical Dimethylhydrazine 
UF Utilization Flight 
UHF Ultra-High Frequency 
ULF Utilization and Logistics Flight 
UMA Umbilical Mating Assembly 
USOC User Support and Operations Centre 
VDC Voltage, Direct Current 
VDU Video Distribution Unit 
VOA Volatile Organic Analyzer 
WRS Water Recovery System 
Z1 Zenith 1, a truss segment 
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APPENDIX 3.  SPACELAB MISSIONS 
• STS-9, Spacelab 1, November 1983, Module LM1 and Pallet (Columbia)  
• STS-51-B, Spacelab 3, April 1985, Module LM1 (Challenger)  
• STS-51-F, Spacelab 2, July 1985, triple Pallet configuration (Challenger)  
• STS-61-A, Spacelab D1, October 1985, Module LM2 (Challenger)  
• STS-35, ASTRO-1, December 1990, Pallet (Columbia)  
• STS-40, SLS-1, June 1991, Module LM1 (Columbia)  
• STS-42, IML-1, January 1992, Module LM2 (Discovery)  
• STS-45, ATLAS-1, March 1992, double Pallet configuration (Atlantis)  
• STS-50, USML-1, June 1992, Module LM1 (Columbia)  
• STS-47, Spacelab-J, September 1992, Module LM2 (Endeavour)  
• STS-56, ATLAS-2, April 1993, Pallet (Discovery)  
• STS-55, Spacelab D2, April 1993, Module LM1 (Columbia)  
• STS-58, SLS-2, October 1993, Module LM2 (Columbia)  
• STS-59, SRL-1, April 1994, Pallet (Endeavour)  
• STS-65, IML-2, July 1994, Module LM1 (Columbia)  
• STS-68, SRL-2, October 1994, Pallet (Endeavour)  
• STS-66, ATLAS-3, November 1994, Pallet (Atlantis)  
• STS-67, ASTRO-2, March 1995, Pallet (Endeavour)  
• STS-71, Spacelab-Mir, June 1995, Module LM2 (Atlantis)  
• STS-73, USML-2, October 1995, Module LM1 (Columbia)  
• STS-78, LMS, June 1996, Module LM2 (Columbia)  
• STS-83, MSL-1, April 1997, Module LM1 (Columbia)  
• STS-94, MSL-1R, July 1997, Module LM1 (Columbia)  
• STS-90, Neurolab, April 1998, Module LM2 (Columbia)  
• STS-99, SRTM, February 2000, Pallet (Endeavour)  
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APPENDIX 4.  PHASE ONE—SHUTTLE-MIR MISSIONS 
 
1994  
Feb  
3 - 11 
STS-60: First Cosmonaut on the Shuttle
Sergei K. Krikalev was the first Cosmonaut to fly aboard the Shuttle. 
 
1995  
Feb  
3 - 11 
STS-63: First Rendezvous with Mir
With Cosmonaut VladiMir Titov aboard, Discovery rendezvoused with Mir, 
closed to within 37 feet, and performed a fly-around, but did not dock. 
 
Mar 14 
- Jul 7 
Thagard Increment: First Astronaut on Mir
Astronaut Norman Thagard launched with Cosmonauts VladiMir Dezhurov and 
Gennady Strekalov aboard a Russian Soyuz to spend 115 days on Mir. 
 
Jun 27 
- Jul 7 
STS-71: First Docking
Atlantis performed the first shuttle docking with Mir; delivered a replacement 
crew -- cosmonauts Anatoly Solovyev and Nikolai Budarin -- and returned 
Dezhurov, Strekalov, and Thagard to Earth. 
 
Nov 
12 - 20 
STS-74: A New Docking Module
The first shuttle assembly flight to Mir, it carried a Russian-built, U.S.-funded 
docking module with two attached solar arrays.  
 
1996  
Mar 
22 - 31 
STS-76: Starting a Continuous U.S. Presence
This mission carried Shannon Lucid to Mir, demonstrated logistics capabilities 
with a Spacehab module, and placed experiment packages on Mir's docking 
module during a spacewalk. 
 
Mar 22 
- Aug 26 
Lucid Increment: One for the Records
Shannon Lucid began the continuous U.S. presence on Mir and set a U.S. single 
spaceflight record of 188 days. The Priroda module, with about 2,200 pounds of 
U.S. science hardware, was docked to Mir. 
 
Aug 
16 - 26 
STS-79: Blaha Succeeds Lucid
This mission included a double Spacehab module. It brought Lucid home and 
replaced her with John Blaha.  
 
Aug 16 -  
Jan 22, 
1997 
Blaha Increment: Keeping it Going
Blaha spent four months with the Mir-22 Cosmonaut crew conducting material 
science, fluid science, and life science research. 
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1997  
Jan 
12 - 22 
STS-81: Linenger Succeeds Blaha
On this mission, Jerry Linenger replaced Blaha. 
 
Jan 12 
- May 24 
Linenger Increment: A Spacewalk and a Fire
Linenger conducted the first spacewalk by a U.S. astronaut wearing a Russian 
spacesuit and experienced the onboard fire in February. 
 
May 
15 - 24 
STS-84: Foale Succeeds Linenger
This mission carried up Linenger's replacement Mike Foale, along with Russian 
mission specialist Elena V. Kondakova. 
 
May 15 
- Sep 25 
Foale Increment: Collision and Recovery
Foale experienced the collision with the Progress, which damaged the Spektr 
module and caused the loss of some science experiments. A remarkable salvage 
and replanning effort by Foale and the science community maximized the 
scientific return. Foale conducted a spacewalk with Anatoly Solovyev to survey 
damage to the Spektr module. 
 
Sep 25 
- Oct 6 
STS-86: Wolf Succeeds Foale
David Wolf boarded Mir with this mission, replacing Foale. Astronaut Scott 
Parazynski and cosmonaut VladiMir Titov conducted a joint spacewalk, the first 
in which a Russian wore a U.S. spacesuit. 
 
Sep 25 -  
Jan 31, 
1998 
Wolf Increment: Back Toward Normal
Wolf conducted a spacewalk in January with cosmonaut Solovyev to conduct 
scientific experiments. 
 
1998  
Jan  
22 - 31 
STS-89: Thomas Succeeds Wolf
This mission replaced Wolf with Andy Thomas. The flight also carried cosmonaut 
Salizhan Sharipov to Mir. 
 
Jan 22 
- Jun 12 
Thomas Increment: Smoothest Sailing
Thomas studied meteorology, ocean biochemistry, and human adaptation to 
microgravity. 
 
Jun  
2 - 12  
STS-91: Closing Out Shuttle-Mir
This mission picked up Thomas and conducted scientific investigations. Phase 1 
came to a close.  
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APPENDIX 5.  INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION MISSION SUMMARIES  
Spacecraft Launch  Landing/ Deorbit Mission  Mission Crew** 
1998 
Zarya FGB 1998 Nov. 20 
In 
progress  1A Control Module - 
STS-88 1998 Dec. 4  
1998 Dec. 
15  2A Unity (Node 1) delivery 
Robert D. Cabana, Frederick W. 
Sturckow, Jerry Ross, Nancy J. Currie, 
James H. Newman, Sergei Krikalev 
1999 
STS-96 1999 May 27  
1999 June 
6  2A.1 Strela/logistics delivery  
Kent V. Rominger, Rick D. Husband, 
Tamara E. Jernigan, Ellen Ochoa, Daniel 
T. Barry, Julie Payette, Valeri Tokarev 
2000 
STS-101 2000 May 19 
2000 May 
29  2A.2a Logistics delivery  
James D.. Halsell, Scott J. Horowits, Mary 
Ellen Weber, Jeffrey N. Williams, James 
S. Voss, Susan Helms, Yuri Usachev 
Zvezda 2000 July 12  
In 
progress  1R Service Module - 
Progress 
M1-3 
2000 
Aug. 6 
2000 Nov. 
1 1P Cargo supply  - 
STS-106 2000 Sept. 8 
2000 
Sept. 19 2A.2b Logistics delivery  
Terrence W. Wilcutt, Scott D. Altman, 
Daniel C. Burbank, Edward Tsang Lu, 
Richard Mastracchio, Yuri Malenchenko, 
Boris Morukov 
STS-92 2000 Oct. 11 
2000 Oct. 
24 3A 
Z-1 truss, PMA-3 
docking port delivery 
Brian K. Duffy, Pamela A. Melroy, Koichi 
Wakata, Leroy Chiao, Peter J.K. Wisoff, 
Michael E. Lopez-Alegria, William S. 
McArthur 
Permanent presence of the crew of three  
Soyuz TM-
31  
2000. 
Oct. 31 
2001 May 
6 2R 
1st resident crew 
delivery  
Bill Shepherd, Yuri Gidzenko, Sergei 
Krikalev (up) Talgat Musabaev, Yuri 
Baturin, Dennis Tito (down) ** 
Progress 
M1-4  
2000 
Nov. 16 
2001 Feb. 
8 2P Cargo supply - 
Endeavour 
STS-97 
2000 
Dec. 1 
2000 Dec. 
11 4A  
Delivery of the P6 
section with solar arrays  
Brendt Jett, Michael J. Bloomfield, Joseph 
R. Tanner, Marc Garneau, Carlos I. 
Noriega 
2001 
Atlantis 
STS-98  
2001 
Feb. 7 
2001 Feb. 
20 5A  Destiny (US lab) delivery 
Kenneth D. Cockrell, Mark L. Polansky, 
Robert L. Curbeam, Marsha S. Ivins, 
Thomas D. Jones 
Progress M-
44 
2001 
Feb. 26 
2001 April 
13 3P Cargo supply  - 
Discovery 
STS-102  
2001 
March 8 
2001 
March 21 5A.1 
1st and 2nd resident 
crew exchange, 
Leonardo cargo module 
delivery and return 
James Wetherbee, James Kelly, Andrew 
Thomas, Paul Richards; Yuri Usachev, 
James Voss, Susan Helms (ISS-2: up), 
Bill Shepherd, Yuri Gidzenko, Sergei 
Krikalev (ISS-1: down)** 
Atlantis 
STS-100 
2001 
April 19 
2001 May 
1 6A 
Remote manipulator 
delivery, Raffaello cargo 
module delivery and 
return 
Kent V. Rominger, Jeffrey S. Ashby, Chris 
A. Hadfield, John L. Phillips, Scott E. 
Parazynski, Umberto Guidoni, Yuri V. 
Lonchakov 
Soyuz TM-
32 
2001 
April 28 
2001 Oct. 
31 2S 
Soyuz rescue vehicle 
replacement 
Talgat Musabaev, Yuri Baturin, Dennis 
Tito (up)** (This crew returned onboard 
Soyuz TM-31) 
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Progress 
M1-6 
2001 
May 21 
2001 
Aug. 22 4P Cargo supply - 
Atlantis 
STS-104 
2001 
July 12 
2001 July 
24 7A 
US airlock delivery and 
installation (four tanks on 
two Spacelab pallets) 
Steven W. Lindsey, Charles O. Hobaugh, 
Michael L. Gernhardt, Janet L. Kavandi, 
James F. Reilly 
Discovery 
STS-105 
2001 
Aug. 
10 
2001 
Aug. 21 7A.1 
2nd and 3rd resident crew 
exchange; Cargo module 
delivery and return 
Scott "Doc" Horowitz, Frederick Sturckow, 
Patrick Forrester, Daniel Barry; Frank 
Culbertson, Vladimir Dezhurov, Mikhail 
Tyurin (ISS-3: up); Yuri Usachev, James 
Voss, Susan Helms (ISS-2: down) 
Progress M-
45 
2001 
Aug. 
21 
2001 
Nov. 22 5P Cargo supply - 
Progress / 
DC-1 
2001 
Sept. 
15 
In 
progress  3R 
Docking Compartment 1 
delivery - 
Soyuz TM-
33  
2001 
Oct. 21 
2002 
May 5 3S 
Soyuz rescue vehicle 
replacement 
Viktor Afanasiev, Konstantin Kazeev, Claudie 
Haigneré (ESA) (This crew returned onboard 
Soyuz TM-32) 
Progress 
M1-7 
2001 
Nov. 
26 
2002 
March 20 6P Cargo supply - 
Endeavour 
STS-108 
2001 
Dec. 5 
2001 
Dec. 17 
UF-
1 
3rd and 4th resident crew 
exchange; The Rafaello 
cargo module delivery and 
return; Starshine-2 
deployment 
Dom Gorie, Mark Kelly, Linda Godwin, Daniel 
Tani; Yuri Onufrienko, Daniel Bursch, 
Carl Walz (ISS-4: up); Frank Culbertson, 
Vladimir Dezhurov, Mikhail Tyurin (ISS-
3: down) 
2002 
Progress 
M1-8 
2002 
March 
21 
2002 
June 25 7P Cargo supply - 
Atlantis 
STS-110 
2002 
April 8 
2002 
April 19  8A S0 truss delivery 
Michael J. Bloomfield, Stephen N. Frick, Rex 
J. Walheim. Ellen Ochoa, Lee M. E. Morin, 
Jerry L. Ross, Steven L. Smith 
Soyuz TM-
34  
2002 
April 
25 
2002 
Nov. 10 4S 
Soyuz rescue vehicle 
replacement 
Yuri Gidzenko, Roberto Vittori, Mark 
Shuttleworth. (This crew returned onboard 
Soyuz TM-33) 
Endeavour 
STS-111 
2002 
June 5 
2002 
June 19  
UF-
2 
4th and 5th resident crew 
exchange; Leonardo 
Multipurpose Logistics 
Module, Mobile Base System 
delivery 
Ken Cockrell, Paul Lockhart, Franklin Chang-
Díaz, Philippe Perrin; Yuri Onufrienko, 
Daniel Bursch, Carl Walz (ISS-4: down); 
Valery Korzun, Peggy Whitson, Sergei 
Treshev (ISS-5: up) 
Progress M-
46 
2002 
June 
26 
2002 
Oct. 14 8P Cargo supply - 
Progress 
M1-9 
2002 
Sept. 
25 
2003 
Feb. 1 9P Cargo supply - 
      
Atlantis 
STS-112  
2002 
Oct. 7 
2002 
Oct. 18 9A S1 truss delivery 
Jeffrey S. Ashby, Pamela A. Melroy, David A. 
Wolf, Piers J. Sellers, Sandra H. Magnus, 
Fyodor N. Yurchikhin. 
Soyuz TMA-
1  
2002 
Oct. 30 
2003 
May 4 5S 
Soyuz rescue vehicle 
replacement; ISS-6 return 
Sergei Zalyotin, Yuri Lonchakov, Frank De 
Winne (Belgium/ESA: up). (This crew 
returned onboard Soyuz TM-34) Ken 
Bowersox, Don Petit, Nikolai Budarin 
(ISS-6: down) 
Endeavour 
STS-113 
2002 
Nov. 
23 
2002 
Dec. 7 11A 
P1 truss, Expedition 6 and 5 
exchange 
Jim Wetherbee, Paul Lockhart, Michael 
Lopez-Alegria, John Herrington, Ken 
Bowersox, Don Petit, Nikolai 
Budarin.(ISS-6: up); Valery Korzun,  
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Progress 
M1-6 
2001 
May 21 
2001 
Aug. 22 4P Cargo supply - 
Atlantis 
STS-104 
2001 
July 12 
2001 July 
24 7A 
US airlock delivery and 
installation (four tanks on 
two Spacelab pallets) 
Steven W. Lindsey, Charles O. Hobaugh, 
Michael L. Gernhardt, Janet L. Kavandi, 
James F. Reilly 
Discovery 
STS-105 
2001 
Aug. 
10 
2001 
Aug. 21 7A.1 
2nd and 3rd resident crew 
exchange; Cargo module 
delivery and return 
Scott "Doc" Horowitz, Frederick Sturckow, 
Patrick Forrester, Daniel Barry; Frank 
Culbertson, Vladimir Dezhurov, Mikhail 
Tyurin (ISS-3: up); Yuri Usachev, James 
Voss, Susan Helms (ISS-2: down) 
Progress M-
45 
2001 
Aug. 
21 
2001 
Nov. 22 5P Cargo supply - 
Progress / 
DC-1 
2001 
Sept. 
15 
In 
progress  3R 
Docking Compartment 1 
delivery - 
Soyuz TM-
33  
2001 
Oct. 21 
2002 
May 5 3S 
Soyuz rescue vehicle 
replacement 
Viktor Afanasiev, Konstantin Kazeev, Claudie 
Haigneré (ESA) (This crew returned onboard 
Soyuz TM-32) 
Progress 
M1-7 
2001 
Nov. 
26 
2002 
March 20 6P Cargo supply - 
Endeavour 
STS-108 
2001 
Dec. 5 
2001 
Dec. 17 
UF-
1 
3rd and 4th resident crew 
exchange; The Rafaello 
cargo module delivery and 
return; Starshine-2 
deployment 
Dom Gorie, Mark Kelly, Linda Godwin, Daniel 
Tani; Yuri Onufrienko, Daniel Bursch, 
Carl Walz (ISS-4: up); Frank Culbertson, 
Vladimir Dezhurov, Mikhail Tyurin (ISS-
3: down) 
2002 
Progress 
M1-8 
2002 
March 
21 
2002 
June 25 7P Cargo supply - 
Atlantis 
STS-110 
2002 
April 8 
2002 
April 19  8A S0 truss delivery 
Michael J. Bloomfield, Stephen N. Frick, Rex 
J. Walheim. Ellen Ochoa, Lee M. E. Morin, 
Jerry L. Ross, Steven L. Smith 
Soyuz TM-
34  
2002 
April 
25 
2002 
Nov. 10 4S 
Soyuz rescue vehicle 
replacement 
Yuri Gidzenko, Roberto Vittori, Mark 
Shuttleworth. (This crew returned onboard 
Soyuz TM-33) 
Endeavour 
STS-111 
2002 
June 5 
2002 
June 19  
UF-
2 
4th and 5th resident crew 
exchange; Leonardo 
Multipurpose Logistics 
Module, Mobile Base System 
delivery 
Ken Cockrell, Paul Lockhart, Franklin Chang-
Díaz, Philippe Perrin; Yuri Onufrienko, 
Daniel Bursch, Carl Walz (ISS-4: down); 
Valery Korzun, Peggy Whitson, Sergei 
Treshev (ISS-5: up) 
Progress M-
46 
2002 
June 
26 
2002 
Oct. 14 8P Cargo supply - 
Progress 
M1-9 
2002 
Sept. 
25 
2003 
Feb. 1 9P Cargo supply - 
Atlantis 
STS-112  
2002 
Oct. 7 
2002 
Oct. 18 9A S1 truss delivery 
Jeffrey S. Ashby, Pamela A. Melroy, David A. 
Wolf, Piers J. Sellers, Sandra H. Magnus, 
Fyodor N. Yurchikhin. 
Soyuz TMA-
1  
2002 
Oct. 30 
2003 
May 4 5S 
Soyuz rescue vehicle 
replacement; ISS-6 return 
Sergei Zalyotin, Yuri Lonchakov, Frank De 
Winne (Belgium/ESA: up). (This crew 
returned onboard Soyuz TM-34) Ken 
Bowersox, Don Petit, Nikolai Budarin 
(ISS-6: down) 
Endeavour 
STS-113 
2002 
Nov. 
23 
2002 
Dec. 7 11A 
P1 truss, Expedition 6 and 5 
exchange 
Jim Wetherbee, Paul Lockhart, Michael 
Lopez-Alegria, John Herrington, Ken 
Bowersox, Don Petit, Nikolai 
Budarin.(ISS-6: up); Valery Korzun, 
Peggy Whitson, Sergei Treshev (ISS-5: 
down)  
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Columbia accident grounds the Shuttle fleet, forces the reduction of the ISS crew to two  
Progress M-
47 
2003 
Feb. 2 
2003 
Aug. 28 10P Cargo supply - 
Soyuz TMA-2  2003 April 26 
2003 
Oct. 28  6S 
Soyuz rescue vehicle 
replacement; ISS-7 crew 
delivery 
Yuri Malenchenko, Ed Lu (ISS-7) 
Progress M1-
10 No. 259 
2003 
June 8 
2003 
Oct. 3 11P Cargo supply - 
Progress M-
48 
2003 
Aug. 29 
2004 
Jan. 28 12P Cargo supply - 
Soyuz TMA-3  2003 Oct. 18 
2004 
April 30 7S 
Soyuz rescue vehicle 
replacement; ISS-8 crew 
delivery 
Alexander Kaleri, Michael Foale (ISS-8), 
Pedro Duque (ESA/Spain) (Duque returned 
onboard Soyuz TMA-2) 
2004 
Progress M1-
11 No. 260 
2004 
Jan. 29 
2004 
June 3 13P Cargo supply - 
Soyuz TMA-4  2004 April 19 
2004 
Oct. 24 8S 
Soyuz rescue vehicle 
replacement; ISS-9 crew 
delivery 
Gennady Padalka, Michael Fincke (ISS-9), 
André Kuipers (ESA) (Kuipers returned 
onboard Soyuz TMA-3) 
Progress M-
49 No. 249 
2004 
May 25 
2004 
July 30 14P Cargo supply - 
Progress M-
50 No. 350 
2004 
Aug. 11 
2004 
Dec. 23 15P Cargo supply - 
Soyuz TMA-5  2004 Oct. 14 
2005 
April 24 9S 
Soyuz rescue vehicle 
replacement; ISS-10 crew 
delivery 
Leroy Chiao, Salizhan Sharipov (ISS-10), 
Yuri Shargin (Shargin returned onboard Soyuz 
TMA-4) 
Progress M-
51 No. 351 
2004 
Dec. 24 
2005 
March 9 16P Cargo supply - 
2005 
Progress M-
52 No. 352 
2005 
Feb. 28 
2005 
June 16 17P Cargo supply - 
Soyuz TMA-6  2005 April 15 
2005 
Oct. 11  10S 
Soyuz rescue vehicle 
replacement; ISS-11 crew 
delivery 
Sergei Krikalev, John Phillips (ISS-11), 
Roberto Vittori (Italy) (Vittori returned 
onboard Soyuz TMA-5) (Gregory Olsen: down 
only)  
Progress M-
53 No. 353 
2005 
June 17 
2005 
Sept. 7 18P Cargo supply - 
Discovery 
STS-114  
2005 
July 26 
2005 
Aug. 9 LF1 
Raffaello Multi-Purpose 
Logistics Module delivery 
and return, cargo supply 
Eileen Collins, James Kelly, Charles Camarda, 
Wendy Lawrence, Soichi Noguchi (Japan), 
Steve Robinson, Andy Thomas 
Progress M-
54 No. 354 
2005 
Sept. 8 
2006 
March 3  19P Cargo supply - 
Soyuz TMA-7  2005 Oct. 1 
2006 
April 9  11S 
Soyuz rescue vehicle 
replacement; ISS-12 crew 
delivery 
William McArthur, Valery Tokarev, Gregory 
Olsen (up only) (Gregory Olsen returned 
onboard Soyuz TMA-6) Marcos Pontes (Brazil) 
down only  
Progress M-
55 No. 355 
2005 
Dec. 24  
2006 
June 19  20P Cargo supply - 
2006 
Soyuz TMA-8  
2006 
March 
30  
2006 
Sept. 
29  
12S 
Soyuz rescue vehicle 
replacement; ISS-13 crew 
delivery 
Pavel Vinogradov, Jeffrey Williams, 
Marcos Pontes (Brazil) (up only) (Pontes 
returned onboard Soyuz TMA-7); Anousheh 
Ansari (down only) 
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Progress M-
56 No. 356 
2006 
April 
24  
2006 
Sept. 
19  
21P Cargo supply - 
Progress M-
57 No. 357 
2006 
June 
24  
2007 
Jan. 17  22P Cargo supply - 
Discovery 
STS-121 
2006 
July 4  
2006 
July 17  ULF1.1 
Multi-Purpose Logistics 
Module (MPLM); 
Integrated Cargo Carrier 
(ICC); 
Lightweight Multi-Purpose 
Experiment Support 
Structure Carrier (LMC); 
ESA astronaut delivery  
Steven Lindsey, Mark Kelly, Lisa Nowak, 
Michael Fossum, Stephanie Wilson, Piers 
Sellers, Thomas Reiter (up only)(ESA). 
Atlantis 
STS-115 
2006 
Sept. 
9  
2006 
Sept. 
21  
12A 
Second port truss 
segment (ITS P3/P4) 
Second set of solar arrays 
and batteries 
Brent W. Jett Jr., Christopher J. Ferguson, 
Heidemarie M. Stefanyshyn-Piper, Joseph R. 
Tanner, Daniel C. Burbank and Steven G. 
MacLean, CSA. 
Soyuz TMA-
9  
2006 
Sept. 
18  
2007 
April 
21  
13S 
Soyuz rescue vehicle 
replacement; ISS-14 crew 
delivery 
Michael E. Lopez-Alegria, Mikhail Tyurin, 
Anousheh Ansari (up only) (returned onboard 
Soyuz TMA-8) Charles Simonyi (down only)  
Progress M-
58 No. 358 
2006 
Oct. 
23  
2007 
March 
28  
23P Cargo supply - 
Discovery 
STS-116 
2006 
Dec. 9  
2006 
Dec. 
22  
12A.1 
Third port truss segment 
(ITS P5) delivery;  
SPACEHAB single cargo 
module and Integrated 
Cargo Carrier (ICC) 
remain in the cargo bay  
Mark Polansky, William Oefelein, Robert 
Curbeam, Joan Higginbotham, Nicholas 
Patrick, Christer Fuglesang (ESA); Sunita 
Williams (up only; returns onboard STS-117); 
Thomas Reiter (ESA) (down only);  
2007 
Progress M-
59 No. 359 
2007 
Jan. 
18  
2007 
Aug. 1 24P Cargo supply - 
Soyuz TMA-
10  
2007 
April 7  
2007 
Oct. 21 14S Expedition 15 delivery  
Fyodor Yurchikhin, Oleg Kotov, Charles 
Simonyi (up only; returned onboard Soyuz 
TMA-9); Muszaphar Shukor (Malaysia); (down 
only, launched onboard Soyuz TMA-11) 
Progress M-
60 No. 360 
2007 
May 
12  
2007 
Sept. 
25 
25P Cargo supply - 
Atlantis 
STS-117  
2007 
June 8  
2007 
June 
22  
13A 
Second starboard truss 
segment (ITS S3/S4) with 
Photovoltaic Radiator 
(PVR) 
Third set of solar arrays 
and batteries 
Frederick W. Sturckow, Lee Joseph 
Archambault, James F. Reilly II, Steven R. 
Swanson, Patrick G. Forrester, John D. Olivas, 
Clayton C. Anderson (up only), Sunita L. 
Williams (down only)  
Progress M-
61 No. 361 
2007 
Aug. 2 
2008 
Jan. 22 26P Cargo supply - 
Endeavour 
STS-118  
2007 
Aug. 8  
2007 
Aug. 
21 
13A.1 
SPACEHAB Single Cargo 
Module 
Third starboard truss 
segment (ITS S5) 
External Stowage Platform 
3 (ESP3) 
Scott Kelly, Charlie Hobaugh, Tracy Caldwell, 
Rick Mastracchio, Dave Williams, Barbara 
Morgan, Al Drew 
Soyuz TMA-
11  
2007 
Oct. 
10 
2008 
April 
19 
15S Expedition 16 delivery  
Peggy A. Whitson, Yuri Malenchenko, 
Sheikh Muszaphar Shukor (Malaysia) (up only; 
returns onboard Soyuz TMA-10); So-yeon Yi, 
(South Korea) (down only; launched onboard 
Soyuz TMA-12) 
  
 
  
104 
 
Node 2 (Harmony)
Sidewall - Power 
and Data Grapple 
Fixture (PDGF)
Progress 
M-62 No. 
362
2007 Dec. 
23 
2008 Feb. 
15 27P Cargo supply -
Progress 
M-63
2008 Feb. 
5
2008 April 
7 28P Cargo supply -
Columbus 
European 
Laboratory Module
Multi-Purpose 
Experiment 
Support Structure - 
Non-Deployable 
(MPESS-ND)
ATV-1
2008 March 
9
2008 
Sept. 29 ATV1 Cargo supply -
Kibo Japanese 
Experiment 
Logistics Module - 
Pressurized 
Section (ELM-PS)
Spacelab Pallet - 
Deployable 1 (SLP-
D1) with Canadian 
Special Purpose 
Dexterous 
Manipulator, 
Dextre
Soyuz 
TMA-12 
2008 April 
8
2008 Oct. 
24 16S
Expedition 17 
delivery 
Sergei Volkov, Oleg Kononenko, So-
yeon Yi, (South Korea) (up only; 
returns onboard Soyuz TMA-11); 
Richard Garriott (down only; arrived 
onboard Soyuz TMA-13)
1J/A
Dominic Gorie, Gregory H. Johnson, 
Robert L. Behnken, Mike Foreman, 
Rick Linnehan, Garrett Reisman, 
(up only; returns with STS-124) 
Takao Doi (JAXA); Leopold 
Eyharts (ESA) (down only; arrived 
with STS-122)
10A
Pamela A. Melroy, George D. 
Zamka; Douglas H. Wheelock, Scott 
E. Parazynski, Stephanie D. Wilson, 
Paolo Nespoli (ESA); Daniel M. 
Tani; (up only) Clayton C. 
Anderson (down only)
2008
Atlantis 
STS-122 
2008 Feb. 
7
2008 Feb. 
20 1E
Stephen Frick, Alan Poindexter, 
Leland Melvin, Rex Walheim, 
Stanley Love, Leopold Eyharts 
(ESA) (up only), Hans Schlegel 
(ESA)
Discovery 
STS-120 
2007 Oct. 
23
2007 Nov. 
7
Endeavou
r STS-123 
2008 March 
11
2008 
March 26
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Progress 
M-64
2008 May 
15
2008 
Sept. 9 29P Cargo supply -
Kibo Japanese 
Experiment 
Module 
Pressurized 
Module (JEM-PM)
Japanese Remote 
Manipulator 
System (JEM RMS)
Progress 
M-65
2008 Sept. 
10
2008 Dec. 
7 30P Cargo supply -
Soyuz 
TMA-13 
2008 Oct. 
12
In 
progress 17S
Expedition 18 
delivery 
E. Michael Fincke, Yury Lonchakov, 
Richard Garriott, (USA) (up only; 
returns onboard Soyuz TMA-12)
Endeavou
r STS-126
2008 Nov. 
14
2008 Nov. 
30 ULF2
Leonardo Multi-
Purpose Logistics 
Module (MPLM)
Christopher J. Ferguson, Eric A. 
Boe, Stephen G. Bowen, Donald R. 
Pettit, Robert S. (Shane) Kimbrough 
and Heidemarie M. Stefanyshyn-
Piper; Sandra H. Magnus, (up 
only, returns with STS-119), Greg 
Chamitoff (down only; arrived with 
STS-124)
Progress 
M-01M
2008 Nov. 
26
2009 Feb. 
8 31P Cargo supply -
Progress 
M-66
2009 Feb. 
10
In 
progress 32P Cargo supply -
2009
Discovery 
STS-124 
2008 May 
31
2008 June 
14 1J
Mark Kelly, Ken Ham, Karen 
Nyberg, Ron Garan, Mike Fossum, 
Akihiko Hoshide, Greg Chamitoff 
(up only); Garrett Reisman (down 
only; arrived with STS-123)
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